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The first three chapters address the international strategy of firms, and the 
implications for firm participation and behavior in both domestic and international 
markets. The first chapter addresses the question of whether firms facing poor domestic 
market performance react by adjusting their position in foreign markets. This response 
can occur both by having non-exporting firms entering export markets, or by having 
existing exporters expand exports. We test this hypothesis in a period of large variation in 
exports to find that small firms enter export markets in response to poor domestic market 
performance, but that firms cannot easily make up for lost domestic sales with increases 
in exports. 
The second chapter addresses the question of whether the establishment of 
subsidiaries abroad by domestic firms is accompanied with a decrease in firm export 
intensity in the domestic market. This would be expected if established subsidiaries 
abroad were constituted by firms to relocate exported home production to local 
production in the host country, in order to better supply the host country. We find little 
evidence in support of this hypothesis and discuss how subsidiary establishment might be 
done to build distribution networks that would benefit home exports. 
The third chapter compares survival prospects of domestic and foreign firms over 
their life cycle. It is found that comparable foreign firms exit more than domestic firms, 
both due to decreasing exit rates by domestic firms and to increasing exit rates by foreign 
firms. It is argued that foreign firms, while possibly subject to a liability of foreignness 
which should decrease over time, are also intrinsically footloose and that this 
characteristic ultimately leads to increasing exit rates for foreign firms as they age. 
The fourth chapter looks at firm differences in another dimension of ownership, 
that of public versus private ownership of firms. It analyses the impact of a privatization 
process on several labor outcomes, using the banking sector. It is found that there are no 
distinguishable differences on wages per hour between private and public banks. 
However, employment in a private bank implies a lower median employment duration, 
which suggests that public banks may create differentials relatively to private banks on 
job security rather than on wages. 
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Domestic Market and Export Decisions 
 
1. Introduction  
The expectation that exports can promote economic growth has led countries to 
adopt “export-led growth” strategies, regardless of their initial country development level 
(Marin, 1992). Export promotion policies are also pursued at the micro level, including 
support for export promotion agencies or government subsidies in support of export 
activity (Bernard & Jensen, 2004). Interest in the behavior of the export supply function 
has increased, as some countries view alternative currency and fiscal policy instruments 
as unavailable or undesirable tools to promote short-run economic growth (Eichengreen, 
2007). 
While disturbances in the export behavior of firms are strongly influenced by 
movements in exchange rates, microeconomic studies on the exporting behavior of firms 
have identified productivity as the main firm level determinant of the export decisions of 
firms (Bernard et al., 1995). Thus, movements in the export supply function of countries 
that share a common currency with their main trading partners could be expected to 
accompany movements in the overall productivity of firms in those countries. For 
instance, an expansion of the export supply is expected for countries without a national 
currency as a result of high unemployment, as high unemployment puts a downward 
pressure in labor costs that feeds back to firms as higher productivity per unit labor cost 
(Wolf, 2011). 
We focus on the hypothesis that negative shocks in the domestic demand can lead 
some firms to initiate or expand an already existing position in international markets, as a 
result of the shock. As a negative shock in the domestic demand does not directly impact 
the individual productivity of firms, we discuss how international market entry or 
expansion could still be expected, and is consistent with standard models of international 
trade with heterogeneous firms. We look for empirical evidence of this effect in a sample 
of manufacturing firms of several countries during a period of large exports growth. We 
find evidence that poor performance in the domestic market is associated with entry of 
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small firms in export markets. However, we do not find evidence that the exports of 
existing exporters or even the exports of entrant exporters, either at the year of entry or at 
subsequent years, are substantially increased as a result of poor domestic market 
performance. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
The productivity of firms is the main determinant of their participation in 
international markets, and the relationship between firm performance and participation in 
international markets has been widely researched, both at the empirical level (Wagner, 
2007; Wagner, 2012) and at the theoretical level (Melitz, 2003). Some of main findings 
of this research are that firms that participate in international markets have higher 
productivity than firms that do not, and that gains in the productivity of exporting firms, 
for instance, are achieved several years before the occurrence of firm entry in 
international markets. This finding is taken as evidence of self-selection of the more 
productive firms into international markets. The higher productivity of firms participating 
in international markets is seen as necessary for firms that participate in international 
markets, as placing goods in international markets requires that firms bear substantial 
additional costs relative to domestic operations (Melitz, 2003). 
While most of the research focuses on firm entry in international markets, there is 
also evidence that firm productivity determines firm exit from international markets. 
Looking at productivity trajectories of plants that have ceased exporting, Clerides et al. 
(1998) found that these plants had remarkably poor performance when compared to either 
plants that participated continuously in export markets, to plants that did not participate in 
export markets or to plants that were just starting participation in export markets. It was 
also found that the performance of plants that ceased exporting decreased steadily in the 
years prior to their exit from foreign markets. Thus, productivity is an important 
determinant for both firm entry and exit from international markets, and poor 
productivity may force firms to exit international markets. 
It is frequently proposed in the business press that firms might decide to enter 
foreign markets in response to negative shocks in the domestic demand. However, 
benchmark models of international trade with heterogeneous firms rely on the interaction 
between costs of international trade and individual firm productivity to explain 
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international market participation (Grossman et al., 2006). Thus, a negative shock in the 
domestic demand does not directly imply firm participation in international markets, as it 
has no direct influence in either individual firm productivity or costs of international 
trade. In fact, if a firm did not have a sufficiently high productivity to profitably incur in 
the costs associated with participation in international markets prior to a negative 
domestic shock, it could face even worse prospects while trying to do so afterwards, as it 
might have to handle a worse position in the domestic market. 
While there are no direct effects of domestic market contractions in the 
productivity of firms, there may be some indirect effects. A demand contraction could 
contribute to decreases in wages or factor prices in general, which would indirectly 
increase firm productivity. For instance, a large negative shock in domestic demand, if 
accompanied with high unemployment, might result in higher productivity for firms due 
to the downward pressure put on wages, which may feed back into firms as higher 
productivity per labor unit (Wolf, 2011). Even without high unemployment, there may 
still be wage concessions at the firm level, as negative product market shocks have been 
shown to reduce wage growth (Hamermesh, 1988). However, this process is necessarily 
not immediate in time, and not sufficient to explain recent cases of surges in the export 
supply, as the export supply expands before significant drops in unit labor costs or other 
factor prices take place. 
Firms might engage in international markets in response to an adverse shock in 
the domestic demand due to the short-run cost structure in place at the time of the shock 
or due to non-profit firm goals such as reduction of sales volatility or firm survival, even 
if there are no immediate effects in productivity. Firms might also exert efforts to 
increase their productivity ahead of an internationalization goal. 
Internationalization may be a profitable short-term strategy in response to a 
negative demand shock due to the short-run cost structure of firms. If firms face a 
sufficiently large demand decrease, it may be profitable for firms to choose to sell their 
products in international markets as long as international prices are sufficiently high to 
cover both variable costs of production and the added costs of internationalization. This 
would require that firms face small costs associated with ad hoc exporting. Thus, it is 
expected that in industries where costs are predominantly fixed as opposed to variable, 
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the likelihood of internationalization due to a negative shock in domestic demand is 
higher. 
Currency devaluations provide evidence that firms have the ability to shift 
production from domestic to international markets. Thus, firms should also have the 
ability to shift production in the event of a negative domestic market shock (Roberts & 
Tybout, 1997). If the increased expected profit of operating in international markets 
resulting from a currency devaluation is sufficient to make firms shift production from 
domestic to international markets, the incentive to do so should also exist in the case of a 
negative domestic demand shock. Given their installed capacity, firms might face a low 
opportunity cost of entering markets if they are not able to place their production 
domestically, unlike the case of a currency devaluation where the value of domestic sales 
is just smaller. 
However, effective substitution of domestic sales with sales abroad could be 
moderated by firm access to distribution networks. The internationalization of firms has 
been often, although not universally, described as a slow and gradual process along 
which firms build a network of ties with distinct agents in foreign markets (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977; Oviatt & McDougall, 2005). The gradual nature of the process suggests 
the existence of hurdles that constrain the ability of firms to substitute domestic market 
sales with sales abroad in the short run. Thus, we expect existing exporters and in 
particular exporters that are more advanced in the internationalization process, to be more 
able to redirect production from domestic to foreign markets than non-exporters or firms 
with smaller international market experience. We also expect that foreign firms, due to 
their membership in a multinational network of affiliates, are also more able to redirect 
production from domestic to foreign markets. 
Regardless of initial export entry or expansion motives, the effects in the export 
supply may be longer lasting. Internationalization motives may only exist in the short-run 
and have sporadic exports as a single goal, and thus export entry could be conceived as 
not having long-term consequences. Firms can also be forced out of export markets due 
to low productivity (Clerides et al., 1998). However, initial export motivation does not 
necessarily hamper the significance of entry in export markets, as history matters for 
export behavior. As has been shown in the case of currency devaluations, even temporary 
currency shocks can lead to permanent changes in the export supply, thus generating 
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export hysteresis (Baldwin & Krugman, 1989; Dixit, 1989). In fact, exposure to past 
exporting episodes increases the likelihood of future exporting behavior (Roberts & 
Tybout, 1997). It has been found that temporary devaluations in currency rates have had 
persistent effects in trade flows (Baldwin, 1988). The persistence effect can be generated 
with simple models, in which it results from the sunk costs firms have to incur when 
entering in international markets (Baldwin, 1986). Firms necessarily incur in some sunk 
costs when they enter in international markets, and as long as these costs are not 
completely depreciated, they decrease the barriers to further reentry in international 
markets, and make exit less likely. An alternative source of persistence could be the 
existence of acquired tastes in international markets, which would increase demand for 
the products of new exporting firms right after an initial exposure of these products to 
international markets (Baldwin, 1988). 
There are internationalization benefits in other dimensions of firm performance 
other than increased profitability. As long as export sales are not perfectly correlated with 
domestic sales, the volatility of total sales of the firm will be smaller than the combined 
volatility of domestic and foreign sales, even if foreign markets can be conceived as 
being more competitive and inherently riskier. Due to a portfolio effect, firms could 
decrease the total risk they face by engaging in a riskier project. Accordingly, engaging in 
exports would provide the non-profit benefit of total sales stabilization for firms, as has 
been documented empirically (Hirsch & Lev, 1971). Thus, firms facing domestic market 
instability or uncertainty may seek foreign markets as a risk hedging strategy. 
There is also evidence of links between firm survival and international trade. 
Exporters are found to survive longer than non-exporters, even after accounting for the 
characteristics of exporters that grant them higher survival (Wagner, 2012). The effect of 
sales stabilization mentioned earlier could contribute to higher survival of firms that 
engage in international markets, although it may not be the sole contributor. If holding 
international distribution networks grants firms the option value of shifting production 
from the domestic to foreign markets, when faced with negative economic conditions at 
home, firms could be expected to internationalize in order to establish and sustain these 
international distribution networks in less profitable foreign markets. Therefore, a 
negative domestic shock, or evidence of uncertainty in the performance of the domestic 
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market, might lead firms to internationalize if they perceive that investing in less 
profitable foreign markets would lead to an increase in firm survival. 
While the productivity of firms is an important determinant on the ability of firms 
to internationalize, forward looking behavior of firm managers might make the link 
between productivity and international market participation partially endogenous. If firm 
managers have the ability to make decisions that enhance the productivity of firms as 
they ramp-up to become exporters, when facing a negative shock in the domestic 
demand, then productivity may not be completely exogenous and stochastically 
determined, but endogenous and the result of forward looking decisions taken by the firm 
(Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2002). According to this view, firms consciously self-select 
by introducing new technologies or increasing R&D expenditures in order to be able to 
export high-quality goods and increase their productivity in the process (López, 2005). In 
fact, Alvarez (2004) provides evidence of persistent exporters resorting to a more 
intensive use of publicly available programs partially designed to promote exporting 
activity, than sporadic exporters. So, persistent export market participation can be 
partially traced to higher voluntary firm participation in export promoting activities. 
Thus, firms facing negative prospects in the domestic demand would have an added 
incentive to import, develop, or somehow acquire technology that allows the firm to be 
more productive, with the intention of future international market participation. 
Summing up, we expect negative growth in the domestic market to lead to firm 
entry in export markets. We expect this effect to be larger when negative domestic shocks 
hinder firm survival or create sales volatility, as may be the case in large domestic shocks 
or prolonged negative growth. We expect negative growth to permanently enhance the 
stock of exporters and that firms place production abroad when domestic market 
performance is poor, particularly firms with more access to international distribution 
networks. 
3. Data and Methods 
To conduct our empirical analysis, we use data from the Amadeus dataset, 
provided by Bureau van Dijk. The dataset contains a large number of firms from several 
European countries and provides comprehensive standardized information from balance 
sheet and profit and loss account items of firms, as well as firm ownership information. 
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We could not use data for all countries in the Amadeus dataset, as some countries 
had no export data, no data for key firm variables such as sales or number of employees, 
or very irregular exports coverage with respect to officially recorded exports. We have 
managed to extract data for three European Union countries: France, Hungary and 
Portugal. Data comprises firms operating from 2007 until 2012, in the manufacturing 
sector, thus classified by having primary activity labeled within NACE Rev. 2 codes 10 
to 33. 
Bureau van Dijk compiles a collection of firm ownership links on an international 
basis and tries to identify a global ultimate owner for each firm, by following firm 
ownership upstream links that are above 51%. We classify firms as foreign if a global 
ultimate owner has been identified and is located in a different country than the country 
of operation of the firm. Information on the number of firm subsidiaries is also obtained, 
although no minimum ownership percentage between owner firm and subsidiary firm is 
required to validate the ownership link. 
Both ownership and industry data are limited to the status at the date of data 
collection, although we do not expect it to be a significant source of error given the short 
span of years covered in the panel and the infrequent nature of changes in primary 
industry or the dimensions of ownership information we have used. 
All nominal variables have been deflated with national GDP deflators obtained 
from Eurostat and are at constant prices of 2012. Information on industry growth by 
country was also obtained from Eurostat. We have also performed the following data 
cleaning procedures in our sample. We drop observations with negative values for any on 
the variables sales, assets, added value or exports. We kept only firms that are active in 
all of the years of the panel, and thus have positive values for sales and number of 
employees. The choice of a balanced panel was made in order to ensure that changes in 
overall exports are not due to a lack of coverage of large exporters in some years of the 
panel. Thus we cannot observe exports from firms that have started operations after 2007, 
or exports from firms that have stopped operating during the time span of the panel. 
Finally, we also drop firms for which the information provided consisted of consolidated 




Our final sample includes a total of 28,366 firms from Portugal, Hungary and 
France. All countries belong to the EU27, and only Hungary does not belong to the 
Eurozone. As shown in Table 6a and Table 6b, most firms are from Portugal (19,410 
firms), followed by France (6,133 firms) and Hungary (2,823); and most firms are 
domestic, with 771 firms being foreign and 360 of domestic firms having registered 
subsidiaries in other countries. Thus, data coverage of firm population differs 
significantly across countries. Coverage is very good for Portugal, as data is compiled 
from administrative sources and almost all firms are legally mandated to file balance 
sheet data and most firms comply with this legal obligation. According to figures 
provided by Bureau van Dijk, only about 40% of Hungarian firms are legally mandated 
to file accounts, in accordance to their legal form, although companies do not generally 
comply with this obligation. For France, most limited liability companies are legally 
mandated to file accounts, although only about 65% of firms comply with this 
requirement. Firms seem to comply with the requirement intermittently, since the 
requirement of a balanced panel is particularly severe for French firms, and 82% of 
French observations in the several years of the panel firms are lost with this requirement. 
We were not able to obtain data for all variables in all years of the panel, and for 
all countries equally, as data is obtained from different primary providers, and firms 
delivered data to original sources to conform to different national legal obligations. The 
most notable gap is that we do not have export data for Portugal in 2007. 
Our sample panel represents a stable share of total product exports across the 
years of the panel for any country in the sample, as can be observed in Table 6c. The 
average share of product exports covered with the sample is very high for Hungary and 
Portugal, while France has a much more narrow coverage in comparison to the other 
countries, at only around 4% of total product exports. However, this share is the most 
stable across the years of the panel, and it is comprised of a very large number of firms, at 
around 6,000 firms. For both Hungary and Portugal, the share of product exports covered 
with the sample is usually above 50%. The share of product exports covered would be 
somewhat stable across the years of the panel for these two countries, except for the 
decrease in coverage in 2009 for Portugal, which does not occur again in 2010, thus 
suggesting that Portuguese firms in the sample have contracted more drastically than 
Portuguese firms in the population. However, sample coverage of total exports does not 
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worsen after 2009 relative to the years before the shock in 2009. Thus, firms outside the 
panel do not contribute proportionately more than firms in the panel for any growth in 
exports after the demand shock of 2009. 
The large coverage of exports achieved with the sample, and the relatively low 
number of Hungarian firms, suggests that our panel of Hungarian firms is mostly 
comprised of large firms, or at least that we able capture most of the large exporters in 
our sample. The large size of Hungarian firms relative to Portuguese or French firms is 
confirmed in Table 7a and Table 7b. The average Hungarian firm employs more workers, 
has larger sales and total assets than the average firm in the other countries. Hungarian 
firms are also more likely to be exporters, export more of their output and operate in 
industries with higher final output exported. The average French firm is also larger than 
the average Portuguese firm, regardless of the size measure being number of employees, 
sales or total assets. The proportion of French firms that are exporters is slightly smaller 
than the proportion of Portuguese firms, and French firms operate in industries that 
export less, but the average French firm still exports more than the average Portuguese 
firm. 
Thus, the sample seems to capture larger Hungarian firms, smaller French firms, 
and even smaller Portuguese firms. Most of the differences between these groups of firms 
are accounted by the difference in average firm size, as larger firms tend to employ more 
inputs, export more, have less debt, higher profits, and a higher likelihood of being 
foreign. For any of the countries in the sample, the distribution of firms by industry is not 
too uneven, with firms in almost all two-digit industries. The distributions of firms by 
industry are similar across countries, with all countries sharing the same two two-digit 
industries with the highest number of firms: manufacturing of metal products and 
manufacturing of food products (Table 7c). 
The export supply function response at the intensive and the extensive margins 
are both important to examine. The decision of firms to enter foreign markets is an 
important export supply response to examine because firms are required to undergo 
important investments ahead of market entry, and thus corresponds to a deliberate and 
arduous effort by firms. As firms may not be able to export considerable volumes in an 
initial stage due to lack of international distribution network, the intensive margin 
remains the most immediately observable export supply function response. We are going 
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to describe how the stock of exporters changed for each of the countries in our panel and 
use logit regressions to test the hypothesis of firm entry due to poor performance of the 
domestic market. 
Although the intensive margin is the most directly observable export supply 
function response, the main short run reason why firms may want to use foreign markets 
in response to poor performance in domestic markets is to substitute lost domestic sales 
due to unmet domestic demand with sales abroad. If firms are able to perform this 
substitution we must observe increased exports after we observe poor domestic market 
performance. We are going to detail how exports have responded after the large demand 
shock of 2009 in our sample panel and we are going to regress firm exports on a measure 
of domestic market performance, using fixed effects regressions, to evaluate firm export 
response at the extensive margin. 
4. Results 
Table 1 displays real GDP growth for all countries and years in the panel. Real 
GDP growth in any of the countries shares the common large drop in 2009 and 
subsequent recovery in 2010, in line with the wider EU27 growth. All countries have 
growth close to zero in 2008, a substantial decline in growth in 2009, and a slight 
recovery in 2010. While the recovery proceeds in 2011 for Hungary and France, Portugal 
enters a recession. In 2012, all countries worsen their growth position, with Portugal 
further deepening its recession, Hungary entering a recession, and France facing 
stagnation. 
 
Table 1. Real GDP Growth (%) 
 Year 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
EU27 3.2 0.4 -4.5 2.0 1.7 -0.4 
Portugal 2.4 0.0 -2.9 1.9 -1.3 -3.2 
Hungary 0.1 0.9 -6.8 1.1 1.6 -1.7 





In order to measure domestic and European demand faced by individual firms, we 
have used added value real growth in the industry in which the firm is located, both at the 
domestic and EU27 level. These figures are provided by Eurostat, discriminated at the 
two-digit NACE industry (although some industries are lumped together). Table 8a and 
Table 8b provide average firm growth, median firm growth, and average firm growth, 
weighted by firm size (measured by number of employees), of the domestic and EU27 
industry growth figures provided by Eurostat, for each country and year in the sample. 
There are some differences in how the manufacturing sector performs relative to the 
overall economy. The manufacturing sector experiences a much larger drop in activity 
than the overall economy in 2009; and the recovery in 2010 and 2011 is also larger than 
the overall economy, with the manufacturing sector still having positive growth in 2011 
for Portugal, in spite of the contraction in the overall economy (Table 1). The EU27 
growth figures are different but similar across countries in each year of the panel (Table 
8b), as the distribution of firms by industry is also close across countries (Table 7c). In 
general, as occurs at the domestic level for each country, the manufacturing sector of the 
EU27 seems to be much more volatile than the overall economy (Table 1). There is a 
large decrease in activity in 2009 and a recovery in the years 2010 and 2011, as also 
occurs at the domestic level for each country.  
In Table 9a we present aggregate exports in constant prices, obtained from 
Eurostat, and the respective yearly percentage change is presented in Table 9b. While in 
2008 we observe small or negative exports growth in any country, in 2009 we observe a 
common large drop in exports. This drop in 2009 is in line with the international trade 
collapse of 2008-2009. This huge demand shock has two main causes. First, a sudden 
drop in commodity prices and the consequent reduction in demand of countries reliant on 
these goods; and second, on the decision by consumers, firms and investors alike to 
postpone all investment and purchasing decisions when faced with an extremely high 
level of uncertainty during the period (Baldwin, 2009). In agreement with the 
postponement of expenditures in 2008-2009, there is a large recovery in exports in 2010. 
The recovery continues in 2011 and in 2012, except for Hungary, which does not grow in 
2012. The exports growth of Portugal is stronger than in the remaining countries. In 2010 
exports from Portugal grow only slightly less than Hungary, although Hungary had a 
larger drop in 2009; and in 2011 and 2012 Portugal is always the country with the fastest 
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growing exports. By 2011, only Portugal has managed to export more in real terms than 
in 2008. However, the much worse domestic market performance in Portugal in 2011 and 
2012 relative to the other countries is accompanied by a relatively small advantage in 
exports growth in these two years relative to the other countries. 
Table 10a and Table 10b are the sample counterparts of tables Table 9a and Table 
9b. Differences between sample manufacturing exports and official exports records are 
expected as we have obtained a balanced panel of firms for the period, and the coverage 
across countries is irregular, with the sample from Portugal having a much larger number 
of small firms relative to any of the other two countries. Nevertheless, we still observe 
the same overall pattern for exports in the panel. For any country in our sample, we again 
observe the huge drop in exports in 2009 and the recovery in 2010 and 2011. Again, 
Portugal seems to recover much more quickly than the two other countries in the three 
subsequent years to the 2009 shock. 
Table 10c details the number of exporters in every year of the panel, and Table 
10d the respective yearly percentage growth in the number of exporters. Similarly to the 
behavior in aggregate exports, Portugal is the only country with large net gains in the 
number of exporters, with net gains of around 6% in both 2010 and 2011. Both France 
and Hungary register low yearly increases or decreases in the stock of exporting firms. 
Table 11a to Table 11c compare mean real exports growth and growth in the 
number of exporters in each country with changes in real factor costs and real changes in 
domestic market sales. As can be observed for France and Portugal, there is no decrease 
in median labor cost per worker justifying the growth in exports or in the number of 
exporters, as the decrease in median labor costs seems to lag behind the increase in 
exports. There is a generalized decrease in material costs per million of sales across all 
countries, but only in 2009, and is always positive in subsequent years, where exports 
growth continues to occur. The drop in average domestic market sales seems to be more 
severe and more persistent than any changes in factor costs. 
 Table 12a presents a breakdown of net firm entry in export markets into gross 
firm entry and gross firm exit in exports markets for each year and country. In every year 
of the panel there are high levels of gross entry and exit of firms from export markets, in 
spite of the low levels of net entry. For France, more than 200 firms both enter and exit 
export markets in every year, around 4% of total French firms in the panel. For Portugal, 
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more than 1,000 firms both enter and exit export markets in every year, around 6% of 
total Portuguese firms in the panel. Only Hungary faces permanently low levels of both 
entry and exit from export markets, even when relative sample sizes are accounted for. 
Countries with lower average firm size have higher gross entry and exit rates from export 
markets, suggesting that small firms are responsible for most export supply function 
adjustments at the extensive margin. Only Portugal, the country with the lowest average 
firm size, registers substantial net entry rates after the demand shock of 2009. In 2010 
and 2012 Portugal adds up more than 400 firms, or 2% of total firms in sample, to the 
stock of exporters. The increased net entry in export markets by Portuguese firms seems 
to be a response to the severe 2009 demand shock and not a response to the recession 
years of 2011 and 2012. 
 However, entrant exporters usually export a very small amount of overall exports 
in the entry year, in spite of the high gross entry rates for most years and countries. For 
Portugal, that has highest gross entry rates in any year, entrant exports are only a 
substantial part of overall exports in the year 2010, where we might observe rebound 
exports from delayed purchases in the year 2009. In all other years, entrant exports never 
surpass 3% of overall Portuguese exports. For our sample of French firms, the weight of 
entrant exports in overall exports is more erratic. Entrant exports are a substantial part of 
overall French exports in the years 2008 and 2009, but not in subsequent years, and thus 
entrant exports cannot account for the overall exports growth in response to the demand 
shock of 2009. Finally, for Hungary, the country with the largest average firm, entrant 
exports have almost no weight in overall country exports. 
Table 12b to Table 12f detail the number of exporters and corresponding exports 
of each of the 2008 to 2012 cohorts of entrant and incumbent exporters, both at the time 
of entry as well as before and after entry, so that we can track new exporter survival after 
entry, past exporting experience of new exporters, and exports growth in the years after 
entry. 
 Entrant exporters are a substantial part of the number of exporting firms for any 
cohort, with samples with lower average firm size having higher rates of entrant 
exporters. Entrant exporters represent 4 to 6% of exporters in the year of entry in 
Hungary, 11 to 14% of exporters in the year of entry in France, and 17 to 22% of 
exporters in the year of entry in Portugal. Again, we only find evidence of increased entry 
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after the demand shock of 2009 for Portugal, and the single largest year over year 
increase in the rate of entrant exporters is recorded in Portugal in 2010, where entrant 
exporters are 22% of exporters in that year, following a rate of entrant exporters of 17% 
in 2009. 
 We find high survival rates of entrant exporters, with most failure to remain in 
export markets occurring in the year after entry. Of the 312 new French exporters in 
2008, 148 remain in export markets in 2012, of the 74 new Hungarian exporters in 2008, 
53 remain in export markets in 2012, and of the 1,192 new Portuguese exporters in 2009, 
707 still remain in export markets in 2012. Out of any of the 2009 to 2012 cohorts of new 
exporters, many firms are also recurring exporters. For instance, out of the 2010 cohort of 
new exporters, 91 out of 259 new exporting French firms had been exporters in 2008, as 
well as 15 out of 50 Hungarian firms, or 582 out of 1,635 Portuguese firms. Thus, around 
one third of new exporters in 2010 had exported two years earlier. This behavior could be 
expected for new entrants in 2010 if many firms had failed to export in 2009 due to 
delayed purchases from their customers. However, for the cohort of new exporters in 
2011, again around a third of new exporters are former exporters relative to 2009. Thus, 
for any cohort, new exporters are a substantial part of the pool of exporters, particularly 
in samples with small firms. Survival of entrant firms is high, particularly if the firm 
survived the second year in export markets, and export recurrence is also common. 
If we track the exports associated with surviving exporting firms of any cohort of 
entrants, in the years after the entry year, we find that exports from cohorts of French 
firms remain relatively stable, although erratic, and that exports from cohorts of 
Portuguese and Hungarian firms increase steadily in any of the subsequent years, even 
though the group of entrants in any year is made smaller in the following years as some 
firms exit export markets. 
Regardless of this increase, exports from cohorts of new exporters do not seem to 
make up for a large amount of country exports, even several years after entry, with the 
exception of the cohort of entrant exporters in 2010. Moreover, although cohorts of new 
exporters register growing exports in subsequent years, they do not seem to grow much 
faster than the corresponding cohort of incumbent exporters, as the rate of entrant exports 
to total exports is only slightly increasing, and thus we expect exports growth to occur as 
much through incumbent exporters as it does through entrant exporters. We could still 
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have some compounded effect of entrants in a few consecutive years making up for a 
substantial amount of country exports in a given year, but entrant exports do not seem to 
be very cumulative as cohorts of entrant exporters seem to be substantially made up of 
firms that had already exported in the past. 
Table 13a to Table 13c detail exporting behavior of firms that reenter export 
markets after one year of interruption. We can observe that about one fourth to one half 
of export market quitters in any given year and country seem to reenter in two years time. 
For instance, out of 1,237 Portuguese firms that ceased exporting in 2008, 582 have 
resumed exporting in 2010, and only 655 have not resumed exporting in 2010; however, 
185 out of these 655 firms have also resumed exporting in 2011. Firms that reenter export 
markets two years after exit seem to resume exports at levels that are similar to those of 
the year of exit. In particular, the large value of entrant exports of 5,115M€ in Portugal in 
the year 2010 has a large contribution of 4,854M€ by firms that had already exported 
4,749M€ in 2008, but did not export at all in 2009, which is in line with the importance 
of delayed purchases in the year 2009 in explaining export behavior during this period. 
Thus, although entrant firm survival in exports markets is high, much of firm entry and 
associated exports is also reentry in export markets, as many firms participate 
intermittently in export markets, which goes against the possibility of cumulative entrant 
exports over a few years making up for a large contribution in overall country exports. 
Table 14a to Table 14d show with greater detail the behavior of the entrant 
exporters in any of the years of the panel. As shown before, entrant exporters tend to have 
worse survival prospects in the first year after entry and better survival prospects in 
subsequent years, and to grow exports steadily over the subsequent years of the panel. 
Both firm median exports and firm average exports tend to grow very quickly. In nearly 
every cohort of new exporters median domestic market growth is negative in the year of 
entry in export markets, with the sole exception being French entrant exporters in 2011, 
whose domestic market grew by 0.08%. Thus, either through firm reentry or not, export 
market entry is simultaneous with poor domestic market performance, which suggests 
that firms may be shifting sales from domestic to foreign markets at the year of export 
market entry, which in line with our hypothesis. 
Summing up, we find large volumes of gross firm entry and exit in export markets 
during the years of the panel. Firm entry and exit is more intermittent than permanent but 
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we seem to observe permanent increases in the stock of exporters after the demand shock 
of 2009, although only for Portugal which is the country with more small firms. Portugal 
also seems to have better export performance during the period. However, the better 
performance of exports is not due to entrant exports, as these have low importance in 
overall exports, with the exception of the year 2010 where they can justified with large 
amounts of rebound exports from the 2009 demand shock, and seem to take several years 
after initial entry trying to increase exports. Moreover, the low volumes of entrant 
exporters do not behave significantly different from the exports of incumbent exporters 
for any cohort of entrants. Thus, substantial increases in exports due to poor domestic 
market performance must be reflected in incumbent exporter exports. 
Table 2 presents the regression output from performing logit regressions of firm 
exporter status on domestic market performance in five different specifications. All 
specifications include lagged values of the logarithm of total assets in millions of euros 
and the logarithm of the number of employees to control for firm size. We include 
country dummies when more than one country is included in the sample to control for 
individual country effects, as well as sets of year and three-digit industry dummies to 
control for year and industry effects. Domestic market performance is measured with the 
added value real growth of the two-digit industry in which the firm is located, our 
variable of interest. Added value real growth of the two-digit industry in which the firm is 
located at the EU27 level is also included to measure changes in international demand, as 
the EU27 is the main trading bloc of these countries and we expect that increases in 
overall demand of the European market would lead to increases in overall added value at 
the European industry level. Both of these added value real growth variables are also 
lagged and in percentage points. Finally, we have included a dummy for previous period 
exporter status, as out interest is in explaining changes in exporter status and not which 




Table 2. Logit Regressions of Exporter Status 
Dependent Variable: Exporter Status, t    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 







ln(Total Assets), t-1 0.415*** 0.415*** 0.404*** 0.194*** 0.349*** 
 35.966 31.149 16.738 5.590 26.331 
ln(Number Employees), t-1 0.174*** 0.214*** 0.135*** 0.269*** 0.156*** 
 12.741 12.881 4.970 8.437 9.758 
Exporter, t-1 3.364*** 2.954*** 4.240*** 3.635*** 3.993*** 
 171.592 128.177 111.085 81.346 174.205 
France -0.395***  0.236*** -0.527*** -0.479*** 
 -15.426  5.179 -9.381 -15.731 
Hungary -0.710***   0.032 -0.385*** 
 -24.561   0.522 -11.480 
EU27 Industry growth, t-1 0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 
 0.269 0.578 -0.049 -0.468 0.463 
Industry growth, t-1 -0.003*** -0.005** -0.001 -0.003 -0.004*** 
 -3.353 -2.027 -1.186 -1.356 -3.426 
Constant -1.890*** -1.538*** -2.936*** -2.350*** -2.695*** 
 -24.122 -13.633 -22.408 -14.236 -28.420 Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Location Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 122 420 77 640 44 780 27 355 122 420 
Log-Likelihood -38 438.70 -27 210.22 -10 629.15 -7 441.32 -30 015.08 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, t-statistics in parenthesis 
 
Specification (1) is run over the entire sample of firms in the panel. Both 
coefficients of size related variables have the expected positive effect on the log odds of 
exporting. Exporter status in the previous year has the largest t-statistic of any predictor 
in this specification and thus is the best predictor for current exporter status. Growth in 
the wider European industry does not have a significant impact on the log odds of 
exporting in the following year, although the coefficient is positive as would be expected. 
In agreement with the hypothesis that firm entry occurs due to poor domestic market 
performance, the coefficient on added value real growth at the domestic level is negative 
and significant at the 1% level. Thus, a one percentage point decrease in the added value 
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real growth in the domestic two-digit industry would lead to an increase in the log odds 
ratio of becoming an exporter in the following year by 0.003. 
Specifications (2) and (3) have the same functional form as the previous 
specification, but are run over a sample of Portuguese firms and a sample of pooled 
French and Hungarian firms, respectively. In the logit regression that is run over the 
sample of Portuguese firms we still have a significant negative effect of domestic 
industry added value real growth on the log odds of being an exporter in the following 
year, even after controlling for size related variables. However, the effect is no longer 
significant for the sample of pooled French and Hungarian firms, which have the largest 
average firms in the panel. These results are confirmed in specification (4), which is run 
over a sample of firms whose total assets exceed two millions of euros. Thus, the 
significance of the negative effect of domestic industry added value real growth 
disappears by either removing the country with the largest number of small firms from 
the sample, or by explicitly removing small firms from the sample. Specification (5) 
presents a simple robustness check in which we change the definition of exporting firms 
as those whose exports exceed 5% of total firm sales. With this more demanding 
definition of what constitutes an exporter firm we expect the new group of exporters to be 
composed of firms that have made a more deliberate effort in becoming exporters. For 
specification (5), the coefficient on added value real growth in the domestic two-digit 
industry is still negative and significant at the 1% level, and even larger. Thus, we find 
evidence for firms entering exports markets in response to poor domestic market 
performance, but only when small firms are included in the sample. 
Table 3 presents the output results from performing fixed effects regressions of 
the logarithm of exports on domestic market performance in five different specifications. 
We have used the fixed effects estimator in order to control for any possible time 
invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level. For the preferred specification (1), 
the test that all firm fixed effects are zero is rejected with p-value<0.0001, thus 
invalidating usage of a pooled OLS regression. The null hypothesis of random effects 
against the alternative of fixed effects is also rejected with a Hausman test with p-
value<0.0001, thus invalidating use of the random effects estimator. All specifications 
include, as before, lagged values of the logarithm of total assets in millions of euros and 
the logarithm of the number of employees, in order to control for firm size. We again 
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include domestic and EU27 lagged value added real growth of the industry in which the 
firm is located to measure changes in domestic demand and international demand, 
respectively. We control for previous year exporting level by including the lagged value 
of exports in logarithm, and thus we only explain growth relative to the previous year 
export level of the firm. By including the logarithm of previous year exports and by 
having as the dependent variable the logarithm of current export level, our sample only 
has firms that were already exporters and that continue exporting. 
Specification (1) is run over the full sample of continuing exporters. The 
coefficients of size related variables associated with total assets and number of 
employees, are both positive and significant and thus both variables have the expected 
positive and significant impact on exports. The lag of the logarithm of exports also has 
the expected positive and significant impact on current exports. Also expected is the 
positive impact of EU27 growth in current exports, meaning that exports are largely 
determined by the EU27 economic cycle. Thus, although growth in the EU27 market is 
not sufficient to drive entry in exports markets, it determines how much existing 
exporters will export. However, the coefficient of interest, which is associated with added 
value real growth in the domestic market, is not significant and very close to zero. Thus, 
we conclude that, although existing exporters increase exports when there is growth in 
international demand, they are not able to export more as a result of poor domestic 
market performance. Specifications (2) and (3) present the same regression as 
specification (1) run over a sample of Portuguese continuing exporters and a sample of 
pooled French and Hungarian continuing exporting firms, respectively. The coefficient of 
interest, which is associated with domestic market performance, is insignificant and close 
to zero in either specification, thus confirming the results in specification (1). 
Finally, we run two additional specifications run over the full sample of existing 
exporters, where we interact the variable associated with domestic market performance 
with either a foreign ownership dummy or a dummy for domestic firms indicating 
whether they have subsidiaries in other countries. In these specifications we check 
whether firms that belong to international networks of affiliates are more able to redirect 
production from home to export markets when domestic market performance is poor. In 
both specifications (4) and (5), we find that the coefficient on the interaction term is not 
significant, although negative, and thus we do not find evidence that even firms that 
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belong to international networks of affiliates are able to place production abroad when 
domestic market performance is poor. 
 
 
Table 3. Fixed Effects Regressions of Exports 
Dependent Variable: ln(Exports), t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 







ln(Total Assets), t-1 0.369*** 0.378*** 0.346*** 0.369*** 0.369*** 
	   12.072 9.467 7.449 12.070 12.074 
ln(Number Employees), t-1 0.240*** 0.255*** 0.210*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 
	   7.095 6.208 4.237 7.087 7.093 
ln(Exports), t-1 0.073*** 0.032*** 0.136*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
	   7.170 2.720 7.379 7.166 7.170 
EU27 Industry growth, t-1 0.002*** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
	   3.041 1.659 2.649 3.051 3.045 
Industry growth, t-1 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
	   0.475 0.623 0.265 0.770 0.512 
Ind. growth × Foreign, t-1 	   	   	   -0.001 	  
	   	   	   	   -0.909 	  Ind. growth ×  
Subsidiary Abroad, t-1 	   	   	   	  
 
-0.001 
	   	   	   	   	   -0.443 Constant -2.028*** -2.545*** -1.440*** -2.027*** -2.028*** 
	   -17.559 -19.702 -7.430 -17.537 -17.557 
Number of observations 40 645 24 399 16 246 40 645 40 645 
Log-Likelihood -36 216.98 -21 610.25 -14 533.74 -36 216.50 -36 216.92 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, t-statistics in parenthesis 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 present regressions of exporter status and exports on 
additional regressors. We checked that growth of labor cost per worker does not help us 
explain which firms respond to poor domestic market performance with entry or 
expansion in export markets, as suggested by descriptive statistics. We also present a test 
on whether a short run cost structure that is more reliant on fixed rather than variable 
costs leads to higher response to poor domestic market performance on export markets. 
Table 4 presents two additional specifications with logit regressions. Specification 
(1) includes the same variables as specification (1) of Table 2, yielding a significant and 
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negative coefficient for value added real growth at the domestic industry level, significant 
and positive coefficients for the size related variables and past exporter status, and an 
insignificant coefficient for value added real growth at the European industry level. 
Specification (1) also controls for the importance of fixed costs on the overall cost 
structure of the firm, measured by the depreciation to added value ratio, which is included 
as a standalone term and as an interaction term with domestic industry growth. Firms 
with a higher depreciation to added value ratio are expected to have higher fixed rather 
than variable costs and thus, as mentioned earlier, are expected to respond more strongly 
to a negative shock in the domestic market. Thus, we would expect a negative coefficient 
for the latter interaction term, as firms with higher reliance on fixed costs should respond 
more strongly to decreases in the domestic market. However, both the standalone term 
for the depreciation to added value ratio and the interaction of this variable with domestic 
market growth are insignificant. Thus, we do not find evidence that firms with a cost 
structure that is more reliant on fixed costs respond more strongly to a negative domestic 
market shock with export market entry. 
Specification (2) includes the same variables as specification (1) in Table 2, and 
has identical results with respect to the magnitude and significance of the coefficients in 
common with specification (1) in Table 2. Specification (2) has added controls for firm 
labor cost per worker growth. We have added yearly percentage point growth of firm 
labor cost per worker both as a standalone term and interacted with value added growth 
for the domestic industry in which the firm is located. We removed a few outliers where 
labor cost per worker grew more than 100% in a single years, the majority of which 
where firms who employed one or two workers. Coefficients for both terms are 
insignificant. This is evidence that firms that respond to negative growth in the domestic 






Table 4. Logit Regressions of Exporter Status 
Dependent Variable: Exporter Status, t   
  (1) (2) 
  Full Sample Full Sample 
ln(Total Assets), t-1 0.417*** 0.413*** 
 27.781 34.139 
ln(Number Employees), t-1 0.107*** 0.180*** 
 6.060 12.326 
Exporter, t-1 3.177*** 3.309*** 
 139.811 162.864 
France -0.436*** -0.398*** 
 -13.835 -15.114 
Hungary 0.419*** -0.719*** 
 6.726 -23.855 
EU27 Industry growth, t-1 -0.000 0.001 
 -0.097 0.379 
Industry growth, t-1 -0.004* -0.003*** 
 -1.809 -3.533 
(Depreciation / Added Value), t-1 -0.135  
 -1.168  
Industry Growth × (Depreciation / Added Value), t-1 0.008  
 0.639  
Labor cost per worker growth / 100, t-1  0.032 
  0.625 
Industry growth × Labor cost per worker growth / 100, t-1  -0.003 
  -0.767 
Constant -1.594*** -1.895*** 
 -15.984 -24.643 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
Location Dummies YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES 
Number of observations 33 791 37 113 
Log-Likelihood -29 204.08 -32 056.95 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, t-statistics in parenthesis 
 
Thus, firm entry in export markets as a response to poor domestic market 
performance is not associated with either decreases in labor costs per worker nor with a 
short run cost structure that is more reliant on fixed costs rather than variable costs. 
Table 5 presents two additional specifications with fixed effects regressions. Both 
specifications (1) and (2) include the same variables as specification (1) of Table 3. 
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Specification (1) introduces a standalone term for the variable that measures reliance on 
fixed costs rather than variables costs, the depreciation to added value ratio, and an 
interaction term of this variable with domestic industry growth. Likewise, specification 
(2) includes a standalone term for the growth of labor costs per worker and an interaction 
of this variable with domestic market growth. The introduced terms are insignificant in 
both specifications. Thus we conclude that, neither higher reliance on fixed costs, nor 
larger decreases in labor costs per worker, result in existing exporters increasing exports 
in response to poor domestic market performance. 
 
Table 5. Fixed Effects Regressions of Exports 
Dependent Variable: ln(Exports), t   
  (1) (2) 
  Full Sample Full Sample 
ln(Total Assets), t-1 0.382*** 0.366*** 
 11.174 10.947 
ln(Number Employees), t-1 0.196*** 0.199*** 
 6.419 5.026 
ln(Exports), t-1 0.070*** 0.034*** 
 6.044 3.171 
EU27 Industry growth, t-1 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 3.328 2.591 
Industry growth, t-1 -0.000 0.000 
 -0.308 0.537 
(Depreciation / Added Value, t-1 0.125  
 1.332  
Industry growth × (Depreciation / Added Value), t-1 0.002  
 0.623  
Labor cost per worker growth / 100, t-1  -0.015 
  -0.502 
Industry Growth × Labor cost per worker growth / 100, t-1  0.001 
  0.498 
Constant -1.882*** -2.065*** 
 -17.589 -15.744 
Number of observations 79 838 112 908 
Log-Likelihood -27 836.65 -36 057.43 





We find evidence of a modest positive impact of poor domestic market 
performance on the decision to become an exporter, although only for small firms. 
However, these firms do not initiate exports with high levels of exports, neither at the 
year of entry or in the years following entry, in spite of high growth rates for exports in 
the years following entry. We find evidence that incumbent exporters are able to increase 
exports in response to increases in international demand, but we do not find evidence of a 
significant relationship between poor domestic market performance and increases in 
exports, even for firms with established distribution networks that could be presumed to 
have higher access to international markets. We also do not find that either having an 
overall cost structure with a higher weight of fixed costs, or facing negative growth of 
labor cost per worker changes the response of firms to poor domestic market performance 
with export market entry or expansion. 
5. Conclusion 
The international trade collapse of 2009 was followed by several years of strong 
exports growth in several countries. This strong growth in exports does not seem to be 
easily explained with changes in factor prices or firm productivity. We have tested the 
hypothesis that firms respond to poor domestic market performance by either entering 
foreign markets or by increasing existing exports. We have found that firm entry is 
associated with poor domestic market performance, although only for small firms. 
However, firm entry in export markets does not cause a substantial increase in overall 
exports, as entrant exporters start out with very low exports, which continue to be small 
several years after entry in spite of strong exports growth in these years. Large exports 
associated with entrant exporters do occur in 2010, but are mostly rebound exports from 
delayed purchases from the year 2009. Incumbent exporters are largely responsible for 
changes in overall exports, but changes in incumbent exporters are not accountable with 
poor performance in the domestic market. Thus, we do not find evidence that most firms 
are able to easily substitute lost domestic sales with sales in foreign markets, and poor 
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Table 6b. Number of Foreign Firms and Domestic Firms with Foreign Subsidiaries 
 Foreign DFS Total 
Country No. No. No. 
France 386 101 6,133 
Hungary 181 32 2,823 
Portugal 204 227 19,410 
Total 771 360 28,366 
 
Table 6c. Share of Sample Exports in Overall Country Product Exports 
 Year 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
France 0.036 0.039 0.041 0.039 0.040 0.039 
Hungary 0.617 0.587 0.600 0.624 0.581 0.596 





Table 7a. Firm Level Summary Statistics 
(mean) France Hungary Portugal Total 
Employees 36.5 137.2 22.7 37.1 
Cost per Worker  (k€) 44.0 12.3 13.3 19.8 
Added Value per Worker (k€) 63.3 30.3 22.6 31.2 
Number of Employees / Assets  17.2 32.4 41.8 35.5 
Material Costs (M€) 4.3 28.1 1.9 3.9 
Sales (M€) 9.1 23.6 3.0 6.4 
Added Value (M€) 3.7 6.6 0.9 1.8 
EBITDA (M€) 0.7 1.7 0.3 0.5 
Exports (M€) 2.7 16.7 1.1 3.2 
Exporters (%) 36.1 48.4 38.2 38.8 
Exports / Sales (%) 7.4 24.2 12.0 12.3 
2d Industry Exports / Sales (%) 19.6 57.3 30.8 31.0 
Total Assets  (M€) 7.0 18.5 2.9 5.3 
Fixed Assets / Assets (%) 30.0 44.8 28.8 30.7 
Long Term Debt / Assets (%) 9.7 2.7 16.1 13.4 
Foreign firms (%) 6.3 6.4 1.1 2.7 
Depreciation (M€) 0.3 1.1 0.2 0.2 
Depreciation / Added Value 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 




Table 7b. Firm Level Summary statistics 
(median) France Hungary Portugal Total 
Employees 8.0 40.0 8.0 9.0 
Cost per Worker  (k€) 40.2 10.0 11.6 13.3 
Added Value per Worker (k€) 52.7 20.4 17.4 21.0 
Number of Employees / Assets 12.7 20.0 22.6 19.4 
Material Costs (M€) 0.2 4.1 0.1 0.2 
Sales (M€) 0.8 2.6 0.3 0.5 
Added Value (M€) 0.8 2.0 0.2 0.3 
EBITDA (M€) 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Exports (M€) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Exporters (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Exports / Sales (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2d Industry Exports / Sales (%) 18.5 57.8 30.5 29.7 
Total Assets  (M€) 0.5 2.0 0.3 0.4 
Fixed Assets / Assets (%) 23.0 45.0 25.7 27.0 
Long Term Debt / Assets (%) 2.9 0.0 1.9 1.0 
Foreign firm (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Depreciation (M€) 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Depreciation / Added Value 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 




Table 7c. Distribution of Firms by Industry 
 Country 
NACE Rev. 2 – 2-digit France Hungary Portugal 
 
No. % No. % No. % 
10 - Man. of food products 1,381 23 309 11 2,711 14 
11 - Man. of beverages 88 1 74 3 257 1 
12 - Man. of tobacco products 0 0 5 0 3 0 
13 - Man. of textiles 118 2 54 2 989 5 
14 - Man. of wearing apparel 109 2 62 2 1,967 10 
15 - Man. of leather 60 1 21 1 963 5 
16 - Man. of products of wood and cork 295 5 93 3 1,328 7 
17 - Man. of paper products 72 1 71 3 213 1 
18 - Printing & reproduction of rec. media 388 6 71 3 991 5 
19 - Man. of coke and ref. petroleum prod. 4 0 5 0 1 0 
20 - Man. of chemicals and chemical prod. 142 2 80 3 300 2 
21 - Man. of basic pharmaceutical prod. 25 0 21 1 55 0 
22 - Man. of rubber and plastics products 228 4 287 10 560 3 
23 - Man. other non-metallic mineral prod. 305 5 139 5 1,345 7 
24 - Man. of basic metals 62 1 56 2 134 1 
25 - Man. of fabricated metal products 942 15 627 22 3,621 19 
26 - Man. of computer, electronic prod. 151 2 120 4 102 1 
27 - Man. of electrical equipment 131 2 105 4 271 1 
28 - Man. of machinery and equipment 313 5 285 10 666 3 
29 - Man. of motor vehicles, trailers 117 2 106 4 242 1 
30 - Man. of other transport equipment 30 0 20 1 75 0 
31 - Man. of furniture 180 3 95 3 1,120 6 
32 - Other manufacturing 296 5 54 2 665 3 
33 - Repair & installation of machinery 696 11 63 2 831 4 
Total 6,133 100 2,823 100 19,410 100 








Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Firm average Portugal 3.2 -1.6 -8.8 3.4 2.7 
Median firm Portugal 2.9 -0.1 -9.0 3.1 2.6 
Size weighted average Portugal 2.4 -2.0 -8.8 5.8 3.7 
Firm average Hungary 7.8 3.5 -11.7 13.7 1.2 
Median firm Hungary 9.3 3.0 -17.4 10.4 1.9 
Size weighted Hungary 8.0 0.2 -15.4 16.1 6.7 
Firm average France 2.1 -3.1 -7.2 2.1 2.4 
Median firm France 1.8 -3.2 -6.1 1.4 3.6 
Size weighted average France 2.3 -2.8 -8.6 4.2 2.1 
 
 
Table 8b. EU27 2.digit Industry Growth Faced by Firms (%), as provided by Eurostat 
 Year 
 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Firm average Portugal 2.3 -2.9 -13.4 6.6 3.8 
Median firm Portugal 1.6 -3.0 -14.8 4.9 3.5 
Size weighted average Portugal 2.4 -3.0 -13.9 8.1 4.1 
Firm average Hungary 3.7 -2.1 -15.1 9.9 4.8 
Median firm Hungary 3.0 -1.1 -14.8 10.9 4.5 
Size weighted average Hungary 5.0 -2.4 -15.3 13.1 5.6 
Firm average France 3.2 -2.6 -11.6 7.0 3.7 
Median firm France 1.7 -3.4 -11.3 4.6 3.2 





Table 9a. Total Product Exports (constant prices, M€) 
 Year 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
France 442,392 442,489 358,448 404,015 434,014 442,643 
Hungary 83,892 84,323 64,616 75,508 82,775 80,612 




Table 9b. Change in Total Product Exports (%) 
   Year    
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
France - 0.0 -19.0 12.7 7.4 2.0 
Hungary - 0.5 -23.4 16.9 9.6 -2.6 




Table 10a. Sample Aggregate Exports (constant prices, M€) 
 
Year 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
No. No. No. No. No. No. 
France 15,852 17,095 14,596 15,743 17,523 17,149 
Hungary 51,775 49,536 38,758 47,113 48,060 48,047 
Portugal - 20,959 14,131 21,457 24,485 24,827 
 
 




2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
France - 7.84 -14.62 7.86 11.31 -2.13 
Hungary - -4.32 -21.76 21.55 2.01 -0.03 







Table 10c. Number of Exporting Firms 
 
Year 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
No. No. No. No. No. No. 
France 2,225 2,261 2,225 2,192 2,203 2,170 
Hungary 1,334 1,354 1,367 1,374 1,374 1,390 




Table 10d. Change in the Number of Exporting Firms (%) 
 
Year 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
No. No. No. No. No. No. 
France - 1.62 -1.59 -1.48 0.50 -1.50 
Hungary - 1.50 0.96 0.51 0.00 1.16 






Table 11a. Change of Selected Firm Variables by Year for Portuguese Firms (%) 
 Year 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Firm Exports (mean) - -32.6 51.8 14.1 1.4 
Domestic Sales (mean) - -4.8 -4.8 2.9 -3.1 
Exporting Firms (0%) - -0.6 6.2 6.2 1.4 
Exporting Firms (5%) - -1.0 6.8 10.6 4.8 
Labor Productivity (median) 1.0 -1.9 0.7 -0.9 -2.7 
Labor Cost per Worker (median) 1.9 1.4 2.6 0.2 -1.6 




Table 11b. Change of Selected Firm Variables by year for French Firms (%) 
 Year 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Firm Exports (mean) 7.8 -14.6 7.9 11.3 -2.1 
Domestic Sales (mean) -4.6 -12.2 2.3 4.9 0.4 
Exporting Firms (0%) 1.6 -1.6 -1.5 0.5 -1.5 
Exporting Firms (5%) 1.5 -1.5 -0.1 0.3 -1.5 
Labor Productivity (median) -1.6 -7.8 5.0 2.7 -0.7 
Labor Cost per Worker (median) 1.1 -1.7 1.7 3.0 0.8 




Table 11c. Change of Selected Firms Variables by Year for Hungarian Firms (%) 
 Year 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Firm Exports (mean) -4.3 -21.8 21.6 2.0 0.0 
Domestic Sales (mean) -4.6 -18.5 -5.1 -3.5 1.8 
Exporting Firms (0%) 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1.2 
Exporting Firms (5%) 2.7 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.5 
Labor Productivity (median) -5.5 -6.1 -3.2 -9.9 9.1 
Labor Cost per Worker (median) -3.9 -9.3 -4.9 -7.8 12.2 





Table 12a. Firm Entry and Exit from Export Markets and Entrant Aggregate Exports 
(M€) 
 
  Year 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of firms (No.)      
France Entry 312 245 259 284 275 
 
Exit 276 281 292 273 308 
 
Net entry 36 -36 -33 11 -33 
Hungary Entry 74 65 50 48 52 
 
Exit 54 52 43 48 36 
Net entry 20 13 7 0 16 
Portugal Entry - 1,192 1,635 1,512 1,328 
 Exit - 1,237 1,203 1,058 1,218 
 Net entry - -45 432 454 110 
Number of firms, relative to country sample size (%) 
France Entry 5.09 3.99 4.22 4.63 4.48 
 Exit 4.50 4.58 4.76 4.45 5.02 
 Net entry 0.59 -0.59 -0.54 0.18 -0.54 
Hungary Entry 2.62 2.30 1.77 1.70 1.84 
 Exit 1.91 1.84 1.52 1.70 1.28 
 Net entry 0.71 0.46 0.25 0.00 0.57 
Portugal Entry - 6.14 8.42 7.79 6.84 
 Exit - 6.37 6.20 5.45 6.28 
 Net entry - -0.23 2.23 2.34 0.57 
Exports (M€)      
France Entrant exports 1,550 1,400 276 727 232 
 
Incumbent exports 15,545 13,196 15,467 16,797 16,918 
Rate of entrant exports 0.091 0.096 0.018 0.041 0.014 
Hungary Entrant exports 152 43 42 82 27 
 Incumbent exports 49,384 38,715 47,071 47,978 48,020 
Rate of entrant exports  0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Portugal Entrant exports - 376 5,115 454 194 
 
Incumbent exports - 13,754 16,342 24,031 24,634 





Table 12b. Number of Exporters and Corresponding Exports of the 2008 Cohort of the 
Entrant and Incumbent Exporters 
  Year  
Country 
Entrant 
Exporter     




Number of Exporters       
France No 1,949 1,949 1,780 1,696 1,672 1,632 
 
Yes 0 312 200 167 158 148 
Rate of entrant exporters 0.000 0.138 0.101 0.090 0.086 0.083 
Hungary No 1,280 1,280 1,243 1,223 1,214 1,203 
 
Yes 0 74 59 62 54 53 
Rate of entrant exporters 0.000 0.055 0.045 0.048 0.043 0.042 
Aggregate Exports (M€)      
France No 15,647 15,545 12,059 12,713 14,540 14,090 
 
Yes 0 1,550 1,137 1,404 1,605 1,464 
Rate of entrant exports 0.000 0.091 0.086 0.099 0.099 0.094 
Hungary No 51,750 49,384 38,545 46,849 47,675 47,520 
 
Yes 0 152 170 173 207 269 
























Table 12c. Number of Exporters and Corresponding Exports of the 2009 Cohort of the 
Entrant and Incumbent Exporters 
  Year  
Country 
Entrant 
Exporter     




Number of Exporters       
France No 1,780 1,980 1,980 1,772 1,724 1,671 
 
Yes 82 0 245 161 144 134 
Rate of entrant exporters 0.044 0.000 0.110 0.083 0.077 0.074 
Hungary No 1,243 1,302 1,302 1,270 1,256 1,240 
 Yes 14 0 65 54 48 44 
Rate of entrant exporters 0.011 0.000 0.048 0.041 0.037 0.034 
Portugal No - 5,746 5,746 5,033 5,115 4,953 
 Yes - 0 1,192 702 700 707 
Rate of entrant exporters - 0.000 0.172 0.122 0.120 0.125 
Aggregate Exports (M€)      
France No 14,990 16,349 13,196 13,926 15,295 15,231 
 
Yes 130 0 1,400 1,541 1,280 1,376 
Rate of entrant exports 0.009 0.000 0.096 0.100 0.077 0.083 
Hungary No 51,707 49,485 38,715 47,006 47,857 47,720 
 
Yes 1 0 43 64 109 149 
Rate of entrant exports 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 
Portugal No - 16,146 13,754 15,889 18,035 17,730 
 
Yes - 0 376 453 555 561 



















Table 12d. Number of Exporters and Corresponding Exports of the 2010 Cohort of 
Entrant and Incumbent Exporters 
  Year  
Country 
Entrant 
Exporter     




Number of Exporters       
France No 1,687 1,772 1,933 1,933 1,758 1,700 
 
Yes 98 91 0 259 161 133 
Rate of entrant exporters 0.055 0.049 0.000 0.118 0.084 0.073 
Hungary No 1,227 1,270 1,324 1,324 1,293 1,274 
 Yes 16 15 0 50 33 39 
Rate of entrant exporters 0.013 0.012 0.000 0.036 0.025 0.030 
Portugal No - 5,033 5,735 5,735 5,265 5,072 
 Yes - 582 0 1,635 1,047 994 
Rate of entrant exporters - 0.104 0.000 0.222 0.166 0.164 
Aggregate Exports (M€)      
France No 14,861 16,120 14,387 15,467 16,431 16,472 
 
Yes 387 369 0 276 366 330 
Rate of entrant exports 0.025 0.022 0.000 0.018 0.022 0.020 
Hungary No 51,665 49,424 38,743 47,071 47,934 47,804 
 
Yes 20 21 0 42 44 94 
Rate of entrant exports 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Portugal No - 15,835 13,863 16,342 18,346 17,969 
 
Yes - 4,749 0 5,115 5,685 6,261 






Table 12e. Number of Exporters and Corresponding Exports of the 2011 Cohort of 
Entrant and Incumbent Exporters 
  Year  
Country 
Entrant 
Exporter     




Number of Exporters       
France No 1,638 1,699 1,758 1,919 1,919 1,734 
 
Yes 131 131 110 0 284 161 
Rate of entrant exporters 0.074 0.072 0.059 0.000 0.129 0.085 
Hungary No 1,216 1,254 1,293 1,326 1,326 1,300 
 Yes 14 14 11 0 48 38 
Rate of entrant exporters 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.000 0.035 0.028 
Portugal No - 5,181 5,265 6,312 6.312 5,664 
 Yes - 569 550 0 1,512 942 
Rate of entrant exporters - 0.099 0.095 0.000 0.193 0.143 
Aggregate Exports (M€)      
France No 15,028 16,321 14,256 15,535 16,797 16,717 
 
Yes 490 500 142 0 727 201 
Rate of entrant exports 0.032 0.030 0.010 0.000 0.041 0.012 
Hungary No 51,597 49,375 38,689 47,050 47,978 47,894 
 
Yes 36 55 10 0 82 126 
Rate of entrant exports 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 
Portugal No - 20,438 13,742 21,315 24,031 24,123 
 
Yes - 256 215 0 454 510 






Table 12f. Number of Exporters and Corresponding Exports of the 2012 Cohort of 
Entrant and Incumbent Exporters 
  Year  
Country 
Entrant 
Exporter     




Number of Exporters       
France No 1,611 1,655 1,693 1,734 1,895 1,895 
 
Yes 129 125 112 99 0 275 
Rate of entrant exporters 0.074 0.070 0.062 0.054 0.000 0.127 
Hungary No 1,208 1,244 1,275 1,300 1,338 1,338 
 Yes 15 12 9 13 0 52 
Rate of entrant exporters 0.012 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.000 0.037 
Portugal No -  5,182 5,259 5,664 6,606 6,606 
 Yes -  408 401 402 0 1328 
Rate of entrant exporters -  0.073 0.071 0.066 0.000 0.167 
Aggregate Exports (M€)      
France No 14,984 16,180 14,109 15,271 16,698 16,918 
 
Yes 124 95 103 85 0 232 
Rate of entrant exports 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.000 0.014 
Hungary No 51,602 49,405 38,681 47,035 48,047 48,020 
 
Yes 3 6 3 2 0 27 
Rate of entrant exports 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Portugal No - 20,136 13,491 20,726 23,866 24,634 
 
Yes - 118 89 80 0 194 






Table 13a. Export Market Reentry of Firms that Cease Exporting in 2008 
  Year  
Country 
Reentry 
in 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
2012 
Number of Exporters 
France Yes 67 91 0 91 66 63 
 
No 102 190 0 0 40 46 
Hungary Yes 8 15 0 15 6 9 
 No 29 37 0 0 6 7 
Portugal Yes 0 582 0 582 450 426 
 No 0 655 0 0 185 211 
Aggregate Exports (M€) 
France Yes 355 369 0 192 327 308 
 
No 302 377 0 0 523 15 
Hungary Yes 18 21 0 15 21 59 
 
No 25 30 0 0 5 9 
Portugal Yes 0 4,749 0 4,854 5,361 5,953 
 
No 0 65 0 0 31 34 
 
 
Table 13b. Export Market Reentry of Firms that Cease Exporting in 2009 
  Year  
Country 
Reentry 
in 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
2012 
Number of Exporters 
France Yes 76 91 110 0 110 69 
 
No 99 117 182 0 0 36 
Hungary Yes 8 8 11 0 11 8 
 No 22 24 32 0 0 2 
Portugal Yes 0 384 550 0 550 408 
 No 0 329 653 0 0 180 
Aggregate Exports (M€) 
France Yes 165 156 142 0 145 131 
 
No 95 74 67 0 0 4 
Hungary Yes 31 50 10 0 31 66 
 
No 13 12 6 0 0 0 
Portugal Yes 0 222 215 0 244 292 
 





Table 13c. Export Market Reentry of Firms that Cease Exporting in 2010 
  Year  
Country 
Reentry 
in 2012 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
2012 
Number of Exporters 
France Yes 71 73 76 99 0 99 
 
No 76 91 99 174 0 0 
Hungary Yes 8 8 7 13 0 13 
 No 19 23 24 35 0 0 
Portugal Yes 0 209 221 402 0 402 
 No 0 225 249 656 0 0 
Aggregate Exports (M€) 
France Yes 112 84 94 85 0 85 
 
No 108 84 37 122 0 0 
Hungary Yes 1 4 3 2 0 3 
 
No 87 66 50 60 0 0 
Portugal Yes 0 90 75 80 0 107 
 






Table 14a. Export Behavior of the Cohort of New Exporters in 2008 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of Exporters  
France - 312 200 167 158 148 
Hungary - 74 59 62 54 53 
Aggregate Exports (M€)  
France - 1,550 1,137 1,404 1,605 1,464 
Hungary - 152 170 173 207 269 
Exports Growth (median, %)  
France - - -9.34 9.22 8.00 -6.09 
Hungary - - 4.39 8.03 8.11 16.28 
Firm Exports (median, M€)  
France - 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.04 
Hungary - 0.25 0.50 0.55 1.36 1.24 
Domestic Sales Growth (median, %)  
France - -3.76 -11.96 3.65 3.40 -1.03 
Hungary - -3.60 -20.55 0.69 -9.48 2.27 
 
 
Table 14b. Export Behavior of the Cohort of New Exporters in 2009 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of Exporters 
France - 245 161 144 134 
Hungary - 65 54 48 44 
Portugal - 1, 192 702 700 707 
Aggregate Exports (M€) 
France - 1,400 1,541 1, 280 1, 376 
Hungary - 43 64 109 149 
Portugal - 376 453 555 561 
Exports Growth (median, %) 
France - - 23.23 -0.95 2.06 
Hungary - - 56.31 33.60 -2.99 
Portugal - - 26.53 23.29 13.38 
Firm Exports (median, M€) 
France - 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 
Hungary - 0.08 0.18 0.41 0.42 
Portugal - 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Domestic Sales Growth (median, %) 
France 2.40 -16.74 5.78 6.51 -0.97 
Hungary 4.17 -18.62 2.06 -7.70 7.44 




Table 14c. Export Behavior of the Cohort of New Exporters in 2010 
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of Exporters 
France - 259 161 133 
Hungary - 50 33 39 
Portugal - 1,635 1,047 994 
Aggregate Exports (M€) 
France - 276 366 330 
Hungary - 42 44 94 
Portugal - 5,115 5,685 6,261 
Exports Growth (median, %) 
France - - 8.79 0.56 
Hungary - - 2.53 18.94 
Portugal - - 16.35 6.99 
Firm Exports (median, M€) 
France - 0.02 0.03 0.07 
Hungary - 0.08 0.46 0.63 
Portugal - 0.01 0.04 0.05 
Domestic Sales Growth (median, %) 
France -7.45 -2.39 3.65 -2.18 
Hungary -13.74 -6.75 8.88 6.27 























Table 14d. Export Behavior of the Cohort of New Exporters in 2011 
Country 2010 2011 2012 
Number of Exporters 
France - 284 161 
Hungary - 48 38 
Portugal - 1,512 942 
Aggregate Exports (M€) 
France - 727 201 
Hungary - 82 126 
Portugal - 454 510 
Exports Growth (median, pp) 
France - - 3.02 
Hungary - - 27.67 
Portugal - - 19.99 
Firm Exports (median, M€) 
France - 0.02 0.07 
Hungary - 0.36 0.92 
Portugal - 0.01 0.03 
Domestic Sales Growth (median, %) 
France 4.18 0.08 -2.13 
Hungary 9.80 -7.85 10.65 






Table 14e. Export Behavior of the Cohort of New Exporters in 2012 
Country 2011 2012 
Number of Exporters 
France - 275 
Hungary - 52 
Portugal - 1,328 
Aggregate Exports (M€) 
France - 232 
Hungary - 27 
Portugal - 194 
Exports Growth (median, %) 
France - - 
Hungary - - 
Portugal - - 
Firm Exports (median, M€) 
France - 0.02 
Hungary - 0.13 
Portugal - 0.01 
Domestic Sales Growth (median, %) 
France 6.23 -5.31 
Hungary -3.08 -11.03 




Productivity and Export Intensity 
 
1. Introduction 
Exports are perceived to play an important role in fostering economic growth and 
are a topic of ongoing research interest. Research at the firm level has concluded that the 
main determinant of export market participation is firm productivity (Bernard et al., 
1995; Wagner, 2007). However, firm export market participation is only the first step of a 
more comprehensive internationalization process that might lead to the establishment of 
manufacturing subsidiaries abroad, as a way to avoid trade costs associated with exports 
from the home country, in a process which is also largely determined by productivity 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Dunning, 1980; Brainard, 1993; Grossman et al., 2006). 
Thus, while firms are required to have high productivity to initiate exporting activities, 
further productivity increases might eventually have a detrimental effect on firm exports. 
This might occur if the optimal international strategy of firms is changed from one where 
firms export from their home country to host countries to one where they become 
multinationals and establish local subsidiaries to supply the host country, with possibly 
no exports from the home to host countries. 
If the optimal international strategy of firms changes as their productivity 
increases, this implies that the more productive exporting firms eventually relocate 
manufacturing activities to host countries. The impact of this relocation can be relevant 
for country exports as these are sometimes dependent on a small number of large 
exporting firms. We examine the relationship between productivity and multinationality 
of domestic firms, and the relationship between productivity and the export behavior of 
non-multinational domestic firms, domestic multinational firms and foreign affiliates of 
multinationals. We compare the results obtained with predictions from the literature on 
international trade with heterogeneous firms. First, we look at the participation of 
domestic firms in international markets as productivity increases, both in terms of export 
intensity and subsidiary establishment. Second, we look for evidence related with the 
hypothesis that subsidiary establishment of domestic firms is associated with a decrease 
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in export intensity behavior at home. Third, as countries are FDI recipients as well as FDI 
contributors, we examine the relationship between productivity and export orientation of 
foreign affiliates operating in a host country, and compare with findings for other 
countries. 
Using recent data on manufacturing firms operating in Portugal we find that 
domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates of multinationals account for a very large 
share of overall country exports. We find that domestic firms with low productivity focus 
on the domestic market, domestic firms with higher productivity export more, and 
domestic firms with the highest productivity are multinationals. We find little support 
that domestic multinationals with higher productivity export less intensely, and we 
discuss how this finding could result from initial subsidiaries being established as non-
manufacturing sales outposts. We find no support for a direct relationship between 
productivity and export orientation of foreign affiliates of multinationals, and discuss 
how the international integration strategies of foreign affiliates, as determined by host 
country factors such as transport and labor costs, might contribute to this finding. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 High productivity firms become exporters 
A persistent finding in the empirical literature on exports is that exporting firms 
are larger and more productive than non-exporting firms (Wagner, 2007). It has been 
found that the high productivity of exporters is better explained by the selection of high 
productivity firms into exporting than by the existence of accrued productivity benefits 
attained after firms begin exporting and become exposed to international markets. In fact, 
the superior performance characteristics of exporting firms have been found to precede 
exporting status of firms by several years (Bernard & Jensen, 1999), while there is no 
significant empirical support for additional performance benefits to exporters due to firm 
engagement in export activities (Clerides et al., 1998).  
The existence of productivity requirements for exporting is expected, as exporting 
activity requires that firms bear additional costs relative to domestic activity. Entry in 
export markets requires that firms bear fixed costs of entry associated with the 
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establishment of distribution or service networks, workforce training or product 
compliance (Baldwin, 1988). While some of these costs may be sunk, continued 
operation in export markets requires that firms repeatedly incur in transport costs and 
thus remain high productivity firms. 
 
2.2 High productivity firms also become multinationals 
Multinationals must be high productivity firms, as they bear high fixed costs of 
FDI, and as they must possess firm-specific advantages to overcome the costs of 
operating in foreign countries (Dunning, 1980). Some of these firm-specific advantages 
are ownership of firm-specific intangible assets. In fact, the decision to become a 
multinational firm has been derived as the optimal mode of serving a foreign market, in 
opposition to alternatives such as licensing agreements or exporting, when firms attempt 
to prevent the dissipation of proprietary knowledge-based assets (Ethier & Markusen, 
1991). The multinational firm is then viewed as an international network of affiliates with 
access to firm-specific intangible assets, related to expertise in engineering, management 
or marketing (Horstmann & Markusen, 1987), and which are available inside the 
multinational firm as public goods. 
The decision to become a multinational firm has also been derived as the result of 
high productivity firms choosing to spread production internationally, as international 
organization of production allows multinationals to exploit scale economies and 
international factor price differentials (Dunning, 1993). However, only high productivity 
firms, with sufficiently low variable costs of production, could profitably attain those cost 
related advantages and thus become multinationals (Grossman et al., 2006). 
 
2.3 Most affiliates of multinationals do not export from the host 
country, in spite of their high productivity 
Multinationals set up affiliates for different reasons. Whether affiliates are set up 
as exporting firms or not depends on the motive to set up affiliates in the first place. On 
the one hand, if multinationals set up affiliates with fear of dissipation of knowledge-
based assets as a primary motive, it is in part because the alternative of exporting from 
 
59 
the home to the host country is costly, and thus we expect that foreign affiliates 
established under this motive will focus on production for the domestic market of the host 
country. Multinational firms establish subsidiaries in host countries, in part, to prevent 
the transport costs associated with international trade between home and host countries 
(Brainard, 1993), and the majority of foreign affiliates have a predominantly domestic 
market oriented activity (Kneller & Pisu, 2004). Thus, costly exporting due to transport 
costs precludes a significant exporting behavior for the affiliates of multinationals in both 
the home or host country. 
On the other hand, some multinational firms do establish exporting affiliates in 
host countries. Noting a growing importance of intra-firm trade, Hanson et al. (2005) 
show that multinationals organized in vertical production networks place labor-intensive 
input-processing activities in low-wage countries, thus leading to the establishment of 
exporting subsidiaries abroad in order to exploit low labor costs in host countries. The 
establishment of exporting affiliates is not restricted to vertically integrated multinational 
firms. Export platform production, where multinational firms establish manufacturing 
affiliates abroad in order to export to third countries or to the home country, is also an 
empirically important outcome as found by Hanson et al. (2005). Export platform 
production in low-cost low-demand countries has been derived as an optimal 
multinational location strategy to serve demand in a free-trade area such as the EU or the 
NAFTA. This strategy allows for the large scale economies associated with production in 
a single plant inside a larger regional bloc to serve its demand, while holding the ability 
to exploit factor price differentials (Ekholm et al., 2007). 
Summing up, some foreign affiliates have exporting activities in the host country, 
although most foreign affiliates are not expected to have exporting activities. The 
exporting activity of foreign affiliates in host countries can be accounted for with 
concentration of production in order to achieve scale economies, or with intermediate 
production in order to draw from favorable factor price differentials, in particular labor 
prices. Multinational exporting behavior at the home country is left undetermined for the 
abovementioned strategies. While multinationals are always expected to maintain 
headquarter services in the home country, whether they displace manufacturing activities 





2.4 Higher productivity allows exporters to become multinationals 
Firms usually follow a gradual internationalization process that starts with ad hoc 
exporting, to deals with intermediaries in foreign markets, and that may progress until the 
establishment of subsidiaries, first as sales organizations, and later on as local 
manufacturers (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Progress along internationalization stages 
necessarily alters the exporting role for the multinational firm at home. In particular, if 
firms establish manufacturing subsidiaries in host countries, it may be in substitution of 
home exports to the host country. However, the effect of subsidiary establishment on 
home export behavior is not clear, as subsidiaries may be established as non-
manufacturing sales outposts in the host country, to be used as distribution or service 
networks, in which case they could actually increase home exports. 
Progress over the various internationalization stages requires, however, that firms 
overcome several productivity hurdles, as discussed earlier. In fact, international trade 
models usually model FDI and international trade decisions of firms as linked and 
dependent on the learned productivity of individual firms. The derived outcome is that 
low productivity firms operate in domestic markets, as they cannot profitably incur in the 
additional transport and trading costs of export markets, and high-productivity firms 
participate in foreign markets, with the most productive among these opting to serve 
foreign markets with manufacturing in host countries, due to FDI being more costly than 
exporting (Helpman et al., 2003). This relationship between the productivity of firms and 
participation in international markets still holds when firms face richer integration 
choices, namely, when firms are able to conduct one or more stages of production 
internationally. Grossman et al. (2006) show that, in the absence of transport costs, as 
assumption that immediately invalidates horizontal location motives where multinationals 
set up non exporting affiliates in host countries, firms might still locate in a low-demand 
low-wage country as part of an export platform or vertical FDI international production 
strategy. As in the case of a single stage of production, only firms with sufficiently high 
productivity can incur the fixed costs of any manufacturing FDI activity, as these firms 
are granted larger variable cost savings associated with production in the low-wage low-
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demand country. Firms with insufficiently high productivity must remain in home 
production and resort to exports to serve foreign markets (Grossman et al., 2006). 
Thus, productivity is the key determinant of the optimal international integration 
strategy of firms, and determines both which firms export or not and which firms 
establish subsidiaries or not. An increase in productivity of firms that are already 
exporters might lead them to establish manufacturing subsidiaries abroad. Thus, for 
sufficiently high productivity firms, and in contrast to the effect found at earlier stages of 
the international process, further increases in productivity might have a negative effect on 
home exports due to a partial or complete displacement of exports from the home to the 
host country with local production in the host country. 
 
2.5 The impact of productivity increases on the home country export 
behavior of multinationals varies with existing levels of firm 
productivity 
The impact of productivity increases in the home country export behavior of firms 
depends on the nature of the subsidiaries being established in the host countries. On the 
one hand, establishment of manufacturing subsidiaries abroad is expected to have a 
negative impact in home country export behavior of firms, at least initially, as most 
subsidiary establishment is done for horizontal motives (Brainard, 1993), and thus it is 
likely that most manufacturing subsidiaries being established abroad are established in 
order to perform local production for local markets. On the other hand, multinational 
firms may wish to build distribution networks and thus establish non-manufacturing 
subsidiaries in order to achieve that purpose. The establishment of non-manufacturing 
subsidiaries should have a positive effect on home country export behavior.  
The establishment of non-manufacturing subsidiaries is sometimes the first stage 
in a process leading to the establishment of manufacturing subsidiaries. It has been found 
that some firms establish subsidiaries abroad as part of setting up a distribution network 
and then gradually increase the number of manufacturing stages performed at the 
subsidiary (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Multinational firms that choose to initiate 
manufacturing activities, where they had previously only set up distribution networks, are 
likely to have higher productivity than firms that do not initiate manufacturing 
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subsidiaries. In fact, when firms choose between establishing more plants that have 
associated higher fixed costs, and establishing fewer plants but with distribution networks 
that have have associated lower fixed costs but higher variable costs, only the most 
productive firms choose the former option, as the most productive firms are more 
interested in minimizing variable costs of operation due to having higher levels of 
production than less productive firms (Lu et al., 2010). 
Thus, if the initial subsidiary establishment is mostly done as an effort to enhance 
the distribution network of the firm, rather than to perform manufacturing activities, we 
expect initial productivity increases to translate into higher home country export intensity 
for multinational firms. By establishing subsidiaries to perform the role of distribution 
networks firms increase their ability to sell their products and thus improve their export 
performance in their home country. However, we expect further increases in productivity 
to eventually result in the establishment of manufacturing subsidiaries that can lead firms 
to, at least partially, withdraw from home market exports as they perform production 
locally in the host country. 
 
2.6 The impact of productivity increases on the host country export 
behavior of manufacturing affiliates of multinationals is undetermined 
at the outset 
Most of the previous discussion addresses how the establishment of subsidiaries 
might influence the export behavior of multinational firms in their home country, under 
the assumption that most multinationals establish manufacturing affiliates for horizontal 
motives. While this motive might be valid for most firms (Brainard, 1993), particularly 
for those at the early stages of the internationalization process (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977), it does not foresee any exporting role for foreign affiliates on host countries and 
thus cannot explain the disproportionate share of country exports held by foreign 
affiliates (Kneller & Pisu, 2004). The strategies of vertical integration and export 
platform mentioned earlier, account for the exporting behavior of foreign affiliates 
operating in a host country. Concentration of final or intermediate production in a single 
country host country leads to the prediction of a positive relationship between 
productivity and export intensity for manufacturing affiliates in host countries, as the 
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higher production levels of the more productive firms cannot be fulfilled with production 
in alternative plants, as in the case of horizontally integrated multinationals. 
Contrary to this hypothesis, Lu et al. (2010) find that, in China, exporting foreign 
affiliates are less productive than non-exporting foreign affiliates. The authors develop a 
model similar to the model developed by Grossman et al. (2006) to illustrate how a 
negative relationship between productivity and the export status of foreign affiliates can 
be derived, if firms choose between establishing individual plants to serve local markets 
and establishing a single plant with distribution networks to serve both the local market 
and markets abroad. In this setting, as discussed earlier, non-exporting foreign affiliates 
are required to have higher productivity, in order to be able to bear the higher fixed costs 
associated with establishing individual plants over establishment of distribution networks. 
Unlike domestic firms, the firms now considered are at a more advanced 
internationalization stage, since they are productive enough to establish manufacturing 
subsidiaries abroad, but face a choice between an export platform strategy that 
concentrates production in a single country and a horizontal integration strategy that 
disperses production in independent countries. The selection of higher productivity 
foreign affiliates into local host country manufacturing is driven by a change in the 
optimal integration strategy from export platform production to local production in 
independent locations when productivity is sufficiently high. This argument would 
predict, for instance, that some high productivity firms would eventually displace 
activities from low-cost host countries to their home countries when faced with positive 
productivity shocks, which might be an empirically relevant result (Sirkin et al., 2012).  
However, the result found by Lu et al. (2010) can be dependent on the considered 
setting. In fact, the result is driven under the assumption of a large domestic demand, 
both theoretically and in the empirical setting used. If domestic demand is low, the 
productivity threshold to make firms abandon an export platform strategy in favor of 
local production should be higher. Thus, a low domestic demand could be insufficient to 
drive a large number of high productivity firms to establish local manufacturing plants to 
the point of inducing a significantly negative relationship between productivity and 
export status for foreign affiliates. Additionally, if the low demand country is located 
inside a large free-trade region with low transport costs with neighboring countries, these 
costs subsequently reduce the value of exclusively local production and make it less 
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likely to occur. While multinationals might take the larger regional market as the relevant 
market, and consider installing manufacturing plants at a regional level to substitute 
distribution networks, this might still not have a visible effect in the export intensity of 
the local affiliate if the affiliate is accustomed to supply neighboring markets, and thus 
not contributing to induce a negative relationship between productivity and export 
intensity. In out setting we will consider a low-demand low-wage country located inside a 
larger regional free trade area, to test the relationship between productivity and export 
intensity of foreign affiliates, as countries with this profile have been conjectured to be 
the most likely recipients of export platform motivated FDI (Ekholm et al., 2007). 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Data 
We use data from the SABI dataset which is provided by Bureau van Dijk, and 
whose primary source in Portugal is “Informação Empresarial Simplificada”, a 
mandatory yearly survey conducted by administrative entities. Almost the entire 
population of Portuguese firms is legally required to hand in these surveys, although 
some legal forms are exempted, mostly non-profit or unlimited liability organizations. 
The information collected contains balance sheet and income statement data, including 
information on export activity for recent years. 
Firms are also required to provide ownership information, including shareholder 
and subsidiary stakes along with the country of origin or destination of these stakes. 
Bureau van Dijk combines this ownership information with exhaustive ownership 
information collected from firm public reports on an international basis, in an effort to 
identify the ultimate shareholder of the firm and its nationality by following all known 
majority shareholder upstream links for the firm. 
Unfortunately, we are only provided with ownership information at the date of 
data collection, and are not able to identify firm ownership changes, although we expect 
firm ownership data to be stable. We use information on the nationality of the ultimate 
shareholder of the firm to assign foreign status to firms, and are also able to identify 




We have access to a panel of firms operating in Portugal from 2008 until 2011, 
from which we select firms with primary activity in the manufacturing sector, and thus 
classified within ISIC Rev. 4 codes 10 to 33. We restrict our analysis to manufacturing 
firms, as our earlier discussion does not conform to the determinants of exports and 
subsidiary establishment decisions of firms operating in the services or in the primary 
sector.  Industry classification data is also only available at the date of data collection, 
although we also expect that it is not a significant source of error, as we do not expect 
that many firms change their main industry during the short time span of the data. 
Additionally, we drop firms with missing values for any of the following 
variables: fixed assets, number of employees and added value. In order to comply with 
the requirements of our estimation procedures, we also drop a small number of firms with 
negative values for added value and firms operating in three-digit ISIC sectors with less 
than 10 firms in total. Finally, due to irregular coverage of data, we use a constant sample 
of firms that are observed in every year of the panel and satisfy all of the cleaning 
procedures described above. The choice to have a balanced panel was made due to the 
nature of exports data. A few firms contribute disproportionately to total Portuguese 
exports in any given year. By choosing to have a balanced panel, we ensure that our 
results are not influenced by irregular coverage in some years of a few small firms that 
contribute disproportionately to overall exports. We also expect that the risks incurred in 
having a balanced panel are minimized since we do not expect that most firms that 
participate or that are at risk of participating in international markets are firms that enter 
or exit operation during the time span of the panel, due to the productivity requirements 
in the participation in international markets. 
Our final sample includes 15,580 non-multinational or purely domestic firms, 100 
domestic multinationals and 209 foreign firms. All nominal variables are deflated with 









3.2 Empirical Strategy 
We follow a two-step approach. First, we estimate input coefficients of Cobb-
Douglas production functions separately for each individual industry, in order to obtain 
total factor productivity (TFP) estimates for individual firms. Second, for each firm 
ownership type, we regress firm export orientation on firm productivity, using the 
estimates of firm productivity obtained in the first step. 
3.2.1 Production Function Estimation 
To obtain TFP estimates for individual firms we estimate several specifications of 
the following equation: 
 
𝑦!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑙!" + 𝛽!𝑘!" + 𝜔!" + 𝜂!" 
 
where 𝑦!" is the logarithm of value added, used to measure of firm output, and 𝑙!" 
and 𝑘!" are the logarithm of labor and capital, respectively. The error term is assumed 
separable into 𝜔!", a productivity component and 𝜂!", an i.i.d component. 
Estimation of the previous equation presents several challenges. The first problem 
is the simultaneity of input choice. If firms with higher productivity choose higher input 
levels, then productivity and input usage will be positively correlated and the OLS 
estimator will be biased upwards for both input coefficients. 
We could also have a selection bias. If firms find capital inputs harder to adjust 
than labor inputs, negative productivity shocks are less likely to lead to firm exit in firms 
with higher levels of capital. This effect would generate a downwards bias in the OLS 
estimator of the capital coefficient (Van Beveren, 2012). However, selection bias is found 
to be much less important empirically than the simultaneity bias (Levinsohn & Petrin, 
2003). 
There are several alternatives to overcome these problems. The procedures 
introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) are frequently 
used and make use of assumptions on the timing and dynamics of input usage and TFP, 
as well as the relationship between inputs and TFP, in order to obtain semi-parametric 
estimators that are consistent in the presence of a simultaneity bias and even for the less 
severe selection bias effect in the case of the first procedure. 
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A less structural approach is to use a fixed effects estimator (Pavcnik, 2002; 
Levinsohn & Petrin, 2003; Eberhardt & Helmers, 2010). The fixed effects estimator will 
provide consistent estimates for input coefficients under the assumption that 𝜔!" is firm 
specific but time invariant, that is, assuming  𝜔!" = 𝜔!  ,∀!, which would be unreasonable 
if firms had time to adjust inputs to their realized productivity. As the fixed effects 
estimator only uses within firm variation, it is not subject to the simultaneity bias. 
Assumption of time-invariant fixed effects for firms rules out the selection bias from exit 
that is due to the realization of low productivity shocks by assumption. 
However, fixed effects estimation may be appropriate to our setting. The 
assumption of time invariant fixed effects may be suited to our short panel. Also, the time 
period used in out panel provides particularly high within firm variation, thus minimizing 
the downfall of only using within firm variation instead of cross section variation. 
Accordingly, we perform fixed effects regressions by each manufacturing sector in our 
panel, both using two-digit and three-digit ISIC sectors. For comparison purposes, we 
also perform equivalent OLS regressions for each manufacturing sector in our panel. 
3.2.2 Export Intensity Regressions 
After obtaining TFP estimates, we estimate several specifications of the following 
equation with OLS regressions: 
 
𝐸𝐼!" = 𝐷𝑂𝑀× 𝛽!!"# + 𝛽!!"#𝑇𝐹𝑃! + 𝐷𝑀𝑁𝐸× 𝛽!!"#$ + 𝛽!!"#$𝑇𝐹𝑃! + 
+  𝐹𝑂𝑅× 𝛽!!"# + 𝛽!!"#𝑇𝐹𝑃! + 𝛾!" + 𝜖!" 
 
where 𝐸𝐼!" is firm export intensity, the share of firm output that is exported, 
DOM, DMNE and FOR are dummies for firm ownership type, indicating whether the 
firm is a (purely) domestic firm, a domestic multinational or a foreign affiliate. 𝛾!" stands 
for a set of common control variables which include, according to specification, 4 year 





Table 16 presents aggregate values for performance and input variables in 2011 
for our sample. Aggregate value added in our sample is roughly 4% of the GDP of 
Portugal, which was 185 billion euros in 2011. This low percentage is due to the 
restriction to manufacturing sectors only, as manufacturing only accounts for about 13% 
of the GDP in Portugal (World Bank data for 2010; data not available for 2011, but with 
overall decreasing trend). However, firms in our sample account for a stable share of 
about 30% of total Portuguese exports in the sample period, as can be seen in Table 17. 
Thus, the contribution of the manufacturing sector to overall exports is disproportionate 
to the overall importance in the GDP, and we should study the manufacturing sector in 
detail in order to understand export behavior. 
We can also observe in Table 16 that domestic multinationals account for around 
10% of aggregate sample values in assets, sales, exports and value added, and a 
substantially smaller share of the number of employees. Foreign affiliates account for 
around 20% of aggregate assets, value added and sales in our sample, and also account 
for a substantially smaller share of employees. Nevertheless, foreign affiliates are 
responsible for a very large share of exports, particularly EU exports as they account for 
40% of EU exports in our sample. 
Table 18 displays the distribution of firms by each two-digit ISIC Industry. The 
aggregate number of firms is around 15,000, which compares to a population of around 
38,000 manufacturing firms (data from Statistics Portugal). Thus we are able to account 
for around 30% of manufacturing output and 40% of the number of firms. Although these 
shares are imprecise, they may indicate an overrepresentation of smaller firms in our 
sample. Both domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates seem to be moderately well 
distributed across sectors, although the distribution of domestic multinationals seem to 
follow more closely that of domestic firms. 
Table 19 displays averages of key variables in our sample by firm ownership type. 
The distribution of some of these variables is depicted in Figure 1. Variables that are 
directly related with input use such as assets, fixed assets, number of employees, labor 
costs, skill and labor productivity, are all similar among domestic multinationals and 
foreign affiliates, although the similarity is smaller for labor related variables, as foreign 
affiliates seem to hire less workers but more skilled ones, when compared to domestic 
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multinationals. For any of these variables, foreign affiliates and domestic multinationals 
have significantly higher average values than domestic firms. Figure 1 illustrates how the 
distributions of input usage variables and performance variables are similar among 
domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates, and dissimilar between domestic firms and 
either domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates. In spite of this similarity, the 
distributions of input usage and performance variables of foreign affiliates are more left 
skewed and exhibit higher dispersion than the distributions of domestic multinationals. 
Foreign affiliates export considerably more than domestic multinationals, 
although they are not located in industries with higher levels of export orientation and a 
higher percentage of domestic multinationals are exporters. Foreign affiliate export 
intensity is more polarized than that of domestic multinationals, as most foreign affiliates 
either export most of their production or a small amount of their total production, in 
contrast with a much more even distribution of domestic multinational firms over export 
intensity. This helps us understand the relative left skew of the distribution of 
characteristics for foreign affiliates relative to that of domestic multinationals, as an 
important number of foreign affiliates are domestic market oriented and thus can operate 
at a smaller scale than domestic multinationals. Foreign affiliate exports are more EU 
market oriented than those of domestic multinationals, and the latter group of firms seems 
to perform better than foreign affiliates in non-EU markets, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Domestic firms have a poorer export performance than any other group of firms, with 
lower exports, a low percentage of exporters and low export intensity among exporters. 
Table 20 and Table 21 present estimates for input coefficients obtained with a set 
of pooled OLS regressions by both two and three digit industries. As discussed above, the 
output variable used is deflated value added. The labor input variable used is the number 
of employees and the capital input variable is deflated fixed assets. Average coefficients 
for labor and capital are similar in the two-digit or three-digit industry specifications. In 
the case of a two-digit industry specification, the average capital input coefficient is 0.92 
and the average labor input coefficient is 0.15. Average sum of coefficients is 1.08, in 
favor of returns to scale, with almost no sector reporting negative returns to scale. In the 
latter case of a three-digit industry specification, the average capital input coefficient is 
slightly higher at 0.94 and the average labor input coefficient is slightly smaller at 0.14. 
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Average sum of coefficients is still 1.08, again in favor of returns to scale for almost all 
sectors. 
In Table 22 and Table 23 we report the input coefficients obtained using a fixed 
effects estimator (within estimator). As expected from the existence of a simultaneity bias 
leading to an upward bias in OLS estimates, there is a drop in average input coefficient 
estimates for both input types. In the two-digit case, the average labor input coefficient is 
now 0.61 and the average capital input coefficient is 0.07, with an average sum of 
coefficients of 0.68, in favor of decreasing returns to scale, although two sectors still 
exhibit increasing returns to scale and the overall distribution of the sum of coefficients is 
larger. In the three-digit case, average labor input coefficient, average capital input 
coefficient and average coefficient sum are all the same as in the two-digit case. 
The capital input coefficient appears to be small, although these input coefficient 
estimates are similar to those generally found performing fixed effects estimations with 
value added as the output variable. In particular, Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) find fixed 
effects estimation to hold a capital input coefficient of around 0.2, sometimes near 0.1, 
depending on specification. Additionally, fixed assets are generally 25% to 30% of total 
assets (Table 16). Total assets include intangible assets, which are one the discussed 
sources of firm productivity, and thus should be excluded. If we were to include total 
assets as our capital input variable and perform fixed effects regressions we would obtain 
input coefficients of 0.53 for both labor and capital at the two-digit level and 0.52 and 
0.50 for labor and capital, respectively, at the three-digit level (not reported). 
In Figure 2 we plot the distribution of TFP estimates according to these 4 
specifications and firm ownership type. The distribution of TFP estimates obtained with 
pooled OLS estimations at the two-digit or three-digit industry level appears to be 
unreasonably different from the distributions of any performance related variables in 
Figure 1. On the other hand, either of the two distributions obtained under fixed effect 
estimations seems to agree with the overall shape of performance variables in Figure 1. 
As the pooled OLS estimator results in larger estimates for the capital and labor input 
coefficients, groups of firms with higher productivity and input usage will have more of 
their performance attributed to the higher input usage, resulting in smaller productivity 
residuals than in the fixed effect estimation case and smaller differences in estimated 
productivity across firm ownership groups. As can be seen in Table 24, TFP estimates 
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according to a two or three-digit industry level are also highly correlated for any chosen 
estimator and do not seem to hold considerable differences, although less so in the fixed 
effects case. 
Table 26 reports the distribution of firm TFP estimates for our preferred 
specification of fixed effects regression at the three-digit level, by firm ownership type. It 
illustrates the similarity in the distribution of TFP estimates for foreign affiliates and 
domestic multinationals, a higher overall productivity of firms in any of these two groups 
relative to domestic firms, and also a slightly higher dispersion of productivity of foreign 
affiliates relative to domestic multinationals. At the last two classes of TFP estimates, we 
find only 0.4% of domestic firms, but 15% of domestic multinationals and 16.3% of 
foreign affiliates. 
Figure 3 depicts how the TFP of firms of any ownership type increases as firm 
age increases. Accordingly, the slope of the lines fitted for any firm ownership type is 
always positive. The firm age coefficient of a simple linear regression of TFP estimates 
on firm age is always positive and significant at p<0.001, for foreign and purely domestic 
firms. For domestic multinationals it is still positive but not significant. This result is 
consistent with gradual productivity increases over time and can justify firms’ gradual 
progress over internationalization stages (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977).  
Figure 4 depicts a non-parametric local polynomial regression of export intensity 
on TFP estimates by firm ownership type. Domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates 
share overall similar levels of productivity, that are much higher than those for domestic 
firms. Domestic firms exhibit a positive relationship between productivity and export 
intensity. For foreign affiliates the relationship between productivity and export intensity 
appears to be negative, while for domestic multinationals the relationship between 
productivity and export intensity appears to be mostly flat, but negative for very high 
productivity levels. 
We now turn to the second stage estimation results.   
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Table 15 displays the results of this estimation procedure in 4 different 
specifications. Export intensity is measured in percentage points. The first two 
specifications are performed with no additional control variables, while the last two 
specifications include three sets of dummy variables, including year dummies, location 
dummies at the district level, and industry sector dummies at the three-digit level. 
Specifications (1) and (3) include different intercepts and linear terms for each firm 
ownership type, while specifications (2) and (4) also include one quadratic term on 
productivity in order to allow for a non-linear effect of productivity on firm export 
intensity. Reported t-statistics are computed with robust standard errors, clustered at the 
firm level. 
The specification in column (1) shows that foreign affiliates and domestic 
multinationals alike are much more export oriented than domestic firms. Both firm 
ownership dummies are above 50 percentage points, and thus we expect multinational 
firms of any type to export more than half of their output. We are not able to reject the 
null hypothesis that the dummies for foreign affiliate and domestic multinational are 
equal (p-value = 0.733). However, their response to an increase in productivity is 
different. While foreign affiliates exhibit a negative effect of productivity on export 
intensity, the effect of productivity on export intensity for domestic multinationals is not 
significant (p-value 0=0.943). Domestic firms, on the other hand, have an intercept of 
12.6 percentage points, much lower than the intercepts of other ownership types, but a 
higher effect from productivity increases. Although the effect is strong enough to 
generate the predicted negative export intensity values for the range of productivity 
estimates for domestic firms in our sample, the threshold value is very low at -1.05, and 
thus it only occurs for a small group of firms (Table 25). 
The specification in column (2) includes a quadratic term in productivity for every 
firm ownership type. All dummy coefficients seem similar to the estimates in 
specification (1). Again, we are unable reject the null hypothesis of equality of dummy 
coefficients for foreign affiliates and domestic multinationals. Domestic firms exhibit a 
significant linear coefficient estimate, which is similar in magnitude to the one found in 
specification (1), but also exhibits a positive and significant estimated coefficient for the 
quadratic term. The linear and quadratic coefficients for foreign affiliates are both 
negative, but no longer significant individually, although the p-value for the test of joint 
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significance of both coefficients is only 0.0503. Both the linear and quadratic coefficients 
for domestic multinationals are significant, but it is the only firm ownership type with 
estimated coefficients of different signs. Thus, the linear term is positive and the 
quadratic term is negative, thus implying initial positive effects of productivity on export 
intensity, but subsequent increases with diminishing positive effects. The coefficient 
estimates imply negative marginal effects of TFP from level 1.93 of TFP onwards, a 
region where 15% of domestic multinationals are located. 
As discussed earlier, specifications (3) and (4) contain estimation results from 
OLS regressions that include sets of year, location and industry dummies as control 
variables. The results obtained are similar to those in specifications (1) and (2). Due to 
the inclusion of control variables, only differences in ownership dummies remain 
interpretable, not individual ownership dummy levels. We continue to fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of equality between the foreign affiliate dummy and the domestic 
multinational dummy, and these remain higher than the domestic dummy. In 
specification (3) all linear coefficients have the same sign and the magnitude only 
decreases considerably for domestic multinationals, while remaining not significant, 
relative to specification (1). The only change in significance levels is that the linear 
coefficient for foreign affiliates is no longer significant (p-value of 0.148). Specification 
(4) also holds similar results to specification (2). In particular, we are unable to reject the 
null hypothesis that ownership dummies for domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates 
are equal. Linear and quadratic coefficients for domestic firms are similar to specification 
(2). The sign and lack of significance for the linear and quadratic terms for foreign 
affiliates are also similar to specification (2), although it is even harder to reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly significant (p-value = 0.3645). For the linear 
and quadratic terms of domestic multinationals we have the same magnitude, sign and 
significance as in specification (2). The coefficient estimates for the linear an quadratic 
terms of domestic multinationals now imply negative marginal effects of TFP from level 





Table 15. OLS Regressions of Export Intensity 
Dependent Variable: Export Intensity (in percentage points) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Domestic 12.608*** 11.686*** -2.031 -3.358** 
 (65.893) (52.806) (-1.306) (-2.118) 
Domestic X TFP 11.969*** 11.912*** 12.357*** 12.236*** 
 (34.119) (34.059) (37.914) (37.990) 
Domestic X TFP2  2.291***  2.802*** 
  (6.509)  (8.518) 
Foreign 53.453*** 52.757*** 33.251*** 33.149*** 
 (12.641) (11.073) (7.690) (6.811) 
Foreign X TFP -5.534** -3.662 -3.600 -2.943 
 (-2.080) (-0.686) (-1.447) (-0.569) 
Foreign X TFP2  -0.666  -0.053 
  (-0.496)  (-0.042) 
DMNE 51.409*** 47.445*** 31.197*** 26.797*** 
 (12.090) (11.140) (6.821) (5.235) 
DMNE X TFP 0.185 6.918* 1.065 7.832* 
 (0.072) (1.750) (0.423) (1.760) 
DMNE X TFP2  -1.788***  -1.606** 
  (-2.919)  (-2.307) 
Industry Dummies NO NO YES YES 
Location Dummies NO NO YES YES 
Year Dummies NO NO YES YES 
Number of observations 63,556 63,556 63,556 63,556 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis 
 
A robustness check is performed to ensure that the choice of a linear probability 
model does not influence results in the presence of a fractional dependent variable that is 
bounded to the unit interval. We follow Papke and Wooldridge (1993) in using a method 
that combines the usual logistic transformation of the dependent variable with a binomial 
distribution, in order to allow the dependent variable to take extreme values of zero or 
one (not reported). For the subsets of firms that we are mostly interested, namely 
domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates, the only change in significance for the 
interaction terms with productivity is that the linear term for domestic multinationals in 
the equivalent specification to specification (3) is now significant, although still positive, 
which is still in agreement with our results. All significant productivity interaction terms 
have the same sign as before. Robustness of results for these groups of firms is expected 
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as they have non extreme export intensity values, as seen in Figure 4. However, as Figure 
4 illustrates, domestic firms have some extreme values near to zero, and thus we expect 
that the convexity could be partially induced by the imposition of a linear probability 
model. Accordingly, the quadratic terms for domestic firms are negative in this 
regression. Thus we should interpret the quadratic term for domestic firms with caution 
when using the simpler and more easily interpretable linear probability model, although 
and we expect no bias in our results for the groups of multinational firms. 
Our results suggest that, unconditional on productivity levels, domestic 
multinationals and foreign affiliates do not have significantly different export intensity 
levels, which stresses the importance of multinationality status for export performance, 
irrespective of the type of established subsidiaries. Hence, domestic multinationals and 
foreign affiliates alike seem to export at least a share of 30% of their output more than 
domestic firms, even if we control for industry, year and location. 
However, the effect of an increase in productivity is different for domestic 
multinationals and foreign affiliates. The effect of productivity on the export intensity of 
domestic multinationals is initially positive and later on negative, as expected. 
Nevertheless, the threshold productivity level required to induce a negative marginal 
effect of productivity on export intensity of domestic multinationals is very high and thus 
unlikely to affect a significant number of domestic multinationals. These results are 
coherent with initially established subsidiaries performing a non-manufacturing 
distribution role, while subsequent subsidiaries may perform manufacturing roles. 
Although this effect does not seem to be very large, it is large enough to break down the 
overall positive association between productivity and export intensity. Finally, we cannot 
account for how much this particular setting influences the findings, as a low domestic 
demand might encourage the establishment of distribution networks. Also, a low-wage 
country located inside a larger regional free trade area is a good candidate to perform 
manufacturing activities, or at least, some input processing operations and thus we cannot 
account for how much Portuguese low labor costs relative to other countries inside the 
same free trade area are a deterrent to firm relocation of manufacturing activities into 




The international involvement of domestic firms according to their productivity 
level seems to be as follows: low productivity domestic firms are focused on the domestic 
market; the most productive domestic firms are exporters; the highest productivity 
domestic firms are multinationals. This results holds before and after controlling for 
industry, year and location and is consistent the predictions of the literature. 
The productivity of foreign affiliates does not seem to have a significant effect on 
their export intensity, after industry, year and location are accounted for. Although the 
coefficient for the productivity variable is negative and significant before addition of 
control variables, and remains negative in specifications (3) and (4), we fail to reject the 
hypothesis that there is no effect of productivity on the export intensity of foreign 
affiliates in both specifications (3) and (4). Thus, we cannot reject the negative effect of 
productivity on export intensity of foreign affiliates, as found in Lu et al. (2010). While 
the persistently negative sign of the coefficients on productivity may suggest that the 
failure to find a negative relationship is due to a lower sample size than the one used in 
Lu et al. (2010), in particular since a clear relationship exists for domestic multinationals 
which constitute a smaller group of firms, it is consistent with the findings of other 
studies. It has been found that the export intensity of foreign affiliates in the United 
Kingdom is similarly unresponsive to individual firm characteristics when compared to 
domestic firms (Kneller & Pisu, 2004). This finding has been taken as evidence of the 
existence of complex integration strategies of multinationals whose strategic decisions 
are not explained in a linear fashion by firm characteristics, which is in agreement with 
our hypothesis that a low-demand low-wage setting moderates the effect of productivity 
on export intensity of foreign affiliates. 
5. Conclusion 
We studied the relationship between productivity and international participation 
of purely domestic firms, domestic multinationals and foreign affiliates of multinationals. 
We have found a direct relationship between the productivity of domestic firms and both 
export intensity and multinationality status, with the productivity hierarchy being the one 
predicted by the international trade literature, that is, low productivity domestic firms are 
domestic market oriented, higher productivity domestic firms export more, and the 
highest productivity domestic firms are multinationals. 
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We have found that multinationals as a whole make up for a very important share 
of exports and that the impact of productivity on the export intensity of multinational 
firms is different from that of purely domestic firms and thus the multinationality status 
of firms is important in assessing export behavior. Among multinational firms, domestic 
multinationals and foreign affiliates also respond differently to productivity, although 
they share similar characteristics and an overall similar level of export orientation. 
We have found that domestic multinationals do not exhibit a negative relationship 
between export orientation and productivity, unlike what could be expected from the FDI 
literature. A possible explanation for this finding is the importance of the establishment 
of subsidiaries as sales outposts at an intermediate internationalization stage, as 
documented in the business literature. 
We were not able to find a direct relationship between productivity and export 
intensity for foreign affiliates. Although we cannot reject the negative relationship that is 
found in other studies, this is evidence of a larger heterogeneity within foreign affiliates, 
as domestic multinationals have a clear relationship between productivity and export 
intensity, while constituting a smaller group of firms. The heterogeneity of foreign 
affiliates may be related to host country characteristics, as export platform and vertical 
integration strategies are more likely to be pursued by multinationals in low-demand low-
wage countries. Thus, identification of the pursued integration strategies by foreign 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 16. Aggregate Values for 2011 
 Ownership Type 
 DOM DMNE FOR Total 
Assets (€  ‘000 000) 30,177 71% 4,493 11% 7,900 19% 42,570 
Fixed Assets (€  ‘000 000) 8,986 73% 1,054 9% 2,243 18% 12,283 
 No. Employees 320,875 83% 23,835 6% 40,680 11% 385,390 
Sales (€  ‘000 000) 28,672 66% 4,140 9% 10,831 25% 43,642 
Exports (€  ‘000 000) 10,158 54% 1,844 10% 6,871 36% 18,873 
EU Exports (€  ‘000 000) 8,222 52% 1,301 8% 6,237 40% 15,761 




Table 17. Aggregate Exports by year (Millions of Euros) 
 Ownership Type   
Exports DOM DMNE FOR Sample Total Portugal Sample 
2008 8,892 1,646 5,769 16,307 59,144 27.6% 
2009 7,828 1,577 4,793 14,198 49,311 28.8% 
2010 8,800 1,694 6,102 16,595 55,577 29.9% 
2011 10,158 1,844 6,871 18,873 62,232 30.3% 
Note: Portuguese Exports include non-manufacturing exports 










Table 18. Distribution of Firms by Industry and Firm Ownership Type 
     
 Ownership Type 
ISIC Rev.4 - two digits DOM DMNE FOR Total 
 No. No. No. No. 
10 - Manufacture of food products 2,030 13 23 2,066 
11 - Manufacture of beverages 194 3 5 202 
13 - Manufacture of textiles 824 7 10 841 
14 - Manufacture of wearing apparel 1,498 10 4 1,512 
15 - Manufacture of leather 850 3 6 859 
16 - Manufacture of products of wood and cork 1,094 5 6 1,105 
17 - Manufacture of paper products 179 3 8 190 
18 - Printing and reproduction of recorded media 810 2 0 812 
20 - Manufacture of chemical products 235 2 22 259 
21 - Manufacture of pharmaceutical products 31 2 6 39 
22 - Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 472 5 12 489 
23 - Manufacture non-metallic mineral products 1,076 5 18 1,099 
24 - Manufacture of basic metals 117 1 7 125 
25 - Manufacture of fabricated metal products 2,985 19 18 3,022 
26 - Manufacture of electronic products 70 1 5 76 
27 - Manufacture of electrical equipment 212 5 11 228 
28 - Manufacture of machinery and equipment 566 9 8 583 
29 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers 179 1 29 209 
30 - Manufacture of other transport equipment 49 0 0 49 
31 - Manufacture of furniture 920 3 1 924 
32 - Other manufacturing 508 0 5 513 
33 - Repair and installation of machinery 681 1 5 687 
Total 15,580 100 209 15,889 





Table 19. Summary Statistics (2008-2011) 
 Ownership Type 
averages DOM DMNE FOR Total 
Sales (€  ‘000 000) 1.8 39.9 47.0 2.6 
Valued Added (€  ‘000 000) 0.5 9.0 10.0 0.7 
Assets (€  ‘000 000) 1.9 42.6 38.3 2.6 
Fixed Assets (€  ‘000 000) 0.6 10.3 11.3 0.8 
No. Employees 20.5 234.7 199.0 24.2 
Labor Costs (€  ‘000 000) 0.3 4.8 5.2 0.4 
Skill (Cost per Worker, € ‘000) 13.5 20.8 27.4 13.8 
Labor Productivity (VA per Worker, € ‘000) 21.2 40.2 55.0 21.7 
Exports (€  ‘000 000) 0.6 16.9 28.2 1.0 
Exporter Dummy 0.429 0.985 0.891 0.438 
Exports as Share of Output 0.123 0.516 0.470 0.130 
EU Exports as Share of Exports 0.779 0.709 0.834 0.780 
Sector Exports as Share of 2D Sector Output 0.368 0.381 0.403 0.369 
Sector Exports as Share of 3D Sector Output 0.352 0.419 0.409 0.353 
Export Intensity Classes     
    0% 0.571 0.015 0.109 0.562 
    >0 - 20% 0.248 0.195 0.289 0.248 
    20 - 40% 0.053 0.180 0.089 0.055 
    40 - 60% 0.037 0.210 0.080 0.039 
    60 - 80% 0.032 0.163 0.100 0.034 
    80 - <100% 0.053 0.238 0.315 0.058 
    100% 0.005 0.000 0.018 0.005 






















































































































































































































Table 20. Input Coefficient Estimates from Pooled OLS at the two-digit level 
ISIC Rev4 2D Description Firms No. Labor Coef. Capital Coef. Coef. Sum 
Man food products 2,066 0.91 0.18 1.09 
Man beverages 202 0.79 0.28 1.07 
Man textiles 841 0.87 0.14 1.01 
Man wearing apparel 1,512 0.85 0.14 1.00 
Man leather 859 0.79 0.20 0.99 
Man products of wood and cork 1,105 0.94 0.14 1.08 
Man paper products 190 0.93 0.19 1.12 
Reproduction of recorded media 812 0.93 0.15 1.08 
Man chemical products 259 0.98 0.20 1.18 
Man pharmaceutical products 39 1.44 -0.13 1.30 
Man rubber and plastics products 489 0.89 0.18 1.07 
Man other mineral products 1,099 0.97 0.17 1.14 
Man basic metals 125 0.96 0.13 1.09 
Man fabricated metal products 3,022 0.94 0.15 1.09 
Man electronic products 76 0.97 0.11 1.09 
Man electrical equipment 228 1.01 0.10 1.11 
Man machinery and equipment 583 0.94 0.13 1.07 
Man motor vehicles, trailers 209 0.98 0.11 1.10 
Man other transport equipment 49 0.89 0.07 0.96 
Man furniture 924 0.98 0.11 1.09 
Other manufacturing 513 0.93 0.11 1.04 
Repair & installation machinery 687 1.02 0.12 1.14 
Averages weighted by number of firms 0.92 0.15 1.08 






Table 21. Input Coefficient Estimates from Pooled OLS at the three-digit level 
Sector Firms Labor Capital Sum       
101 205 0.92 0.15 1.07  242 12 1.29 -0.01 1.28 
102 60 0.80 0.18 0.98  243 18 1.01 0.15 1.16 
103 76 0.88 0.20 1.08  244 32 0.96 0.12 1.08 
104 61 0.97 0.15 1.12  245 63 0.96 0.10 1.06 
105 105 1.04 0.16 1.20  251 1,337 1.01 0.12 1.14 
106 41 0.99 0.19 1.18  252 50 0.95 0.13 1.08 
107 1,343 0.99 0.09 1.08  253 10 0.69 0.08 0.77 
108 116 0.85 0.21 1.06  255 119 0.98 0.12 1.10 
109 59 0.83 0.18 1.01  256 506 0.95 0.13 1.08 
110 202 0.79 0.28 1.07  257 505 0.85 0.18 1.03 
131 46 0.90 0.01 0.91  259 495 0.91 0.15 1.05 
132 79 0.89 0.12 1.01  261 28 1.01 0.03 1.04 
133 132 0.74 0.22 0.96  262 12 1.12 0.03 1.14 
139 584 0.89 0.14 1.03  263 11 0.97 0.18 1.14 
141 1,347 0.84 0.15 0.99  265 25 0.82 0.20 1.01 
143 165 0.93 0.09 1.02  271 78 1.00 0.09 1.09 
151 90 0.75 0.24 0.99  273 17 1.26 -0.02 1.25 
152 769 0.80 0.19 0.99  274 55 1.06 0.10 1.16 
161 248 0.98 0.14 1.12  275 32 0.90 0.15 1.05 
162 857 0.94 0.15 1.08  279 46 1.21 0.10 1.31 
171 12 0.75 0.33 1.08  281 53 0.96 0.12 1.08 
172 178 0.91 0.18 1.09  282 226 0.94 0.12 1.06 
181 812 0.93 0.15 1.08  283 45 0.98 0.15 1.14 
201 54 0.82 0.33 1.15  284 42 0.86 0.19 1.05 
203 62 1.07 0.11 1.18  289 217 0.95 0.12 1.07 
204 75 1.08 0.09 1.17  291 11 1.01 0.13 1.14 
205 68 0.95 0.22 1.17  292 76 1.02 0.05 1.07 
212 39 1.44 -0.13 1.30  293 122 0.92 0.15 1.07 
221 56 1.05 0.05 1.10  301 23 0.89 0.05 0.94 
222 433 0.87 0.20 1.07  309 26 0.92 0.11 1.03 
231 155 1.20 0.09 1.29  310 924 0.98 0.11 1.09 
233 61 0.95 0.21 1.16  321 148 0.98 0.09 1.07 
234 121 0.94 0.14 1.08  323 16 0.91 0.27 1.18 
235 14 1.25 0.25 1.50  325 174 0.99 0.12 1.11 
236 197 0.95 0.18 1.12  329 175 0.90 0.10 1.00 
237 523 0.96 0.14 1.11  331 554 1.00 0.11 1.11 
239 28 0.70 0.34 1.05  332 133 1.01 0.14 1.15 
 (continues)    Weighted Avg. 0.94 0.14 1.08 
 
86 
Table 22. Input Coefficient Estimates from Fixed Effects at the two-digit level 
ISIC Rev4 2D Description Firms No.  Labor Coef. Capital Coef. Coef. Sum 
Man food products 2,066 0.42 0.05 0.48 
Man beverages 202 0.23 0.29 0.53 
Man textiles 841 0.56 0.06 0.62 
Man wearing apparel 1,512 0.62 0.05 0.67 
Man leather 859 0.72 0.10 0.82 
Man products of wood and cork 1,105 0.66 0.09 0.74 
Man paper products 190 0.53 0.11 0.64 
Reproduction of recorded media 812 0.50 0.09 0.59 
Man chemical products 259 0.64 0.03 0.66 
Man pharmaceutical products 39 0.32 0.12 0.44 
Man rubber and plastics products 489 0.71 0.11 0.82 
Man other mineral products 1,099 0.71 0.05 0.76 
Man basic metals 125 1.09 0.06 1.15 
Man fabricated metal products 3,022 0.61 0.07 0.69 
Man electronic products 76 1.07 0.13 1.20 
Man electrical equipment 228 0.72 0.08 0.79 
Man machinery and equipment 583 0.58 0.10 0.69 
Man motor vehicles, trailers 209 0.49 0.09 0.58 
Man other transport equipment 49 1.01 -0.01 1.00 
Man furniture 924 0.70 0.07 0.76 
Other manufacturing 513 0.59 0.05 0.64 
Repair & installation machinery 687 0.66 0.06 0.72 
Averages (weighted by firm number) 0.61 0.07 0.68 





Table 23. Input Coefficient Estimates from Fixed Effects at the three-digit level 
Sector Firms Labor Capital Sum       
101 205 0.48 0.05 0.53  242 12 2.34 -0.49 1.85 
102 60 0.56 0.05 0.61  243 18 0.85 0.09 0.94 
103 76 0.29 0.00 0.29  244 32 0.52 0.08 0.60 
104 61 -0.16 0.02 -0.14  245 63 0.59 0.03 0.63 
105 105 0.43 0.19 0.62  251 1,337 0.68 0.08 0.77 
106 41 0.15 0.04 0.19  252 50 0.83 -0.03 0.81 
107 1,343 0.51 0.04 0.55  253 10 0.84 -0.06 0.78 
108 116 0.37 0.07 0.44  255 119 0.47 0.06 0.52 
109 59 0.19 0.15 0.34  256 506 0.56 0.06 0.62 
110 202 0.23 0.29 0.53  257 505 0.50 0.06 0.56 
131 46 1.26 -0.01 1.25  259 495 0.60 0.09 0.69 
132 79 0.33 0.08 0.40  261 28 1.74 -0.04 1.70 
133 132 0.51 0.00 0.51  262 12 0.79 0.18 0.97 
139 584 0.57 0.09 0.66  263 11 0.76 0.26 1.01 
141 1,347 0.63 0.05 0.67  265 25 0.79 0.09 0.88 
143 165 0.58 0.04 0.62  271 78 0.78 0.02 0.80 
151 90 0.73 0.16 0.89  273 17 0.42 0.05 0.47 
152 769 0.71 0.09 0.81  274 55 0.41 0.07 0.48 
161 248 0.61 0.15 0.75  275 32 0.90 0.18 1.07 
162 857 0.66 0.08 0.74  279 46 0.57 0.18 0.75 
171 12 1.62 0.12 1.74  281 53 0.19 0.06 0.26 
172 178 0.53 0.11 0.63  282 226 0.52 0.17 0.70 
181 812 0.50 0.09 0.59  283 45 0.39 0.05 0.44 
201 54 0.59 0.20 0.79  284 42 0.48 -0.01 0.48 
203 62 0.38 -0.02 0.36  289 217 0.77 0.04 0.81 
204 75 0.75 -0.01 0.74  291 11 0.41 0.14 0.56 
205 68 0.58 0.03 0.62  292 76 0.44 0.11 0.55 
212 39 0.32 0.12 0.44  293 122 0.52 0.08 0.60 
221 56 1.00 0.07 1.07  301 23 1.03 0.04 1.07 
222 433 0.68 0.12 0.80  309 26 0.98 -0.12 0.85 
231 155 0.93 0.09 1.02  310 924 0.70 0.07 0.76 
233 61 0.79 -0.00 0.79  321 148 0.61 0.04 0.65 
234 121 0.53 0.01 0.55  323 16 1.00 -0.19 0.81 
235 14 0.78 -0.42 0.36  325 174 0.52 0.04 0.56 
236 197 0.69 0.06 0.75  329 175 0.61 0.09 0.70 
237 523 0.70 0.04 0.75  331 554 0.67 0.06 0.73 
239 28 0.29 0.09 0.38  332 133 0.60 0.08 0.68 
 (continues)    Weighted Avg. 0.61 0.07 0.68 
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Table 24. Correlation of TFP Estimates across Estimators 
 FE2D FE3D OLS2D OLS3D 
FE2D 1.000    
FE3D 0.929 1.000   
OL2D 0.528 0.494 1.000  





Table 25. Summary Statistics of TFP Estimates (FE3D) by Firm Ownership Type 
TFP DOM DMNE FOR Total 
N 15,580 100 209 15,889 
mean -0.024 1.246 1.166 -0.000 
sd 0.633 0.965 0.936 0.662 
min -3.687 -1.850 -1.401 -3.687 
p10 -0.739 0.338 0.156 -0.733 
p25 -0.398 0.775 0.547 -0.392 
p50 -0.055 1.179 1.080 -0.043 
p75 0.339 1.670 1.730 0.363 
p90 0.761 2.267 2.351 0.814 





Table 26. Distribution of TFP Estimates (FE3D) by Firm Ownership Type 
TFP Classes 
 DOM DMNE FOR Total 
]-∞,-4 ] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
] -4,-2 ] 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.004 
] -2, 0 ] 0.538 0.050 0.081 0.529 
]  0, 2 ] 0.454 0.800 0.756 0.460 
]  2, 4 ] 0.004 0.130 0.153 0.007 








































Figure 4. Non-Parametric Local Polynomial Regressions of Export Intensity on TFP by 
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Abstract 
Received wisdom indicates that, due to a liability of foreignness, foreign firms 
exit with greater likelihood than do comparable domestic firms and that the difference 
attenuates as firms age and overcome the liability. We posit that foreign firms are also 
intrinsically more volatile and footloose than domestic ones and that this leads to an 
increasing divergence between the exit rates of foreign and domestic firms. Empirically, 
we find that the difference between exit rates of foreign firms and domestic firms 
increases with age, as exit of foreign firms increases with age while that of purely 
domestic firms decreases. Exit rates of domestic based multinationals do not change 
significantly with age; they are between those of foreign and purely domestic firms, but 
are closer to the latter. This suggests that the footlooseness observed for foreign firms is 
due to foreignness more than to multinationality. 
 
1. Introduction 
Do foreign firms exit with less or greater likelihood than their domestic 
counterparts? How does this relative likelihood of exiting vary over the life cycle of 
firms? Many studies have investigated the survival of firms in foreign markets (Bane & 
Neubauer, 1981; Delios & Beamish, 2001; Li, 1995; Mitchell, Shaver, & Yeung, 1994; 
Mudambi & Zahra, 2007; Shaver, 1995; Shaver, Mitchell, & Yeung, 1997; Tsang & Yip, 
2007; see Morschett, Donath & Schramm-Klein, 2011 for a recent survey). Most of these 
studies, however, do not compare these patterns with those of domestic firms and thus 
lack an appropriate benchmark to answer the first question above. In addition, the few 
studies that have compared exit by foreign and domestic firms either did not distinguish 
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exit by the time of exit, or focused only on the first years and thus cannot answer the 
second question. 
In one of the earliest studies that compared the survival of foreign and domestic 
firms, Li and Guisinger (1991) reported lower exit rates for foreign companies, but they 
did not control for many factors that are known to be different for foreign and domestic 
firms. Kronborg and Thomsen (2009) analyzed matched pairs of foreign and domestic 
firms established in Denmark between 1895 and 2005. They found no significant 
differences between the pairs that were established in the last 20 years, although they 
found a greater propensity of domestic firms to exit in earlier periods. In another study, 
Mata and Portugal (2002) followed a sample of new firms over their first years and found 
that foreign firms were indeed more likely to survive, but once a relatively small number 
of characteristics that were different between foreign and domestic firms were accounted 
for, foreign firms became more likely to exit, although not significantly so. Görg and 
Strobl (2003) and Bernard and Sjöholm (2003) found that, after controlling for 
characteristics that make foreign firms different from domestic ones, foreign firms exited 
with greater likelihood in Ireland, the US and Indonesia. 
The most common view on why foreign firms exit more easily than their domestic 
counterparts is perhaps that associated with the work by Zaheer (1995) and subsequent 
literature. This literature identifies an increased propensity to exit with liabilities of 
foreignness, that is, cost disadvantages that foreign firms face vis-à-vis their domestic 
counterparts. While the term “liability of foreignness” is relatively new, the concept is 
certainly not, as is acknowledged by its advocates. Its origins can be traced back to the 
pioneering work of Hymer, and one of the fundamental pillars of the theory of 
international firms is that firms operating in foreign markets must have some sort of 
ownership advantage to compensate them for the increased costs of doing business 
abroad, the “liabilities of foreignness”. However, another view, associated with earlier 
writers on foreign divestment (e.g. Boddewyn, 1979; Flamm, 1984), posits that foreign 
investment is inherently “volatile”. According to this view, foreign firms are more 
footloose and should be more likely to exit, as they are less attached to a particular 
location than are domestic firms. When changes in the host economy make that economy 
less attractive or changes elsewhere increase the attractiveness of other locations, 
relocation is seen more favorably by foreign firms than by domestic ones. 
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While both the liability and footlooseness arguments indicate that foreign firms 
may be more likely to exit markets, they lead to different perspectives with respect to the 
temporal evolution of exit rates. The liability of foreignness argument implies that the 
exit rates of foreign and domestic firms should converge as time goes by and firms 
overcome the liabilities. On the contrary, the footlooseness argument implies that 
multinationals should become more and more likely to exit as time goes by. While 
footlooseness is seen as a permanent characteristic, its impact upon exit is likely to 
become more and more evident as changes in the host and other countries come about. 
The few studies that have compared the survival of foreign and domestic firms 
typically cover only a very limited period in the life of firms, and thus are not able to 
shed light on the implications of the two views above. In this paper, we compare the 
survival of foreign and domestic firms over a long period. We use data on firms operating 
in Portugal that include information on the nationality of the most important owners of 
each firm and on whether the firm has a major stake in other firms in foreign countries. 
This information allows us to identify and compare foreign owned firms with purely 
domestic ones and with domestic-based multinationals. Our data are available for the 
period 2006-2008. We identify exiting firms, by finding firms that are active in one year, 
but not in the subsequent year. Because the data include information on the date each 
firm was established as a legal entity in Portugal, we are able to calculate age at the time 
of exit and to estimate exit patterns for firms of all ages.  
An earlier study by Mata and Portugal (2000) examined the survival of newly 
established domestic and foreign firms in Portugal. While that study focused on the first 
seven years of operation, in the current work we use a much more comprehensive data set 
that includes domestic and foreign firms of all ages. This enables us to estimate the 
probabilities of exit for the whole life of firms and to compare the survival of domestic 
and foreign firms from a long-term perspective. To our knowledge, the only study that 
has adopted a long-term perspective is a recent paper by Kronborg and Thomsen (2009). 
One of the novel aspects of their study is that the authors identified foreign and domestic 
firms that were established in different epochs, from the late nineteenth century to the 
present and followed all of them until the current time. However, the study includes only 
a little more than 500 pairs of firms, most of which were relatively young and most of 
which had not exited by the end of the sample period. Because our data set concentrates 
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on a narrow calendar time frame, we are able to control for heterogeneity in world 
conditions that may easily interfere with the exit patterns when one observes cohorts of 
firms over long periods of time, such as in Kronborg and Thomsen (2009).  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the reasons that may 
lead to increasing and decreasing exit of foreign firms over time. Section 3 discusses the 
data and the methods used in the analysis and gives an overview of the basic patterns 
found in the data. Section 4 presents our estimation results and Section 5 discusses the 
implications of these results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature and Hypothesis 
Liabilities and advantages of foreign owned firms 
The recent interest in the liability of foreignness (LOF) originated with a study of 
Zaheer (1995). In this study, the author analyzed foreign exchange trading rooms in New 
York and Tokyo and found that the average profits per trader were higher in rooms 
operated by local banks than in those operated by foreign ones. She concluded that this 
was due to a cost disadvantage faced by foreign firms in doing business abroad, which 
she termed “liability of foreignness”. In a subsequent study, Zaheer and Mosakowski 
(1997) used a multi-country sample of trading rooms and found that foreign firms were 
more likely to exit, in particular during the first years of life. In another multi-country 
study, Miller and Parkhe (2002) found that foreign banks were less efficient than their 
domestic counterparts, and other authors found that foreign firms exit more than domestic 
ones with similar characteristics (e.g. Colombo & Delmastro, 2000; Pennings & 
Sleuwaegen, 2000; Bernard & Sjöholm, 2003; Görg & Strobl, 2003). 
Not all exits of foreign firms are due to liabilities of foreignness, of course. 
Hennart, Roehl, and Zeng (2002) analyzed 32 exits of Japanese subsidiaries from the US 
and found that in several of them the Japanese subsidiaries indeed exited following 
problems in managing human resources, or in dealing with the US government, motives 
that may be considered to be related with LOF. Another reason for exiting - 
overoptimism in forecasting demand - can also be linked to an inability to understand the 
market, although it is difficult to contend that all domestic firms would forecast demand 
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in a flawless fashion. In other cases, however, exits were determined by problems in the 
parent firm, because they had accomplished the mission for which they had been created, 
or because they were acquired by the American partner. Other reasons included oil price 
increases, which would affect all firms in the industry whether they were local or foreign. 
Therefore, in order to test the LOF hypothesis with data on exits it is essential to compare 
the exit patterns of foreign firms with those of their domestic counterparts, rather than 
consider the exit of foreign firms alone. 
Foreign companies may, of course, compensate for the LOF. They can do it, not 
only because of the advantages they possess before entering the host market as a result of 
general ownership advantages, of the type known in the international business literature 
since the pioneering work of Hymer, but also because of the specific strategies they 
choose for the host market. For example, Elango (2009) shows that foreign insurance 
firms operating in the US offer greater product variety than their American counterparts 
in order to offer greater choice to a market that they do not know as well, concentrate in 
fewer and highly populated geographic markets to reduce the need to learn about many 
different local environments, and are more likely to be affiliated with intracorporate 
networks through which they obtain information about the host market. Elango shows 
that while foreign firms perform less well than the average American firm, they perform 
as well as the local firms that follow comparable strategies, a finding that can also be 
seen as indicating that foreign firms are pushed into less attractive niches. 
But foreignness can also be thought of as an intrinsic advantage, because foreign 
firms are typically less constrained by the host country’s informal institutions than are 
their local counterparts. Foreign firms are better able to deal with periods of institutional 
changes in the host countries (Pinkse & Kolk, 2011) and are in a favorable position to 
recognize inefficiencies in local institutions. For example, Siegel et al. (2011) observed 
that foreign firms operating in Korea were able to recognize that women were strongly 
discriminated against in the labor market and to take advantage of that fact by hiring a 
disproportionate number of women for managerial positions. The ability to escape the 
norms of the host country has also been emphasized by Edman (2009) in his analysis of 
the operations of Citibank in Japan. He argues that the negative effects of foreignness 
prompted Citibank to develop practices that differed from the dominant practices of local 
firms. By doing so, Citibank was able to stay in niches with little competition and thus 
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avoid the negative effects of foreignness. While these practices remained atypical in the 
market, foreignness became an advantage for Citibank, as they protected it from local 
firms and delayed imitation. When its practices were eventually imitated by local firms, 
Citibank became again disadvantaged and was pushed into a new wave of innovation. In 
the same line, Un (2011) argues that the need to cope with consumers that tend to be 
biased against foreign products forces the subsidiaries of foreign MNEs to be more 
innovative than domestic firms. Both this evidence and the Citibank episode indicate that 
foreign firms were able to cope with foreignness because they possessed what can be 
called an ownership advantage: the ability to innovate and adapt (although in a disruptive 
manner) to the local environment.  
Foreign firms may thus possess advantages and disadvantages relative to domestic 
units and the net effect of foreignness depends on the balance between these advantages 
and disadvantages. For example, Nachum (2003) observed that foreign financial service 
firms operating in London were, in general, more successful than British firms, and 
asserted that the liability of foreignness did not exist in there. More generally, Nachum 
(2010) attempted to identify and measure the sources of advantages and disadvantages 
and found that while, on average, foreign and domestic firms were not significantly 
different on the costs dimension, foreign firms possessed advantages relative to the 
purely local firms, albeit not relative to multinationals based in the UK.  
The LOF view predicts that, after controlling for these ownership advantages, 
foreign firms should incur extra costs relative to local firms and should, therefore, 
experience greater likelihood of exit. This should hold irrespective of the comparison 
group being purely domestic firms or domestic based multinationals. The extent to which 
these firms possess ownership advantages varies across firms, domestic based 
multinationals being likely to have developed such assets to a greater extent than purely 
local firms. Once these assets are controlled for, however, both purely domestic and 
domestic based multinationals should be less likely to exit than foreign firms, as they do 
not suffer from the foreignness disadvantage. Therefore, our first hypotheses are 
formulated as  
 





Hypothesis 1b. The exit probabilities are greater for foreign firms than for 
domestic based multinationals. 
The evolution of LOF over the life of firms  
A more complete test of the implications of the LOF calls for an examination of 
the evolution of exit rates in addition to the level of exit rates of domestic and foreign 
firms. Zaheer (1995) cited four sources of “liabilities of foreignness”: lack of familiarity 
of foreign firms with the modus operandi of local markets, lack of legitimacy of foreign 
firms in the eyes of customers and other firms (suppliers, for example), the costs 
associated with distance (transportation, coordination), and restrictions imposed by the 
host country. Identifying the nature of the LOF is important because, depending on the 
reasons that cause it in the first place, one may expect it to disappear more quickly or 
slowly as firms grow older. Lack of familiarity and legitimacy are likely to disappear 
over the tenure of foreign firms in the host country. Distance and restrictions from the 
host country may also change over time, but these changes are more related to calendar 
time than to the length of the firm’s tenure in the country. 
Although they did not specifically investigate the causes of the liability of 
foreignness, the findings of Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) suggest that the LOF 
vanishes as firms’ tenure in the host country increases. They followed foreign exchange 
trading rooms in different countries over a period of 19 years, and found that immediately 
after being set up, foreign trading rooms were more likely to exit than domestic ones. 
However, the initial differences in exit rates diminished over time. By the end of the 
sample, they were more or less comparable, a finding that the authors attributed to the 
erosion of the liability of foreignness. 
In another study Mezias (2002) analyzed the number of labor law suits faced by 
foreign and American firms in the US courts to find that foreign firms operating in the 
US faced more labor suits in American courts than did their local counterparts. Mezias 
interpreted this finding as evidence of a liability of foreignness, due to foreign firms 
being less accustomed with American industrial relations than local firms. Supporting his 
view, Mezias presented evidence that the intensity of labor law suits was reduced for 
subsidiaries that had a wider operation in the US and for those that used American top 
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officers. Older subsidiaries also faced fewer law suits at the state level, presumably 
because they had greater opportunities to learn how to deal with industrial relations over 
time. Different firms may overcome the LOF at different paces and active engagement in 
learning about the host country may speed up the process. Petersen and Pedersen (2002) 
showed that those foreign firms that invest in learning about the host country tend to 
report higher perceived familiarity with foreign markets than those which do not and that 
tend to stick to standardized international business routines and are less willing to adapt 
their products and practices to local markets. 
The LOF argument predicts that foreign firms start by displaying an increased 
chance of exiting. As time goes by and the LOF are gradually overcome, exit 
probabilities become closer to those of comparable domestic firms. Because the source of 
the LOF is lack of familiarity with local markets, the argument should hold for foreign 
firms in comparison both with purely domestic firms and domestic based multinationals. 
Therefore our next two hypotheses are: 
 
Hypothesis 2a. Exit probabilities of foreign owned firms become closer to those 
of purely domestic firms as firms age. 
 
Hypothesis 2b. Exit probabilities of foreign owned firms become closer to those 
of domestic based multinationals as firms age. 
Footloose multinationals 
Earlier writers on foreign divestment have sustained that multinationals would be 
more volatile than their local counterparts (Flamm, 1984). According to Boddewyn 
(1983), this pattern of behavior would be explained by two key reasons: the greater range 
of geographical options that foreign firms would consider relative to those considered by 
the domestic firms, and the fact that managers responsible for implementing the 
divestment would be emotionally less involved with the divested firm if the firm were 
located elsewhere than in their home country. 
The first idea was developed by Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994), who argued that 
multinational networks provide options for relocating production among the different 
units. Multinationals may invest in units where single firms would not because, on top of 
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their intrinsic value, these units carry an extra option value for the network. Indeed, 
multinationals have been observed to maintain duplicate production structures (Zander, 
1998) and to shift production from one country to another as a consequence of 
unfavorable evolution of labor costs in the former (Belderbos & Zou, 2007). The ability 
to take advantage of such flexibility may require firms to specifically prepare for it 
(Rangan, 1998; Chung, Lee, Beamish, & Isobe, 2010), and apparently many firms are 
able to do so. When labor costs in countries where the multinational operates change, the 
shift of production between countries sometimes takes the extreme form of divestment 
from subsidiaries operating in those countries in which labor costs increased, in particular 
when the value of keeping options open is not particularly great, such as when 
uncertainty is low or the firm has other subsidiaries in the country (Belderbos & Zou 
2009).  
Many of the changes that induce multinationals to exit from a country also affect 
other firms in the same industries, and some domestic firms may eventually shut down 
their production facilities and exit as a consequence of these changes. However, when 
multinationals contemplate re-location what matters is not whether or not they are 
making a profit in their current location, but whether or not they can make higher profits 
elsewhere. In addition, multinationals respond to changes in not only the host country, 
but also in all the other possible locations they contemplate. Should any of these alternate 
locations become more attractive, they will contemplate re-location. A recent example of 
this is the concern that emerged regarding the most recent enlargement of the European 
Union that firms might be de-locating from some areas toward others (see Konings & 
Murphy, 2006). The longer the period of tenure in a country, the more likely it is that the 
environment changes and that these changes will trigger the decision to exit. A factor that 
has long been emphasized as important in the determinants of the exit decisions of 
multinationals from a certain location is the evolution of the product life cycle (Vernon, 
1979). If multinational firms choose their international locations based on product life 
cycle considerations, then it is likely that any location is temporary and that 
multinationals change location as industries evolve along their life cycle. As time goes by 
it is more likely that it becomes optimal to change location. 
Multinationals thus have reasons for investing in units in which single country 
firms would not and for divesting from units from which single country firms would not. 
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Their investment and divestment decisions thereby become volatile compared to their 
single country counterparts, and it is not surprising that multinationals have been 
observed to be quicker to adapt to changing conditions than single country firms (see 
Dunning, 1993: 428).  
Although most of the arguments above were originally developed in the context 
of comparing local and foreign firms, they apply to a large extent to the comparison 
between purely local firms and domestic based multinationals, as domestic based 
multinationals also take other locations into consideration. Berry (2010) showed that the 
number of divestments of home-country operations is affected by the investments that 
firms make abroad as shutting down domestic operations is easier if the firm has 
alternatives abroad. Also, the reason why multinationals are able to close units more 
easily than single country firms is not specific to being foreign. In the domestic UK steel 
casting industry, multi-plant firms have been found to close plants more easily than single 
plant firms for the same reason: because multi-plant units can more easily re-deploy their 
labor and productive facilities elsewhere (Baden-Fuller 1989). 
These considerations lead us to our next hypotheses, which are formulated as: 
 
Hypothesis 3a. Exit probabilities of foreign owned firms diverge from those of 
purely domestic firms as firms age. 
 
Hypothesis 3b. Exit probabilities of domestic based multinationals diverge from 
those of purely domestic firms as firms age. 
Foreignness and multinationality  
While both domestic and foreign multinationals may seek to explore opportunities 
in other locations, divesting a foreign operation and a domestic one are often not the same 
(Benito, 1997). Tsetsekos and Gombola (1992) studied the impact of divestments upon 
stock prices and found that stock prices react to closing of domestic, but not to foreign 
plants, which they interpreted as indicating that, while closing of a foreign plant does not 
indicate problems in the parent firm, closing a domestic unit does. Firms even consider 
changing the location of their headquarters but, while this may have increased in recent 
times, the numbers are still small (Voget, 2011). As many relocations of headquarters are 
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dictated by tax reasons (Voget, 2011), these relocations do not imply the divestiture of 
production or selling activities from the original “home” country. 
Differences in the patterns of foreign and domestic divestment may be due to a 
particular attachment of domestic firms to their home country as suggested by Boddewyn 
(1983).  Divestments are decisions that are described as difficult, painful and subject to 
cognitive biases (Duhaime & Schwenk 1983). Much of the decision making in these 
processes is made at the headquarters, not at the subsidiaries (Ghertman, 1988) and 
managers resist divesting the units they are personally involved with (Nees, 1981), both 
because their jobs may be at stake and because they may be emotionally attached to the 
business. Livengood and Reger (2010) observed that divestment from firms’ “home” 
business, such as Singer’s sewing machines, Greyhound’s bus lines, and GE’s light bulbs, 
was delayed long after what was economically sound because of the emotional 
attachment of executives to these lines of business. It has also been shown that 
divestment from foreign operations is more likely when a new CEO has just been 
appointed (Shimizu, 2007) and that, prior to divestment, the management of the 
subsidiary to be divested is often replaced (Ghertman, 1988), presumably because 
recently appointed managers have lower emotional attachment to the unit to be divested. 
Likewise, it has been found that relocation of multinational headquarters is more likely 
when ownership is dispersed and the percentage of equity that is held by foreigners is 
high (Birkinshaw, Braunerhjelm, Holm, & Terjesen, 2006) and when as a result there is 
no significant owner that is strongly attached to the country. This suggests that domestic 
multinationals are less likely to exit than foreign ones. 
The prediction that foreign multinationals will be more likely to exit than 
domestic ones is also supported by the classical obsolescing bargain argument. Foreign 
companies are often attracted to the host country with incentives that do not apply to 
domestic investment (Blomström & Kokko, 2003). After having invested, foreign 
investors become vulnerable to opportunistic behavior from host country governments, 
which may wish to force them to reduce their stake in firms in host countries or to accept 
a less favorable treatment over time (see, e.g., Vachani, 1995). More recent studies have 
acknowledged that the relationship between foreign firms and host governments is more 
complex than this earlier view suggests. This relationship may include not only 
adversarial, but also cooperative dimensions, namely because the stake to be shared is not 
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necessarily constant over time and may be augmented with efforts from both sides (Luo, 
2001; Agmon, 2003). This relationship may also involve a more complex scenario in 
which actors other than the multinational firm and the host country government (such as 
NGOs, international organizations, other governments, and the potential future presence 
of other multinational firms) play a role and may change the distribution of bargaining 
power (Nebus & Rufin, 2010; Eden, 2002). Still, to the extent that there remains any 
threat of expropriation, foreign firms will likely adopt investment policies that ease their 
decision to exit more than their domestic counterparts.  
The above arguments lead us to our next hypothesis, which is formulated as 
follows. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Domestic based multinationals are less likely to divest their home 
country operations than foreign owned firms that operate in the same country. 
 
In summary, foreign firms are predicted to exit with greater probability than 
purely domestic firms (hypothesis 1) and domestic multinationals (hypotheses 1 and 4). It 
is unclear whether these exit rates should converge or diverge over the life of firms, as 
the LOF and footlooseness views make different predictions. LOF predicts that they 
should converge (hypotheses 2), but the footlooseness view suggests that exit of foreign 
firms should diverge from that of purely domestic ones (hypothesis 3a) and does not 
make a clear prediction regarding domestic multinationals. The footlooseness argument, 
however, also predicts that exit rates of purely domestic firms and domestic 
multinationals should diverge (hypothesis 3b). 
3. Methods 
3.1 Data 
For testing the hypotheses above, we use a data set on firms operating in Portugal 
(SABI) provided by Bureau van Dijk. The primary source of these data is an 
administrative source that includes information on firms’ accounts that limited liability 
firms are annually required to report. In 2006 the data collection and processing was re-
structured, and since then this information has been used by all major state institutions for 
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different purposes and is regarded as highly reliable. The tax administration office uses it 
for processing corporate taxes and the central bank, and the statistical office, among 
others, use it as the main source of annual information on business activity. Aside from 
information on a number of balance sheet and profit and loss account items, the data 
include the date of firm creation along with detailed information on geographic location 
and industry affiliation. Also included is information on the largest owner of each firm, 
enabling us to classify firms as being controlled by domestic or foreign interests, 
although it does not allow us to tell joint-ventures from wholly-owned firms. In addition, 
the data include information on which domestic owned firms operate subsidiaries abroad, 
and this enables us to identify domestic based multinationals. The data are available from 
2006 to 2008. We use the data from 2006 and 2007 and classify firms as exits if they are 
not active in the subsequent year. Because we have information on the year the firm 
started operating in Portugal, we are able to identify their age at exit. Of course, for 
foreign firms, this means that we control for age in Portugal and any other age effect is 
left unobserved. We will discuss the implications of this further below.  
 We measure exit for purely domestic firms, and for domestic based and 
foreign multinationals, exit being defined as the end of operations in Portugal. First, note 
that we are able to account for full divestment only. Foreign and domestic based 
multinationals may partially divest their operations from Portugal, with or without 
relocation of the divested operations elsewhere in the world. We do not account for these 
divestments in the same way that we do not account for contraction of purely domestic 
firms. Second, these are rather different sets of firms, and exit may have different 
implications for each of them. Most foreign firms exiting a host country will probably 
continue their operations elsewhere without dramatic changes in these locations. In 
contrast, domestic based multinationals abandoning their home country will likely entail 
considerable changes, namely headquarter changes. Finally, for most purely domestic 
firms, exit most likely means that the firm stops operating altogether. Also, if for purely 
domestic firms exit means going out of business and is often (although not always) 
associated with failure, exit of a domestic based multinational may well be associated 
with success on a wider scale. While the data do not allow closer inspection of these 
issues, they need to be kept in mind when looking at the comparisons below.  
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3.1.1 Selecting comparable firms 
To increase comparability between domestic and foreign firms in our sample, we 
excluded industries in which there were no foreign or domestic firms in at least one year. 
For each of the remaining industries, we sought to exclude those domestic firms whose 
characteristics were markedly different from foreign firms in the same industry. For this, 
we estimated a score model for the likelihood of being foreign for each firm. This is a 
probit model in which the dependent variable is 1 if the firm is foreign and 0 if it is 
domestic. The covariates include sales, profitability (Return on Assets), and leverage 
(Debt to Assets), plus sets of dummies for location (22) and industry (210 3-digit NACE 
industries). From these regressions we recovered the estimates of the probabilities of 
being foreign for each firm in our sample. We compared the probability of each domestic 
firm being foreign with that of each one of the foreign firms operating in the same 
industry. Domestic firms for which we could not find a foreign counterpart with a 
reasonably similar probability of being foreign (probabilities in the vicinity of 0.1% of 
each other) were excluded from the sample. The remaining domestic firms in our sample 
are thus only those for which we can find at least one “comparable” foreign firm.  
 











41 Distribution of water 141 100 0 
64 Post and telecommunications 353 53 0 
20 Manufacture of wood and wood products  4,950 32 0 
92 Recreational, cult. and sporting activities 2,703 22 0 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 392 5 0 
71 Renting of mach. and household goods 1,368 5 0 
40 Electricity, gas, and hot water supply 239 4 4 
15 Manufacture of food and beverages 6,726 2 0 
33 Manufacture of precision instruments 801 1 0 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum  8 0 25 
73 Research and development 100 0 1 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles 553 0 1 
Note: Table includes only 2-digit industries in which more than 1% of firms were excluded. All the analysis is 




Table 27 indicates the 2-digit NACE industries from which at least 1% of the total 
number of firms was excluded.  The criterion of requiring that at least one foreign and 
one domestic firm be active in the 3-digit industry is the one that excludes most of the 
firms. The industries in which this exclusion was most important are not surprising. In the 
water distribution sector all firms were excluded and the same was true with 53% percent 
of the firms in the postal and telecommunications sector. The criterion of requiring the 
presence of “similar” foreign and domestic firms is much less important and when it is 
met, it is mostly in relatively small sectors, as in the manufacture of coke and refined 
petroleum. In only one industry – the electricity, gas, steam, and hot water supply sector 
– both criteria excluded firms.  
After performing these exclusions our data include over 300,000 purely domestic 
firms, over 3,500 foreign owned, and 367 domestic firms owning a major stake of firms 
in foreign countries. The number of firms and the exit rates for different age classes in 
our final sample are shown in Table 28. The age structure of the different type of firms is 
rather different, purely domestic firms being the youngest and domestic multinationals 
being the oldest firms. Overall, foreign firms exit in greater proportions than domestic. 
While the figures are comparable at the earliest ages (exit rates for foreign firms are even 
lower than those of domestic firms aged 0-4), the age patterns of exit are rather different; 
the exit rate of domestic firms is decreasing with age (flattening out after age 20), 
whereas the exit rate of foreign firms seems to be much more constant, perhaps 
increasing somewhat with age. Domestic multinationals have a lower overall exit rate, 
but with two peaks at the youngest and oldest age classes.  
 
Table 28. Exit Rates 
  Domestic Foreign Domestic Multinationals 
Age Firms Exit rate (%) Firms Exit rate (%) Firms Exit rate (%) 
0_4 60,206 9.5 424 8.5 36 11.1 
5_10 104,433 7.1 814 8.7 68 2.9 
11_20 92,489 5.6 1,301 8.6 105 1.9 
21_30 35,420 5.1 422 11.6 53 3.8 
31_50 22,261 4.9 387 8.8 78 5.1 
51_99 6,390 4.9 200 13.0 27 14.8 




The number of observations in each of the categories is very different and the 
precision of the corresponding estimates is, of course, different. In addition, these figures 
do not take into account that firms differ in a number of aspects (to be discussed below). 
To account for these differences and to measure the precision of the different estimates, 
we resort to appropriate regression models.   
 
3.2 Estimating the Probabilities of Exit  
To estimate the probabilities of exit, we use a probit model where the dependent 
variable is whether or not a firm exited (1 for exit, 0 for survival). We allow age to have 
non-linear effects by including age, age squared, and age cubed in the regressions. In 
addition, because we wish to allow the age effects to be different for the different types of 
firms, we interact age with appropriate dummies for purely domestic, domestic 
multinational, and foreign firms. 
In order to properly appraise the effect of foreignness and multinationality we 
need to control for characteristics that make these firms different. Our regressions include 
controls for firm size, intangibles, profitability, and leverage, plus sets of dummies that 
control for different location (22), and industry affiliation (210). Foreign and domestic 
firms vary considerably with respect to size and the use of intangible assets (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008), and size has been consistently found to be related to the survival of firms 
(Mitchell, 1994). The largest firms in our sample are domestic multinationals and the 
smallest are purely domestic firms; this holds irrespective of measuring firm size by 
sales, employees or assets (Table 29). Intangibles are measured by the average wage paid 
by firms (Conyon, Sourafel, Thompson, & Wright, 2002) and we find little difference in 
wages paid by domestic and foreign multinationals, but purely domestic firms pay 
significantly lower wages. Profits (measured by return on assets and return on equity) are 
higher in foreign owned firms than in purely domestic firms or in domestic multinationals 
in our sample. Profitable firms are less likely to exit than non-profitable ones, and while 
the three groups of firms do seem to use leverage (measured by the ratio of debt to assets) 
to different degrees, there may be heterogeneity in the use of debt within groups, and debt 




Table 29. Control Variables 
  Domestic Foreign Domestic Multinationals 
Sales (thousand Euros) 1,154 31,175 68,085 
Number of Employees 12 115 477 
Assets (thousand Euros) 669 25,316 95,217 
Average Wage (thousand Euros) 11 29 26 
ROA  0.037 0.059 0.038 
ROE  0.046 0.101 0.032 
Debt to Assets 0.620 0.604 0.634 
 
4. Results 
Table 30 reports the results of our regressions. The starting point for the 
regressions in this table is a regression with three dummies (for domestic firms, domestic 
multinationals, and foreign firms) which, of course, does not include a constant, but does 
include the control variables previously defined. We augmented this specification by 
including interactions of the category dummies with Age, Age squared and Age cubed. 
Interactions between the Domestic dummy and the three age terms were significant. The 
only interaction of the Age terms with the Foreign dummy that was significant was the 
interaction with Age, while none of the interactions with Domestic Multinationals was 
significant. Accordingly only these terms were retained. The results of several variants of 
this final specification (in which different control variables are included) are reported in 






Table 30. Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Domestic -1.329*** -1.104*** -1.202*** -1.329*** 
 (-118.12) (-31.03) (-111.62) (-117.96) 
Age -0.0214*** -0.0248*** -0.0239*** -0.0216*** 
 (-14.81) (-16.92) (-16.50) (-14.92) 
Age squared / 100 0.0426*** 0.0519*** 0.0506*** 0.0441*** 
 (7.71) (9.28) (9.12) (7.94) 
Age cubed / 10,000 -0.0240*** -0.0311*** -0.0304*** -0.0256*** 
 (-4.46) (-5.69) (-5.59) (-4.72) 
Foreign -1.226*** -1.074*** -1.144*** -1.226*** 
 (-25.85) (-17.78) (-23.77) (-25.69) 
Foreign x Age 0.00509*** 0.00390** 0.00487*** 0.00519*** 
 (2.90) (2.20) (2.77) (2.94) 
Domestic Multinationals -1.403*** -1.330*** -1.202*** -1.329*** 
 (-12.38) (-10.95) (-111.62) (-117.96) 
Average Wage -0.00216*** -0.00575*** -0.00540*** -0.00207*** 
 (-3.45) (-7.00) (-7.53) (-3.32) 
Debt to Assets 0.174*** 0.126*** 0.139*** 0.172*** 
 (11.64) (8.26) (9.31) (11.38) 
ln(Sales) -0.0609***   -0.0632*** 
 (-19.37)   (-20.11) 
ln(Assets)  -0.0124***   
  (-3.73)   
ln(Employees)   -0.0464***  
   (-11.37)  
ROA -0.285*** -0.335*** -0.334***  
 (-13.52) (-15.05) (-15.26)  
ROE    -0.0498*** 
    (-13.90) 
     
Log-likelihood -78,184.5 -78,424.6 -78,350.9 -77,226.6 
         
Notes: N=325,114. All regressions include 210 industry and 22 location dummies. t statistics in  
parentheses. Stars (***, **, and *) indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
	  
 
Starting with the results of the control variables, we find that larger firms, those 
that use a greater amount of intangible assets, those that are more profitable, and those 
that use less debt are less likely to exit. Results are robust to different measures of size 
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(sales, employment, and total assets) and profits (Return on Assets and Return on 
Equity). 
It is not easy to immediately appreciate the substantive meaning of the regression 
results with respect to the effect of age in the table. On the one hand, the dummies and 
the age polynomial for domestic firms would make the evaluation of the effect of age 
difficult even in the context of ordinary least squares regression. On the other hand, 
unlike the situation in ordinary least squares regression, the estimated coefficients in the 
probit model do not reflect marginal effects. For permitting an easier appreciation of the 
regression results, Figure 5 shows the estimated probabilities implied by our model, 
evaluated at the different ages and at the mean values for all other variables. We see that 
for domestic firms, the estimated probability of exit decreases in the first years and then 
stays more or less constant after the age of 40 or so. The pattern of the plot for domestic 
firms is very much in accordance with results established in the literature on new firms 
from different research streams. Using data on several populations of firms that, in some 
cases, are covered for over one century, Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan (1983) report a 
decreasing probability of exit with age, while Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) 
report similar patterns using data that cover all new firms from the US Census of 
Manufacturing over a period of 40 years (see also Shepherd, Douglas, & Shanley, 2000 
for an overview of the findings in the small business literature). 
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The exit probabilities for foreign firms are estimated to be close to those of their 
domestic counterparts at the earliest ages and then increase linearly. This suggests 
support for the footlooseness hypothesis, rather than the liability of foreignness 
hypothesis. 
Domestic multinationals are estimated to confront a constant exit rate. This 
constant exit rate is at a level that is higher than that of purely domestic firms at their 
earliest ages, but that becomes greater after age 4. This seems to indicate that domestic 
multinationals are, indeed, more likely to exit than purely domestic firms, presumably 
because they have greater ease in relocating their activities elsewhere.  Still, they are 
much less likely to exit than comparable foreign firms at all ages. 
Using the estimated variances and covariances of the exit probabilities in Figure 
5, we can test hypotheses on the equality of these probabilities. Using a critical level of 
1%, we find that the exit probabilities are significantly different right from age 1 for 
domestic and foreign firms. These probabilities are significantly different from age 25 
and thereafter for foreign and domestic multinationals, while they are never different for 
purely domestic firms and domestic multinationals. 
Therefore, in a nutshell, we find that the patterns of exit of foreign firms are rather 
different from those of purely domestic firms, that they are somewhat different from 
domestic multinationals, and that exit patterns of domestic multinationals are not 
distinguishable from those of purely domestic firms.  
 
4.1 Robustness  
4.1.1 Age of Foreign Parents 
Even though we are able to control for a large number of characteristics of firms, 
there remain differences we cannot control for. Particularly important for our analysis, it 
is most likely that foreign firms have been active for some time number before they begin 
operating in Portugal. It is plausible that this previous experience contributes to 
decreasing exit. A foreign subsidiary whose parent is 5 years old when it starts will have 
an overall experience that is longer than that of a domestic firm when it starts.  
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While we cannot measure the actual effect of this experience, we can conduct a 
robustness analysis by adding a constant to the age of the foreign firms and see if this has 
a sizeable impact on our estimates of the effect of age. Of course, not all parents are of 
the same age when they start operating in Portugal. As we do not control for this 
variability in the age of parents, this dispersion is transmitted to the error term and our 
estimates are less precise than what they would be if we were able to control for it. We 
performed this check by repeating the estimations after having incremented the age of 
foreign firms by 5, 10, and 20 years. The results reveal an effect of age that is slightly 
flatter than it is in the baseline estimation, but the qualitative results do not change in any 
significant manner. The same shapes for the exit probabilities that were reported in 
Figure 1 persist. Exit probabilities that were estimated in our baseline case to be different 
for foreign and domestic firms since age 1 are now estimated to be different since age 3, 
4, and 8 when age is incremented by 5, 10, and 20 years.  The corresponding figures for 
the comparison between foreign and domestic multinationals are 30, 35, and 45, while in 
the baseline case it was 25. Purely domestic firms and domestic multinationals are never 
different, as in the baseline case. 
 
4.1.2 Firms and industries that were excluded for being very different  
We performed a series of operations to guarantee that when comparing foreign 
and domestic firms we were not comparing firms that were operating in radically 
different environments or firms that were clearly very different in their characteristics. 
Because of that, we excluded industries in which there was not at least one domestic and 
one foreign firm, and also those domestic firms whose characteristics made them very 
different from any foreign firm in the same industry. We checked whether these 
exclusions affect our results by running the same regressions including these observations 
in the sample, but results are not sensitive to this inclusion. The same shapes for the exit 
probabilities that were reported in Figure 1 persist. The only observed change in the 
results is that foreign and domestic multinationals are estimated to confront different exit 




4.1.3 Estimating the effect of age with age classes  
We also estimated the effect of age by including a series of dummies for different 
age categories. Results indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the exit rate is 
constant for domestic multinationals (χ square = 9.20  p-value= 0.102), but that we 
should reject the corresponding hypothesis for foreign firms (χ square = 14.26  p-value= 
0.014), and for domestic firms (χ square = 630.34  p-value< 0.0001). Figure 6 reports the 
estimated exit probabilities with such a model and displays a pattern which is close to 
that in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 6. Conditional Exit Probabilities (age class) 
 
The conditional probabilities of exit are higher for foreign than for domestic firms 
for all age classes, and formal tests of equality of these estimated probabilities indicate 
that they are statistically different except for very young firms up to 4 years The χ square 
statistics for these tests are 0.58 (p-value = 0.45) for age 0-4 and greater than 22, with the 
corresponding p-values being less than 0.0001, for all others ages. The hypothesis that the 
effect of age for foreign and domestic firms differs only by a constant is soundly rejected 
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Our results do not lend support to the idea that the liability of foreignness is 
decisive in shaping the patterns of exit of foreign firms relative to their domestic 
counterparts. The hypothesis that such a liability gradually disappears over time implies 
that the hazard rates of domestic and foreign firms should converge. In contrast, we find 
that the hazard rates diverge. At the earliest ages the two rates are rather similar but they 
diverge, as a consequence of domestic firms confronting a decreasing exit rate and 
foreign firms an increasing rate as they grow older. Even if they are footloose, foreign 
firms are unlikely to exit much during the first years. On the one hand, environmental 
conditions are unlikely to change much, both in the host country and elsewhere. On the 
other hand, the entry costs incurred by foreign firms are typically substantial and of a 
larger magnitude that those incurred by comparable domestic firms. Consequently, 
foreign firms may require longer periods in activity in order to decide to exit. 
Our results are at odds with those reported by Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997), in 
which the exit rates of foreign and domestic firms converge during the first 19 years of 
life. This result is largely driven by an increase in the exit rate of domestic firms that the 
authors found to hold between ages 10 and 19. We can only speculate on why the exit 
rate for domestic firms increases in the sample of Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997), but we 
note that this pattern is rather atypical and does not conform well to the liabilities of 
newness or of adolescence, which have been found to hold in most survival studies that 
do not discriminate between foreign and domestic firms. It is also possible that this is 
somewhat related to an industry-specific shock. However, we note that in Zaheer and 
Mosakowski (1997), time is measured from the moment the study begins, not from the 
moment firms actually started their operations, and that the sample also includes firms 
that were already operating in the first year of the study. If these are a large proportion of 
the sample, then the effect that is attributed to age can, in fact, be due to calendar time. 
This should be more and more important as time elapses, as fewer new firms remain in 
the sample. In our study, age is measured from the moment at which a legal entity was 
created in Portugal. 
The divergence that we observe between exit of foreign and domestic firms is the 
consequence of two rather disparate evolutions of the hazard rates. The exit rate of 
foreign firms increases rather markedly, while that of domestic firms decreases, albeit at 
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slower paces as firms age. The fact that we observe a much greater contrast in the exit 
rates of domestic and foreign firms than did Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) is, however, 
quite plausible, especially taking into account that our data refer to a period and a context 
in which more changes occurred than in the case of Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997). On 
the one hand, there might have been an overall increase in globalization from the period 
1974-1993 used by Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) to the years 2006 and 2007 which we 
use. In addition, ours is also the period immediately following the greatest enlargement of 
the European Union. Ten Eastern European countries became members of the European 
Union in 2004 and two more in 2007. This enlargement of the EU generated a great deal 
of speculation on whether firms would de-locate from other places in Europe in order to 
take advantage of the new locations with cheaper labor. This debate, first held in the 
popular press, is more recently making its way into more academic type of research 
(Konings & Murphy, 2006), and is particularly relevant for a periphery country such as 
Portugal, which received a massive FDI inflow in the late 1980s immediately after 
joining the EU. 
It is quite possible that this specific context increased the importance of 
“footlooseness” relative to that of the liabilities of foreignness. Note, however, that our 
evidence does not suggest that exiting firms are mostly those that invested in Portugal 
after the country became an EU member in 1986. These firms would be aged 20 or less in 
2006, and, if anything, it is the age class 21-30 that exhibits what seems to be an 
abnormally high exit rate. 
Note also that our evidence does not necessarily support the argument that 
flexibility is more valuable today than it used to be (although neither does it invalidate 
the argument). The argument implies that firms that invest in foreign countries today may 
adopt more flexible arrangements than those that were adopted by their older counterparts 
when they were established. This is consistent with the findings of Kronborg and 
Thomsen (2009), in which foreign firms that were established long ago were less likely to 
exit than their domestic counterparts, but that these differences in the last 20 years 
increased their propensity to exit relative to domestic counterparts. If this were dominant 
in our data, we would observe an increased propensity to exit in the younger foreign 
firms but not in more mature ones. In contrast, we observe that the conditional probability 
of exit increases persistently with age, and this holds for firms established 50 years ago 
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and more, much before the value of flexibility may have increased. Therefore, the 
increased propensity of firms which are 50 and older to exit cannot be taken as evidence 
of the effect of globalization and the corresponding changes in the entry strategies. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Recent research comparing the survival of foreign and domestic firms has 
emphasized the liabilities of foreignness and largely neglected that foreign firms are 
inherently footloose, that is, firms are less attached to foreign markets than to their own. 
Liabilities of foreignness, the disadvantages experienced by firms when they 
operate in a foreign country, are to a large extent temporary, as many sources of this 
liability can be overcome with time. Footlooseness, on the contrary, is rather more 
permanent and refers to the greater willingness of firms to abandon a country, because 
they contemplate alternative locations more easily than do purely domestic firms. While 
footlooseness may always be there, its impact upon exit is likely to become more and 
more evident, as environment conditions change, both in the host country and elsewhere. 
This study analyzes the survival of foreign and domestic firms using a long-run 
perspective that enables us to acknowledge both forces and evaluate their impact upon 
the survival of foreign firms. It uses a unique data set of firms operating in Portugal in 
2006 and 2007 that contains information on the age of firms and the share of foreign-
owned equity. This allows us to compare the probability of exit of foreign and domestic 
firms over their life cycle and to uncover differences in the likelihood of exiting at 
different moments in time. In addition, the data also include information on which 
domestic owned firms have major stakes in firms operating in foreign countries, which 
enables us to identify domestic based multinationals. This enables us to contrast the exit 
patterns of these three different groups of firms.  
We find that, taking differences between foreign and domestic firms into account, 
the exit rates of foreign and domestic firms become more and more different as firms age. 
This is the result of a decreasing exit rate for domestic firms and an increasing rate for 
foreign firms. The pattern found for domestic firms is consistent with a liability of 
newness that has been found to prevail in many studies that do not distinguish domestic 
from foreign firms. The pattern found for foreign firms suggests that the effect of a 
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liability of foreignness, which may exist early in the life of foreign firms, is not strong 
enough to dominate the effect of the intrinsic footlooseness of these firms. Our results 
also suggest that this finding is due more to foreignness than to multinationality. First, we 
did not detect any specific age pattern for exit of domestic based multinationals. Second, 
although domestic based multinationals exit with greater likelihood than purely domestic 
firms, the difference is not statistically significant, while, in contrast, domestic based 
multinationals exit less than foreign ones, and this difference is statistically significant for 
most of the age span covered.  
This finding has implications for public policy toward foreign investment. Many 
countries actively pursue such policies (see UNCTAD, 2000), under which incentives for 
foreign investment are available during a limited period of time. A rationale for providing 
incentives that are limited in time is that these incentives should compensate for the 
initial liabilities of doing business abroad, the implicit assumption being that, after that 
initial period, foreign firms would naturally remain in the country. Our evidence shows 
that, on the contrary, foreign firms are less and less likely to remain in the country as they 
grow older. This suggests that the benefits a country expects to obtain from the presence 
of foreign firms, against which the costs of the incentives are weighed, should probably 
be discounted more heavily than they currently are. Our findings should also alert policy 
makers for the fact that the emphasis typically placed on the moment of entry and on 
attracting foreign investment may be misplaced, and equal attention should be given to 
the retention of foreign firms. Our results cannot, of course, be taken as an indication that 
domestic multinationals should be neglected by policy makers, but they nevertheless 
indicate that these firms may have reasons of their own to remain in the home country.   
Our results also have implications for managers. First, our results imply that 
managers should be careful when investing in a foreign country. It is likely that 
conditions that led to entry will eventually change and exit may be necessary. Creating 
exit options may, therefore, be a valuable strategy. Second, managers of domestic 
multinationals may be tempted to threaten to leave the home country in an attempt to 
obtain benefits from their countries’ governments. This threat may suffer from lack of 
credibility, since our evidence shows that, in general, domestic multinationals do not 
leave often. If one is to make this threat, it is important to be aware of the need to 
establish credibility.  
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Our implications for managers extend to those operating purely domestic 
companies.  One of the channels through which foreign firms are expected to exert their 
positive impact on the economy of the host country is via their upstream linkages. Entry 
of foreign firms is commonly seen as an opportunity for developing a set of suppliers to 
these firms.  Managers of these suppliers must be aware that the likelihood of seeing their 
clients leave the country does not decrease over time. It is therefore important to remain 
cautious and avoid significant specific investments without appropriate safeguards. 
Finally, for managers of firms that operate in the same industry as exiting foreign firms, 
this exit may be an opportunity. Closing of such firms is often done by selling productive 
facilities, which makes skilled labor available for hire. Scouting the horizon for possible 
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Private vs Public Ownership: Labor Outcomes in the Banking 
Industry 
with Tiago Pires and Claudia Alves 
 
Abstract 
This paper identifies and estimates the differences between private and public 
firms on median employment duration, hazard rate, type of employment contract and 
wages. A second contribution is to analyze a privatization process and to identify the 
winners and losers with that process. In our empirical application we consider the 
Portuguese banking industry. 
We find no distinguishable differences on wages per hour by working in a private 
bank rather than in a public bank. In contrast, employment in a private bank implies 
lower median employment duration but increases the likelihood of an open-ended 
contract. We find that the marginal treatment effect on log of wages per hour has the 
expected shape, decreasing in the likelihood of working in a public bank. In fact, workers 
with a higher likelihood of working in a private bank have a high wage premium by 
working in a private bank. The marginal treatment effect on log employment duration is 
increasing in the likelihood of working in a public bank for workers very likely to be 
working in a private bank but it is decreasing in the likelihood of working in a public 
bank for workers very likely to be working in a public bank. Indeed, workers with a high 
likelihood of working in a private bank have a negative MTE on log employment 
duration. Thus, for these workers the choice of a private bank implies a trade-off between 
wages and employment duration. 
Privatization improved workers compensation, particularly in the banks that 
remained public. Furthermore, it increased the job stability on public banks relatively to 
private banks. 
 
Keywords: banking sector, state ownership, wage differentials 




Differences between private and public firms1 and the effects of privatizations are 
frequent themes in the political debate. The debate gained a new importance with the 
wave of privatization processes that started in the early 1980’s.2 Despite the importance 
of the question, until the 1990’s, the economic literature on this topic was relatively 
scarce and the results obtained were often questionable by the limitations of the data and 
incapacity to control in a proper way for the endogeneity of ownership and workers’ 
choice. The access to new data sets and the wave of privatizations in the former 
communist countries created new opportunities for researchers interested in the analysis 
of the ownership effects. 
We contribute to the existent literature by analyzing the effects of ownership on 
labor outcomes. Our goal is to identify and to measure the gains (or losses) on median 
employment duration, hazard rates, type of employment contract and wages of working 
in a private firm rather than in a state-owned firm. A second contribution is to analyze a 
privatization process and to identify the winners and losers with that process. 
Our paper has two main novelties. First, we analyze ownership effects on the type 
of employment contract (i.e., the choice between fixed-term and open-ended contracts), 
median duration and hazard rates, while the extant literature is usually focused in wage 
differentials. Second, we identify the marginal treatment effect of ownership on labor 
outcomes. 
In our empirical application we consider the banking industry in Portugal. This 
empirical application offers some specificities and characteristics that are very 
appropriate given our goals. On one hand, public and private firms keep coexisting in a 
competitive market environment. On the other hand, liberalization and privatization 
                                                
1 In this paper a public firm is a state-owned firm, that is, a firm whose main stockholder is the 
national state. On the other hand, a private firm is a firm whose main stockholders are private entities. In 
particular, in our empirical application we define a private firm as a firm where fifty percent or more of the 
equity is owned by private investors while a public firm is defined as a firm where fifty percent or more of 
the equity is owned by the Portuguese State. 
2 Despite the fact that most people associate modern privatization programs with Thatcher’s 
government privatization program in the 1980’s, the first large-scale privatization program started in the 
early 1960’s in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
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processes occurred in the eighties and nineties (formally, these processes finished in 
1997), thus creating the necessary event to study the effects of privatization. Furthermore, 
the analysis of ownership effects in this industry is particularly relevant because, as 
pointed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002), around the world, 
government ownership of banks has had significant consequences for economic and 
financial development. 
Since we restrict the analysis to a particular industry in a particular country, in the 
interpretation of our results we should take external validity considerations into account 
and hence we can only interpret them with respect to our particular application (the 
banking industry in Portugal). Nonetheless, we hope that our results could provide some 
insights for what happens in similar situations. 
In our study we use the data of Quadros de Pessoal (henceforward QP), a survey 
conducted by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and Social Security. This survey is 
done since 1985 and covers the work force of all firms employing paid labor in Portugal. 
Its longitudinal nature, where a unique number identifies both firms and workers, makes 
it possible to follow firms and workers over time and identify ownership changes. This 
data source enables to identify in which sector each firm is and to observe the evolution 
of labor outcomes over time. Thus, it is a valuable source to analyze differences on labor 
outcomes between the private and the public sector. The QP survey is mandatory for all 
firms, either public or private, therefore the data should be immune to bias resulting from 
differences in survey questionnaires and from no compliance with the survey. 
In order to identify and to estimate the effects of ownership structure on labor 
outcomes, we consider some of the methodologies proposed by the literature on the 
econometric evaluation of social programs and the literature on “causal inference”. In 
particular, we derive a propensity score matching estimator, a difference-in-differences 
(DID) propensity score matching estimator and a marginal treatment effect estimator 
(MTE). Under the suitable assumptions the propensity score matching estimator and the 
difference-in-differences (DID) propensity score matching estimator enable to identify 
the average treatment effect on treated. The MTE estimator is also a useful tool since it 
allows us to identify the effects of a treatment on individuals that are indifferent between 
participating or not in the treatment. 
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Our results show no distinguishable differences on wages per hour of working in 
a private bank rather than in a public bank. Conversely, we find that employment in a 
private bank implies a lower median employment duration which can be partially 
explained by the higher positive state dependence of employment spells in private banks. 
This suggests that a worker in a private bank would have longer employment spells if she 
worked in a public bank. 
This lower employment duration and the positive state dependence of 
employment spells in both sectors help to explain the lower hazard rates associated with 
employment in a private bank. In order to understand this, consider the following 
example. For sake of simplicity ignore that the coefficients associated with the regressors 
are different in each sector and consider two identical individuals at the beginning of their 
working life. One is employed in a public bank and the other in a private bank. After 10 
years, the probability of remaining in the same job is higher for the worker who started 
working in the public bank. However, since she remains in the same bank and the 
probability of exiting increases with the employment spell length, then her hazard rate is 
higher than the hazard rate of the other worker. 
Finally, we find that the likelihood of an open-ended contract is higher in private 
banks. Nevertheless, due to the large proportion of this type of contracts in the banking 
industry, the difference is relatively small. 
We find that the marginal treatment effect on log wages per hour has the expected 
shape, since it is decreasing in the likelihood of working in a public bank. In fact, 
workers with a high likelihood of working in a private bank have a high wage premium 
by working in a private bank while workers with a low likelihood of working in a private 
bank have a penalty. The marginal treatment effect on log employment duration is 
increasing in the likelihood of working in a public bank for workers with a high 
likelihood of working in a private bank but it is decreasing in the likelihood of working in 
a public bank for workers very likely to be working in a public bank. Indeed, workers 
very likely to be working in a private bank have a negative MTE on log employment 
duration. Therefore, for these workers the choice of a private bank implies a trade-off 
between wages and employment duration. For these workers a job in a private bank 
implies higher wages but losses in the employment duration. 
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Despite the negative MTE on log employment duration for workers with a high 
likelihood of working in a private bank, the MTE on log employment duration is positive 
for a large range of values of the propensity score, suggesting that for a large proportion 
of workers there are gains on employment duration by working in a private bank rather 
than in a public bank. The negative MTE for the individuals more likely of receiving the 
treatment explains the aforementioned negative average treatment effect on the treated. 
That is, some of the workers that are receiving the treatment are the workers that have 
few benefits (in terms of employment duration) of receiving it. In fact, some of these 
workers have a penalty. 
The marginal treatment effect on the log hazard rate is always positive, suggesting 
that the choice of an employment in a private bank rather than in a state-owned bank may 
have negative effects on the probability of terminating the employment spell. 
Our results show that the gender wage gap is lower in public banks. In both 
sectors, ceteris paribus, the employment spell for women terminates faster than for men 
and is even faster in public banks. Women that were working in a private bank in 2005, 
given their characteristics, had on average lower wages and lower median employment 
duration by working in a private bank rather than in a state-owned bank. Younger 
workers also had a lower wage and a lower median employment duration by working in a 
private bank rather than in a public bank. These results give some support to the 
hypothesis that state-owned firms protect groups in a weaker position in the labor market. 
The returns to education are higher in private banks rather than in state-owned 
banks. This helps to explain why workers with at least 10 years of schooling have a 
higher probability of being employed in a private bank. 
Finally, our evaluation of the privatization processes suggests that privatization 
improved workers compensation, particularly in the banks that remained public. 
Furthermore, it increased the job stability on public banks relatively to private banks. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly places our work in the context 
of the related literature. In Section 3 we describe the Portuguese banking industry, the 
liberalization and privatization processes during the 1980’s and 1990’s. Section 4 
proposes a model to analyze sectoral-choice decisions and to identify the effects of the 
different treatments on the labor outcomes. Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy to 
identify the value of switching from the public to the private sector. Section 6 proposes a 
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theoretical framework for each of the outcomes analyzed. In Section 7 we describe the 
data and outcomes while in Section 8 we present the results obtained using our 
identification strategy. Section 9 evaluates the privatization process and its impact on the 
labor outcomes and differences between ownership structures. Section 10 concludes the 
paper. 
2. Literature Review 
Our paper is essentially related with the literature on ownership effects3. This 
literature has studied, for example, differences in performance, efficiency4 and labor 
outcomes due to ownership structure. In our paper we are interested in the latter point. 
Although many papers analyzed public wage differentials between the public and 
the private sector for the United States, there is not a consensus in the results5. For 
instance, papers such as Smith (1977) and Gyourko and Tracy (1988) found that federal 
employees earnings are nearly 20 percent higher than their otherwise equivalent private 
sector counterpart. According to Belman and Heywood (2004), the wage differential 
remains after controlling for occupational differences, but it is slightly lower. In contrast, 
papers such as Hartman (1983) showed that, when properly defined positions are 
compared, federal workers are underpaid. Such conflicting results were also found at the 
state and local level. For example, Moore and Newman (1991) found a positive wage 
differential for the Houston metropolitan transit workers while Moore and Raisian (1991) 
                                                
3 See Shirley and Walsh (2000), Megginson and Netter (2001) and/or Dysney (2007) for a survey 
in the empirical literature on privatization. Megginson (2005) provides a survey specific for the banking 
industry. 
4 Some examples of papers that analyze the effects of ownership structure on performance and 
efficiency are Boardman and Vining (1989), Ehrlich et all (1994), Galal et all (1994), La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes (1999), D’Souza, J. and W. Megginson (1999), Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002), Bhaumik and Dimova (2004). Al-Obaidan (2002) examines the 
macroeconomic/efficiency effects of privatization in developing countries. 
5 Bender (1998) and Gregory and Borland (1999) provide surveys of the literature on the wage 
differential between the public and the private sector. According to them, most of the studies show that, on 
average, the public sector pays more than the private sector, even after controlling for differences in the 
productive characteristics of workers. 
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and Belman and Heywood (1995) found very small differentials at the state level and 
negative differentials at the local level.6 
Katz and Krueger (1991) studied the changes in the structure of wages in the 
public and private sectors for the US during the 1970’s and 1980’s. They found that the 
rise in skill differentials in the 1980’s was essentially a private sector phenomenon since 
education differentials and wage inequality only slightly increased in the public sector. 
These findings suggest that relative wages in the public sector responds only sluggishly 
to shifts in relative wages in the private sector. Katz and Krueger (1991) also provided 
evidence of a public-sector wage premium for women and less educated workers. 
Due to data limitations, these papers usually restricted their analysis to wages 
differentials without taking non-wage compensations into account. Yet papers such as 
Bellante and Long (1981) and Quinn (1979) examined compensation differentials taking 
into account fringe benefits, employment stability and working conditions. Bellante and 
Long (1981)’s findings suggest that, once public/private ratios are adjusted for fringe 
benefits and employment stability, significant rents exist for public employees. Quinn 
(1979)’s findings also suggest public employees would be receiving rents, even after 
controlling for other forms of compensation. 
In recent years some papers analyzed the effects of privatization processes on 
labor outcomes for particular countries. Brainerd (2002) studied the mass privatization 
process in Russia after 1992 to explore the effects on wages of changing ownership. She 
found evidence of a wage premium in private firms. The limitations of her data do not 
allow to completely identify the sources of the higher wages in private firms. 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that one of the reasons for this differential was the 
increase of workers’ power in private firms, explained by the particular characteristics of 
                                                
6 It is also important to mention the seminal paper of Blank (1985) that estimates the extent to 
which workers with different personal characteristics have different probabilities of choosing the public 
versus the private sector employment. The results of this paper show that public employment is preferred 
by the “protected” groups of veterans, nonwhites and women. Highly educated and more experienced 
workers are also more likely to choose the public sector. Furthermore, the results reveal that sectorial 
choice is influenced by more than wage comparison. 
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the privatization process7. A private sector wage advantage, particularly pronounced for 
University-educated workers, was also found in Poland by Adamchik and Bedi (2000). 
Pendleton (1999) examined for the United Kingdom’s bus industry the effect of 
ownership structure and the consequences of the privatization process on labor relations, 
wage and the level of employment. He also analyzed the effects of competition on these 
outcomes. His paper found very little support for the hypothesis that privatization will 
lead to institutional changes in labor relations. He found that average wages are lower in 
private firms but the increases on wages are higher in private firms. This suggests that the 
impact of privatization on wages occurs in the early stages of the process. 
The ownership effects on wages in Canada were analyzed by Mueller (2000). He 
showed that, on average, public-sector employees tend to be paid a wage premium 
compared with their otherwise equivalent counterparts in the private sector. This 
premium is unambiguously higher for females. 
Ho et all (2002) analyzed the effects on wage structures of privatization in China. 
In particular, they examined how returns to human capital and the gender inequalities 
changed with the privatization of rural industry in China. This paper also analyzed the 
effects of ownership on returns to human capital (education and experience) and the 
gender gap. They found that post-privatization ownership effects on the returns to human 
capital characteristics and gender wage gaps are not significant. However, privatization 
was associated with an increase in wages and with earnings inequality. Both the returns 
to education and the gender wage discrimination increased after the privatization. The 
returns to experience also increased for mid-aged workers. 
Our paper is closely related with Monteiro (2010) who analyzed the effects on 
wages of the Portuguese banking’s privatization. In order to identify the treatment effect 
on the treated, Monteiro (2010) considered Propensity Score Matching and Difference-in-
Differences (DID) Propensity score matching estimators. She found a positive relation 
between wages and the timing of the privatization in the long-run and a negative relation 
in the short-run for workers that remained in the firm. Moreover, her results show that 
                                                




privatization affects more intensely the most educated, experienced and the best paid 
workers. 
An important difference between our paper and Monteiro (2010) is that our main 
interest is not the analysis of the privatization per se but to study how ownership structure 
affects labor outcomes.8 This allows us to consider all bank workers instead of restricting 
the analysis to workers who remained within the firm after the privatization as in 
Monteiro (2010). Furthermore, our paper has two important novelties. First, we do not 
restrict the analysis to wages, since we also analyze the effects of ownership on type of 
employment contract, median employment duration and hazard rates. Second, we identify 
the Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) on labor outcomes associated with ownership. 
Two other papers closely related to ours are Figueiredo, Figueiredo and Monteiro 
(2008) and Monteiro and Portela (2009). Figueiredo, Figueiredo and Monteiro (2008), 
using a STATIS approach, examined labor adjustments in ten Portuguese banks after 
switching from public to private. In particular, they studied the changes experienced by 
the privatized banks during the privatization process in terms of wages, employment, 
occupation, seniority, market share, profitability and capital-labor ratio. The paper 
showed that the privatization process was complex and firms adjustment to it differed in 
speed and path. Moreover, pay level was the workforce attribute that changed more, 
which is explained by substantial changes in terms of workforce’s composition. 
Monteiro and Portela (2009) estimated how wages in the Portuguese banking 
industry depend on the employers’ ability to pay. In their analysis they take into account 
that rent sharing may vary according to the bank ownership structure. They found that 
wages are strongly positively correlated with rents even after controlling for firm and 
workforce characteristics. Furthermore, the elasticity of wages with respect to rents is 
higher in state-owned firms. 
In a paper close to ours, Chong and Leon (2007) compared labor indicators of 
privatized, private and public firms. Using firm-level data for different countries they 
analyzed ownership effects on wages, benefits, labor composition, education, training, 
                                                
8 The effects on wages of the Portuguese banking industry’s privatization are also examined in 
Monteiro (2009). In this paper the focus is not exclusively in the privatization process of the banking 
industry but also in the liberalization of this industry, which occurred in the second half of the eighties. 
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unionization and quality of management. They found that labor productivity increases 
after privatization and is higher on private firms. However, these differences are not 
reflected on average wages. 
3. Privatization of the banking industry in Portugal 
On April 25th of 1974 a military coup ended the dictatorship that ruled Portugal 
for 48 years. The collapse of the dictatorship led to struggles among the former 
opposition groups and parties as to who would exercise power and what sort of regime 
would be created. This created an economic and political turmoil in the eighteen months 
after the revolution. During that period, the movement that took power followed an anti-
monopolistic policy, where large private enterprises were understood as monopolies. One 
of the measures approved within this anti-monopolistic policy was a nationalization 
process that affected several economic sectors, including the banking sector (Nunes, 
Bastien and Valério 2005). 
The policies followed in the post-revolutionary period had persistent and long-
term effects. In the 1980's the Portuguese banking industry was almost exclusively in 
public hands and there were several controls that constrained financial operations. The 
liberalization of the banking industry only started in 1983, with the adoption of the first 
laws to allow freedom of entry for private banks9 (law 11/83 of 16th August 1983, 
decree-law 406/83 of 19th November 1983 and decree-law 51/84 of 11th February 1984). 
A consequence of this liberalization was an increase in the number of banks and a 
subsequent rise in competition, which stimulated financial innovation. This liberalization 
process cannot be disentangled from the goal of joining the European Community. This 
goal motivated several financial market reforms whose objectives were to increase 
efficiency, improve macroeconomic management and the international competitiveness 
of Portugal (OECD 1999, Monteiro 2009, Bação 1997). The improvement in efficiency 
was seen as essential for the sustainability of the industry in a common european market, 
                                                
9After the nationalization of the banking sector and until the new legislation of 1983, private banks 
were forbidden to operate in Portugal. However, mutual and cooperative banks were allowed to operate 
during this period. 
This explains why institutions such as Montepio Geral and Caixa de Credito Agricola, which were 
not state-owned, were able to be active during this period. 
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since, prior to 1984, the industry was almost exclusively composed of a small number of 
public firms, which were overstaffed and inefficient, and by small and inefficient mutual 
and cooperative banks. Therefore, the banking industry in Portugal was in weak 
conditions to compete with foreign firms. (OECD,1999) 
The deregulation reforms and the opening of financial intermediation to the 
private sector can be seen as the first phase of the reform of the banking industry and 
covered almost all second half of the eighties. In 1989, the privatization process started 
and with it the second phase of reforms. The first law adopted to start the privatization 
process (law 84/88) was approved in 1988. However, it only allowed a partial 
privatization of public firms since the law required that at least 51 per cent of the equity 
remained state-owned. Deeper privatization required a Constitutional amendment, since 
the Constitution approved after the 1974’s revolution imposed that all nationalized firms 
had to remain state-owned. The necessary Constitutional amendment was approved in 
1989 and enabled the adoption in 1990 of the laws allowing the privatization of 
previously nationalized firms (decree-law 11/90). Ten out of twelve public banks were 
privatized between 1989 and 1996.10 The two public banks that remained state-owned 
were CGD and BNU11. It is important to notice that the reasons that were given as to why 
these banks remained public were historical and not economic. In fact, it is usually 
emphasized that CGD remained public because, in contrast with the other banks, it was 
not nationalized after the revolution, since it was founded as a public entity in the 
nineteenth century and always remained state owned. The non-privatization of BNU is 
also explained by the specificities associated with its foundation and operational 
characteristics. 
In contrast with other economic sectors (e.g. electricity and telecommunications), 
the government adopted a policy of no interference in the public banks during the period 
before the privatization (Monteiro, 2010). 
                                                
10 BTA was privatized in 1989, BPA was privatized in 1990, BES and BFB were privatized in 
1991, CPA was privatized in 1992, UBP was privatized in 1993, BPSM, BFN and BBI were privatized in 
1994 and BCA was privatized in 1996. 
11 BNU had a very particular ownership structure since 60 per cent of the equity was owned by 
CGD and the other 40 per cent was owned by the public Treasure. Subsequently, the BNU was fully 
merged into CGD. 
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The privatization program aimed to improve the performance of enterprises. To 
do that, it was necessary to modernize them, to increase their competitiveness, and to 
broaden the participation of Portuguese citizens (particularly workers and small 
shareholders) in the ownership of enterprises. The first two objectives were attained 
through significant improvements in terms of productivity and efficiency levels. 
However, the third objective failed to be attained. Instead, a managerial type of 
ownership emerged with many of the privatized enterprises returning to their pre-
nationalization owners. The privatization program was also seen as vital in the context of 
the European Monetary Union (Bação 1997). 
The reform period induced changes in labor outcomes. With the increase in 
competition, the number of banks operating in the market rose during the privatization 
process period (1990 to 1996). Nonetheless, in the post-privatization period the number 
of banks started to decrease (see Table 31). Efficiency and demand for skilled workers 
increased, thus leading to employment growth. In the public sector, the average firm size 
decreased during the privatization process but increased from then onwards. In private 
banks, there was an increase in the level of employment, particularly during the 
privatization process, when employment growth was sharper. The employment growth is 
explained by the increase in the average firms’ size rather than in the number of banks. 
Despite the increase in the average firms’ size, labor productivity rose, reflecting 
the increase in working hours, in the share of full time employees and in the use of more 
skilled workers. The increase in wages was more evident in the private sector, but there 
was also an increase in wage dispersion among privatized firms, suggesting dissimilar 
wage impacts from the privatization process (see Figure 11 and Figure 12). Banks also 
experienced the impact of the regulatory reform. During the initial period of increased 
competition, from 1985 to 1989, profits turned down but recovered in the following 
periods reflecting a boom in the credit activity. (Monteiro 2009, 2010) 
In the analysis of the liberalization process, the privatization process, and the 
performance of the banking activity after these processes, it is important to mention the 
rule of unions. The oldest labor unions represent all employees in the bargaining process 
regardless of the ownership structure. Each year, trade unions and banks meet to 
negotiate the vertical collective bargaining agreement. This collective agreement 
regulates the employment conditions, the remuneration and the duration of work. It 
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delimits the starting wage level and the compulsory wage progressions. Though the 
unionization in the sector expanded, it did not go against the reforms being done. 
By 2005, most of the financial sector was in private hands (nearly 78 percent of 
share in terms of assets and nearly 70 percent of share in terms of workforce) and was 
among the most profitable and solvent in Europe. The reform process is considered a 
success not only because its main objectives were achieved but also because this 
achievement was done without the instability experienced by many other countries. For 
instance, one can mention the absence of strikes during the privatization process as a 
measure of the smoothness of reforms. This stable transition is justified with the prudent 
macroeconomic policies and adequate supervision adopted by the Portuguese authorities. 
As previously mentioned, unions also had an important role for this stable transition. 
Although the state continued to hold significant ownership in the banking sector, 
through the fully state-owned CGD (one of the two largest banks in the country), this was 
not seen as a factor distorting the market due to the prudent and market-oriented 
supervision. In spite of the high concentration of the industry, competitive conditions 
were robust. The financial liberalization, the deregulation and the creation of the 
European Monetary Union helped boost the consolidation in the banking industry. 
Portuguese banks continued to enjoy robust growth and strong profitability 
despite the difficult operating environment. Portugal’s regulatory framework is modern 
and highly compliant with international standards, as proved by the participation of banks 
and other specialized entities in the securities market. In 2005, there were 61 banks 
including 22 branches of institutions authorized in other EU member states, 168 other 
credit institutions and 105 financial institutions under the Banco de Portugal’s 
supervision (IMF 2006). 
4. Theoretical Framework 
The empirical analysis in this paper follows some of the methodologies proposed 
by the literature on the econometric evaluation of social programs and the literature on 
“causal inference”. In particular, we consider a treatment effect approach. We define the 
treatment as the type of ownership structure of the firm where the worker is employed. 




1 if  𝑖works  in  a  private  bank
0 if  𝑖works  in  a  public  bank  
Given the rich data available and our goals, we consider as unit of observation 
each worker in each year. As we explain latter, one of the advantages of this approach is 
to take worker heterogeneity into account. 
4.1 - A Simple Sector-Choice Model 
Since we consider a free labor market, the assignment of a worker to a specific 
sector implies that both worker and firm are happy with the match. That is, workers 
prefer that sector and there is at least one firm in the sector that wants to hire that worker. 
Let 𝑉!"! be the utility that worker 𝑖 gets from working in firm 𝑗 in sector 𝑘, given 
that firm 𝑗 wants to hire the worker. Assume that this utility can be described by 
V!"! = V!! + α!
= δ!Z! + ɛ!" + α!
  
where 𝑍! is a vector of personal and job characteristics that includes age, gender, 
educational levels, and dummies for different geographic regions and occupations, ɛ!" 
includes worker’s and sector’s unobserved characteristics and 𝛼! is a firm fixed effect12. 
This specification implies that the utility is separable in the value created by the 
sector and by the firm. Furthermore, the value created by the firm is equal for all workers. 
Worker 𝑖 chooses the private sector instead of the public sector if and only if 
max
!∈ !!!
V!"! ≥ max!!∈ !!! V!!!
!   
⇔ 𝛿!𝑍! + ɛ!! + max!∈ !!! 𝛼! ≥ 𝛿!𝑍! + ɛ!! + max!∈ !!! 𝛼! 
⇔ ɛ!! − ɛ!! ≤ max!∈ !!! 𝛼! − max!∈ !!! 𝛼! + 𝛿! − 𝛿! 𝑍! 
⇔ 𝜂! ≤ 𝛾! + 𝛾!𝑍! 
Thus, 
                                                
12 The firm fixed effects include for example specific pension plans offered by each firm. 
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P Z = P D = 1 ∣ Z
= P η! ≤ γ! + γ!Z!
= F! γ! + γ!Z!
  
We assume that ɛ! and ɛ! are independent and type 1 extreme-value distributed. 
Hence, 𝜂 = ɛ! − ɛ! is logistically distributed and thus 
P Z! =
exp γ! + γ!Z!
1+ exp γ! + γ!Z!
  
Our specification for the sector-choice model is in line with the models proposed 
in Blank (1985) and Lewis and Frank (2002) because it takes into account some of the 
most important factors influencing worker’s choice of sector. First, the public sector may 
place greater weight on social welfare commitment than the private sector and thus some 
groups that are in a weaker position in the labor market (such as women and older 
workers) may receive both wage and non-wages advantages (e.g. increased probability of 
being hired and better advancement opportunities over the long-run) from public 
employment.13 Second, the lack of profit pressures in the public sector leads those more 
concerned with job security to seek jobs in the public sector.14 Third, the demand for 
workers’ skills may be different in each sector. Finally, geographic preferences may also 
affect sectorial employment choice since the availability of public or private employment 
varies among geographic regions.15 
4.2 - Model of Worker’s outcomes and Treatment Parameters 
We use a model of potential outcomes to examine worker’s outcomes and 
treatment parameters. Let 𝑌!"! and 𝑌!"! denote the individual’s outcome associated with 
                                                
13 However, as pointed by Mueller (2000), the public-sector is subjected to taxpayer scrutiny to a 
degree rarely encountered by private-sector firms and this might limit the ability to provide wage and non-
wage advantages for the groups in a weaker position. 
14 However, since we do not have a good measure of risk aversion, we cannot identify how 
important this factor is in the case studied. 
15 The model is also flexible enough to consider the possibility that some individuals are motivated 
by particular notions of “public service” or duty. Despite not being possible to identify the effects of this 
characteristic, it is taken into account by the unobserved characteristics term ɛ. 
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private and public sector, respectively. 𝑌!"! with 𝑘 = {0,1} is assumed to be a function of 
worker’s characteristics. For sake of simplicity and expositional convenience, assume in 
this subsection that the potential outcomes can be described by16 
Y!"! = β!X!" + U!"!   
At any given period 𝑡 either 𝑌!"! or 𝑌!"! is observed, but not both. Thus, we can 
write the observed outcome 𝑌!" as 
Y!" = D!"×Y!"! + Y!"!×(1− D!")  
or 
Y!" = Y!"! + ×!! D!"  
where =!! 𝑌!"! − 𝑌!"! represents the individual level treatment effect parameter of 
working in a private bank instead of working in a state-owned bank in period 𝑡. In this 
paper we propose a strategy to identify and estimate: 
• The average treatment effect on treated =!!! 𝐸( ∣!! 𝐷! = 1) 
• The marginal treatment effect =!"#! 𝐸( ∣!! 𝑋 = 𝑥,𝑃 𝑍 = 𝑝) 
5. Empirical Strategy 
5.1 - Propensity Score Matching 
One of the methods we propose to identify and to estimate the average treatment 
effect on treated (∆!!!) is the propensity score matching estimator. Formally, we consider 








                                                
16 In section 6 we propose and discuss a particular specification for each of the outcomes analyzed 
in the paper. 
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𝐸 𝑌!! ∣ 𝐷! = 1,𝑃 𝑋! = 𝑊
!∈!!
𝑖, 𝑗 𝑌!! 
and 𝑌! denotes the outcome of receiving the treatment, 𝑌! the outcome of not 
receiving the treatment, 𝐼! the set of individuals treated, 𝐼! the set of individuals in the 
control group, 𝑆! the region of common support and 𝑛! is the number of individuals in 
the set 𝐼! ∩ 𝑆!. 𝑊 𝑖, 𝑗  is a weight matrix, which in the case of Kernel matching is 
defined as 
W i, j =
K
P Z! − P Z!
δ!
K!∈!!
P Z! − P Z!
δ!
  
where 𝐾 .  is a kernel function and 𝛿! is a bandwidth parameter. In this paper, 
the propensity score matching estimation is performed using a bi-weight kernel with 
replacement for the control group. For each estimator we present bootstrap standard 
errors based on 100 replications. As propensity score we use the probabilities derived 
from the sector-choice model described in subsection 4.1. According to our framework 
being treated means to work in a private bank while the control group contains the 
individuals that work in a public bank. 
The propensity score matching estimator allows identification of the average 
treatment effect on treated under the following assumptions17 
P D = 1 ∣ Z < 1
E Y! ∣ D = 1,P Z = E Y! ∣ D = 0,P Z
  
The first assumption (overlap assumption) ensures that for each value of the 
regressors each treated individual has an analog on the control group, and thus the 
matching between them can be done. The second assumption (conditional mean 
                                                
17 These assumptions are weaker than the assumptions 
: 𝑃 𝐷 = 1 ∣ 𝑍 < 1
𝑌! ⊥ 𝐷 ∣ 𝑃 𝐷 = 1 ∣ 𝑍
 
frequently mentioned in the literature. However, since we are only interested in evaluating the 
effect on the mean they are sufficient. 
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independence assumption) can be seen as a strong assumption in our framework since it 
requires that the outcome in a state-owned bank does not determine participation (i.e. 
does not affect the choice between a private and a public bank). There are several 
situations where that might not be true. Therefore, to obtain identification of the average 
treatment effect on treated we have to rule out all these situations. 
The utilization of a propensity score matching estimator to identify the average 
treatment effect on treated avoids the selection problem resulting from the workers 
possibility of choosing between the two sectors and the firms freedom to hire or not the 
worker. The propensity score matching estimator also avoids the potential bias resulting 
from labor market mismatch commonly observed in observational studies (Monteiro, 
2010). Furthermore, this estimator has the advantage of not requiring a functional 
specification for the outcome. 
5.2 - Diff-in-Diff Propensity Score Matching 
Another approach to identify ∆!!! is to use a Difference-in-Differences (DID) 
propensity score matching estimator. Formally, we define the DID-Propensity Score 









where 𝐼!, 𝐼! denote the treatment and comparison group, 𝑌!! denotes the outcome 
of the treated at time 𝑡, 𝑌!! the outcome of the control group in time 𝑡, 𝑌!!
! the outcome of 
the control group in time 𝑡!, 𝑆! the region of common support, 𝑛! is the number of 
individuals in the set 𝐼! ∩ 𝑆!. and 𝑊 𝑖, 𝑗  is a weight matrix. The treatment group is 
composed by workers in the private sector in 𝑡 and the control group is composed by 
workers in the public sector in 𝑡. 
Since we want to use panel data, we have to restrict the treated and control sample 
to workers that were employed in a public bank in period 𝑡! and that remained employed 
in the banking industry in period 𝑡 (but maybe in a different bank). This difficults the 
comparison between this estimator and the propensity score matching estimator described 
in the previous subsection because the samples considered in each case are different. 
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Indeed, the sample for the DID-Propensity Score Matching estimator is a subsample of 
the sample for the Propensity Score Matching estimator. If the former is not 
representative of the latter, the treated group in each case should be seen as different. 
The identification of the treatment effect on treated by the DID-Propensity Score 
Matching estimator requires 
E Y!! − Y!!
! ∣ P,D = 1 = E Y!! − Y!!
! ∣ P,D = 0   
0 < P D = 1 ∣ Z < 1  
These assumptions show that a difference-in-differences propensity score 
matching estimator allows for temporally invariant differences in outcomes between 
workers in the treatment and control groups. This estimator is analogous to the usual DID 
estimator, but it does not impose the linear form restriction in estimating the conditional 
expectation of the outcome variable and it reweights the observations using the weight 
matrix 𝑊 𝑖, 𝑗 . 
In comparison with the usual Propensity Score Matching estimator, the DID 
Propensity Score Matching has the advantage of allowing for systematic differences 
between treated and control outcomes even after controlling on observables. Furthermore, 
the DID Propensity Score Matching is more robust since it requires a weaker assumption 
regarding the unobserved decision of participation. Nevertheless, as we pointed before, 
since the samples considered for each estimator are different, we should be careful in the 
comparison between the estimators, because they identify the same treatment parameter 
under the suitable assumptions but possibly for different treatment groups. 
5.3 - Marginal Treatment Effect 
The Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) is a measure of the treatment effect for 
individuals that are at the margin of participating in the treatment. That is, according to 
our definition, the 𝑀𝑇𝐸 is the average effect for people who are just indifferent between 
participation or not at the given value of the propensity score. Thus, the 𝑀𝑇𝐸 for values 
of 𝑝 close to zero is the average effect for individuals with unobservable characteristics 
that make them more likely to participate, and the 𝑀𝑇𝐸 for values of 𝑝 close to one is the 
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average effect for individuals with unobservable characteristics that make them less 
likely to participate. 
Our identification strategy for the MTE relies in the identity between the MTE 
and the Local Instrumental Variable (LIV) estimator over the support of 𝑃 𝑍 . That is, 
∆!"# x,P z ≡
∂E Y X = x,P Z = P z
∂P z   
for 𝑃 𝑧 ∈ 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝 𝑃 𝑍 ∣ 𝑋 . 
In order to estimate the MTE parameter notice that 
Y! = β! − β! D!X! + β!X! + U!" − U!" D! + U!"  
and 
E Y! ∣ X,P Z = P z = β! − β! X!P z + β!X! + k P z   
where 𝐾 𝑝 = 𝐸 𝑈!! − 𝑈!! 𝐷! + 𝑈!! ∣ 𝑋,𝑃 𝑍 = 𝑝 . Using the previous 
equation it is easy to show that 
∆!"# x,P z ≡
∂E Y X = x,P Z = P z
∂P z




To estimate ∆!"#, we consider an adapted version of the semiparametric 
algorithm proposed by Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006) and Carneiro, Heckman and 
Vytlacil (2010)18: 
Step 1: Find the predicted values of 𝑃 𝑧  for each observation using the sector-
choice model described in subsection 4.1. 
Step 2: Estimate the coefficients 𝛽! and 𝛽! − 𝛽!  using a nonparametric version 
of the double residual procedure proposed by Robinson (1988). In order to do that, we 
regress the outcome, each of the regressors (𝑋!) and 𝑋!𝑃 𝑧 , on 𝑃 𝑧  using a local linear 
                                                
18 In our application and given the specificities of the outcomes analyzed we have to use a 
modified version of the procedure explained with more detail in section 6. 
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regression (LLR). If we have 𝑛! regressors this implies the estimation of 2𝑛! + 1 local 
linear regressions. Compute the residuals for each regression and denote them by 𝑒!, 𝑒!! 
and 𝑒!!⋅! ! . 
Step 3: Regress 𝑒! on 𝑒!!  and 𝑒!!⋅! ! . This allows us to obtain consistent 
estimators for 𝛽! and 𝛽! − 𝛽! . The intuition is the following. The equation estimated in 
this step is 
Y! − E Y! ∣ P z = β! X! − E X! ∣ P z + β! − β! P z X! − E X! ∣ P z   
⇔ e! = β!e!! + β! − β! e!!⋅! !   
This equation does not have endogeneity problems. Hence, the estimators 
obtained are consistent. 
Step 4: Using the results found in step 3 compute 𝑘 𝑃 𝑧  as 
k P z = Y− ββ!X! − β! − β! X!P z   
Step 5: Let 𝜗! 𝑝  denote the nonparametric estimator 𝑘! 𝑝 . This estimator is 
obtained in two steps. First, we run a five degree polynomial regression of 𝑘 𝑃 𝑧  on 
𝑃 𝑧 . From this regression we obtain the effects of 𝑃 𝑧  on 𝑘 𝑃 𝑧  which allows us to 
obtain 𝜗! 𝑝 . 
6. Model for the outcomes 
In this section we motivate a particular functional specification for each of the 
outcomes analyzed in the paper. 
First of all, we should notice that only the MTE estimators require a functional 
specification of the outcomes in order to obtain identification. Nonetheless, a functional 
specification of the outcomes is useful to identify the groups that win and lose with the 
treatment. 
In our paper the analyzed outcomes are wages, type of employment contract (i.e. 
choice between fixed-term and open-ended contract), median employment duration and 
hazard rates. The two latter outcomes deserve particular attention by two reasons. First, 
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duration is a censored variable, which creates several challenges in the estimation of the 
effects of ownership on median employment duration and on employment hazard rates. 
Second, we do not observe these two outcomes and thus in a first stage we need to 
estimate them. In subsection 6.1 we propose a strategy to deal with these problems. 
6.1 - Theoretical framework and empirical strategy to estimate the 
effects on median employment duration and employment hazard rates 
Let 𝑇! and 𝜆! be, respectively, the median employment duration and the 
employment hazard rates of worker 𝑖. These outcomes are not observed and hence we 
need to estimate them. In order to estimate these outcomes we consider a parametric 
model of employment duration. We assume that employment duration (𝑇!) is a 
nonnegative random variable with a Weibull distribution. Thus, 
F t ∣ v = 1− exp −γt! g v   
where 
γ = exp(x!β)  
, 𝑡 is a realization of 𝑇 and 𝑥 includes the explanatory variables. We consider as 
explanatory variables gender, age, level of education (the reference group is workers with 
less than four years of education), occupation (the reference group is less skilled workers) 
and a measure of firm size (number of employees). 
In order to estimate 𝑇! and 𝜆! , all inter-individual differences that are not 
measured by the regressors should be taken into account, that is, we have to take the 
unobserved individual heterogeneity (UIH) into account. UIH measures proportional 
variations in the hazard rates operating on a given individual relative to that on an 
average individual. We assume that UIH can be characterized by a multiplicative effect 𝑣 
on the hazard function. Therefore, the conditional hazard function is 
λ t ∣ v = vγαt!!!  
where 𝑣 follows a gamma distribution. 
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These assumptions imply that duration can be characterized by a Weibull-Gamma 
mixture such that 





Thus, the median employment duration and the hazard function for each potential 



















The parameter 𝛼 is the shape parameter and, as pointed out by Abraham and 
Farber (1987), might be interpreted as representing some (unspecified) combination of 
true duration dependence and unmeasured heterogeneity. This parameter therefore relates 
the probability of the spell terminating with the length of the spell. The parameter 𝜃 is a 
measure of the characteristics of UIH. 
The choice of the Weibull-gamma mixture model is adequate for the goal of 
accurately predicting completed job duration since it allows a flexible specification of 
completed job duration and accounts for duration dependence and unmeasured 
heterogeneity in the hazard rates. The model of potential outcomes also allows to 
consider unobserved heterogeneity between treated and untreated. 
Using the usual notation on treatment literature, we can write 
lnT = 1− D lnE T! + DlnE T!   
lnλ t = 1− D lnλ! t + Dlnλ! t   
The coefficients are estimated by the following likelihood function 
L β, δ = f ! t ∣ x !S! t ∣ x !!! !!! f! t ∣ x !S! t ∣ x !!! !  
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where 𝜓 is a dummy variable equal to 0 if the spell is right censored (the 
employment relation has not finished yet) and equal to 1 otherwise. 
To estimate the coefficients and identify the median employment duration and the 
employment hazard rates, we use the data to obtain a flow sampling of employment 
spells for the period before and after the privatization process. The flow sampling after 
the end of the privatization process is constructed by considering all employment 
relations between 1996 and 2006 in firms created before 1996. The flow sampling before 
the privatization process considers all employment relations that started in the period 
between 1985 and 1988 in firms created before 1985. Table 32 and Table 33 each of 
these samples. For the period between 1996 and 2006, our data provides information for 
31,909 employment relations that started during this period (24,463 in the private sector 
and 7,446 in the public sector). The mean of the spells associated with these relations is 
2.821 and the median is 2. During this period the mean and the median of employment 
spells in the private sector are higher than in the public sector, suggesting that the 
employment relations in the private sector that started between 1996 and 2006 have a 
lower turnover and an higher duration than the employment relations in the public sector. 
16,533 of these spells had not finished in 2006 and thus these observations are right 
censored. For the period between 1985 and 1988 we have information for 3,124 
employment relations with a mean of 1.417 years and a median of 1 years. 1,494 of these 
employment relations had not finished in 1988. 
Table 34 presents the results from the proportional hazard model for the post-
privatization period (1996-2006). In the public and in the private sector the effect of age 
on the probability of termination of the employment relation is negative for younger 
workers and positive for older workers. That is, for younger workers, age decreases the 
probability of separation between workers and firms while for older workers age 
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increases that probability. One explanation for the increase of the hazard rate with age for 
older workers is the earlier retirement of workers in the banking industry. The legal 
retirement age during this period was 60 years old but many workers retired earlier. This 
earlier retirement was, in fact, incentivized by the government as a way of helping public 
firms dealing with the increasing competition and of helping the restructuration of 
privatized firms. The inversion in the effect of age on the hazard rate occurs earlier for 
workers in state-owned banks than in private banks (41 years against 45 years), however, 
excluding workers between 36 and 45 years old, the positive or negative effect of age on 
the hazard rate is higher for the public sector.19 
The estimated coefficient of women is positive for public and private banks, but 
for the latter type of ownership the effect is not statistically significant. This implies that 
the employment spells for women terminate faster than the employment spells for men. 
In particular, since the coefficient for women in the public sector is 0.0844 and in the 
private sector is 0.0197, this implies that being women increases the hazard by nearly 8.8 
percent over the baseline hazard in the public sector and increases the hazard by nearly 2 
percent over the baseline hazard in the private sector sector. These results suggest that in 
private banks the incentives to terminate an employment relation with a female worker 
are only slightly higher than the incentives to terminate an employment relation with a 
male worker (in fact, the difference is not statistically significant). In contrast, in the 
state-owned banks this differential in the incentives is much larger. These results should 
be related with the fact that the proportion of women in private banks is lower than in 
public banks. Two possible explanations for the differences between the employment 
spells of female and male workers in private banks are that (i) women know that it is 
difficult to find another employment in the private sector and thus are less likely of 
quitting, and (ii) employer selection of the women accepted in the private sector is more 
strict and thus firms do not want to lose a valuable asset. Overall, our results suggest that 
it is more difficult for women, relative to men, to obtain an employment in a private bank 
but after obtaining it, the incentives to terminate that employment relation are smaller 
than in otherwise equivalent employment spells in a public bank. 
                                                
19 Notice that controling for education, age captures also the effect of labor market experience and 
so our interpretation might be extended to analyze the effects of labor market experience on the hazard rate. 
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Our results show that more education decreases the probability of separation in 
private and public banks. The magnitude of these effects is large. In public banks 
enrolment into high-school without enrolment in college implies a decrease in the hazard 
by nearly 73 percent over the baseline hazard and enrolment in college implies a decrease 
in the hazard by nearly 76 percent over the baseline hazard. In private banks enrolment 
into high-school without enrolment in college implies a decrease in the hazard by nearly 
69 percent over the baseline hazard and enrolment in college implies a decrease in the 
hazard by nearly 81 percent over the baseline hazard. In public banks the effect of 
enrolment in college relative to enrolment only in high school is small. In contrast, the 
differences in private banks are higher. These results are in line with the predictions of 
job-matching and job-shopping theories that say that workers with more years of 
schooling are better at finding their most suited employment and thus they will have less 
turnover and higher job duration. Those results, however, contradict the findings in 
Farber (1994) and Mumford and Smith (2004) that workers with more education tend to 
have higher mobility. 
We find that employment spells for managers and highly specialized workers, 
relative to employment spells of less skilled workers, terminate faster in private banks but 
terminate slower in public banks. The results suggest that managers and highly 
specialized workers are the occupation with the highest likelihood of separation in private 
banks and the occupation with the smallest likelihood of separation in public banks. 
Occupation is highly correlated with education. Therefore, in public banks the effects of 
occupation and education reinforce each other for managers and highly specialized 
workers, thus reducing the likelihood of separation. In contrast, for private banks, each 
effect has a different direction. Given the magnitude of each effect, the results suggest 
that the occupation effect attenuates the effect of education on reducing the probability of 
separation. The coefficients for foremen, supervision and administrative workers are not 
significant for public and private banks. 
Finally, the firm size coefficient is negative for both sectors and thus separations 
are more likely in the smallest firms. One possible explanation is that exit rates decrease 
with size since in larger firms jobs are more valuable, promotion opportunities are higher, 
and the probability of failure is smaller. 
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For the two types of ownership structure the model exhibits positive state 
dependence (since 𝛼 is greater than 1 in both cases); that is, the probability of spell 
termination increases as the spell lengthens. For the private sector the positive state 
dependence is very large, which implies that long spells have a high probability of 
termination in private banks. 
The gamma coefficient, that provides information about the UIH, is small but 
significant for public banks. In contrast, for private banks the gamma coefficient is large 
and statistically significant. This suggests that UIH might not be very strong in state-
owned banks but it is relevant for private banks. 
Table 35 displays the results obtained for the pre-privatization period (1985-
1988). The table reveals that for private and public banks’ workers in the period before 
the privatization, the hazard rate decreases (but at a diminishing rate) with age for young 
workers and increases with age (at an increasing rate) for older workers. Furthermore, in 
both sectors, the coefficient for women is negative but not statistically significant. 
As for the effects of education on the hazard rate, the results show that in both 
sectors the employment spell for more educated workers terminates faster. The effect of 
education on the hazard rates is stronger in the public sector. These results differ from the 
results for the period after the privatization. One possible explanation is that, before the 
privatization, workers with more education revealed higher availability to leave their 
employment to find a best one, while for workers with less education the percentage of 
voluntary turnover was small. Moreover, more educated workers might have faced a 
greater range of employment opportunities. Those facts are consistent with the findings in 
Farber (1994) and Mumford and Smith (2004) that workers with more education tend to 
have higher mobility, but they contradict job-matching and job-shopping theories. 
The effect of occupation in the hazard rates is only significant for foremen, 
supervision and administrative workers in the public sector. For these workers, ceteris 
paribus, the employment spell terminates faster than the employment spell for any other 
occupation in the public sector. 
During this period there was a high and significant positive state dependence for 
both types of ownership structure, since 𝛼 greater than 2.9 for both types of banks. 
Furthermore, both types of ownership structure have a very small and not significant 
value of gamma, suggesting that UIH was not important during this period. 
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Using the coefficients obtained by maximum likelihood we can calculate the 



















It is possible to fit the specification of these outcomes with the model described in 
sections 4 and 5. In order to make this more clear notice that we can write the potential 
median employment duration and the hazard rate for an individual as 
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Therefore, it is possible to obtain the MTE estimators of these outcomes by using 
the procedure described in subsection 5.3. However, given the assumptions made about 
the distribution of the potential outcomes of job duration and the specificities of these 
outcomes, the maximum likelihood estimators of the coefficients described above will be 
more efficient than estimators obtained from the step 3 of the procedure described in 
subsection 5.3 20. Hence, the MLE estimators will be used to obtain the estimated values 
of median job duration and hazard rates, and in the procedure to obtain the marginal 
treatment effect. 
6.2 - Theoretical framework and empirical strategy to estimate the 
effects on wages 
In our specification for wages we follow standard neoclassical models which 
predict that, in competitive markets, pay differences across individuals arise from 
differences in measured and unmeasured ability and characteristics. Our specification 
also takes into account that factors such as market power and social inequalities may 
explain differences between pay and productivity. Moreover, we assume that potential 
outcomes for wage have a linear (Mincerian) specification, 
W! = x!β! + u!  
where 𝑥 includes the explanatory variable and 𝑢 contains the unobserved factors. 
We consider as explanatory variables gender, age, the level of education, the tenure in the 
firm, and a measure of firm size (number of employees). Following Monteiro (2010), 𝑊 
is the logarithm of hourly wage and is constructed as the logarithm of the sum of monthly 
                                                
20 Nevertheless, the estimators obtained from that procedure continue being consistent. 
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base wage, plus the regular and irregular payments, payment indexed to tenure and 
overtime divided by normal and extra hours worked.21 
6.3 - Theoretical framework and empirical strategy to estimate the 
effects on type of employment contract 
Let 𝑂! be the potential outcome that a contract is an open-ended contract. 𝑂! is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the worker has an open-ended contract and equal to 0 if the 
worker has a fixed-term contract. 𝑂! depends on the factors that determine the worker’s 
choice of whether to accept an open-ended contract and the factors that determine the 
firm’s decision of offering an open-ended contract. Taking these factors into account, we 
consider the following generic specification for 𝑂! 
O! = g! x, u!   
where 𝑥 includes the explanatory variable and 𝑢 contains the unobserved factors. 
We consider as explanatory variables gender, education, occupation, education, and a 
measure of firm size.22 In our estimation procedure to obtain the MTE we consider that 
E O! ∣ x = x!β! + E u! ∣ x   
which allows usage of the algorithm proposed in subsection 5.3. This 
specification has the obvious deficiency of predicting probabilities that are negative or 
exceed one. Furthermore, since 𝑂! is a binary variable, the standard errors have to be 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. Nonetheless, this specification is a useful exploratory 
tool and we believe the estimation procedure is robust enough to produce consistent 
estimators from this specification. This specification also has the advantage of reducing 
the number of assumptions, particularly, it avoids an assumption about the distribution of 
𝑂! and 𝑢! 
                                                
21 As pointed by Monteiro (2010), hourly wage is preferable to monthly wage because workers 
from privatized and public firms experienced different length of hours of work after the reform. 
22 See Portugal and Varejao (2010) for a discussion about the importance of these variables to 
explain the choice of fixed-term versus open-ended contracts. 
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7. Data and Outcomes 
We use the data of Quadros de Pessoal (henceforward QP), a survey conducted by 
the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and Social Security. This survey is done since 
1985 and covers the workforce of all firms employing paid labour in Portugal. Its 
longitudinal nature, where a unique number identifies both firms and workers, makes it 
possible to follow them over time. 
This data source is valuable to analyze differences between labor outcomes in the 
private versus the public sector because it enables to identify in which sector each firm is 
in each year and the respective labor outcomes. The access to raw data files allows us to 
compute labor outcome variables ourselves. The QP survey is mandatory for all firms, 
public and private, thereby the data should be immune to bias resulting from differences 
in survey questionnaires and from no compliance with the survey. 
In the analysis of the ownership’s effects on the labor outcomes of the banking 
industry we consider the year of 200523 and for the difference-in-differences approach we 
also consider the year of 1986. These years have some similar macroeconomic 
characteristics (Table 36), and most importantly, have relatively similar employment 
growth. Employment growth affects, for example, the participation rates, the number of 
vacancies and voluntary turnover. So, if we had chosen years with different 
macroeconomic characteristics, we could have obtained a spurious regression for the DID 
- propensity score matching estimators. 
The Quadros de Pessoal contains information for 3,084,711 workers in 2005 and 
for 1897785 workers in 1986. To be on the safe side, we did some corrections to the data. 
We dropped observations with missing information for any of the variables described in 
Table 37 (except for type of contract) and in the worker identification variable. We 
excluded from our final sample observations where the age was smaller than 16 
(minimum legal working age) and were the computed tenure was not in the interval from 
                                                
23 The choice of 2005 is justified by three main reasons. First, the privatization process that 
occurred during the nineties is already finished and consolidated since the last privatization occurred in 
1996. Second, 2005 is one of the last years in our data. Third, for the last years in our data 2005 is the year 




0 to 65. Also, we excluded from our sample instances were the same worker hold 
multiple jobs in the banking sector in the same year, by keeping only the job with the 
larger number of declared monthly working hours. 
We dropped from our sample temporary and part-time workers. Our sample was 
also restricted to the banking sector, that is, to commercial banks operating in the market 
in the considered time span. The final sample consists of 21,942 workers in 1986 and 
33,753 workers in 2005. In order to obtain more accurate data about banks’ ownership we 
also correct observations on social capital. More precisely, we assume that when social 
capital takes the value zero in only one year but a specific value in the remaining years 
the figure for the former year will be the same as in the later years. Finally, we deflated 
all nominal variables employed (sales, wage and social capital) to 2005 prices. 
We define a private firm as a firm where fifty percent or more of the equity is 
owned by private investors and a public firm is defined as firm where more than fifty 
percent of the equity is owned by the Portuguese State. 
Table 37 reports some summary statistics for the data. This table shows that, in 
2005, employees in private banks were younger (approximately 38 years against 42 years 
in the public sector), had a lower tenure (11 years against 18 years in the public sector) 
and were more educated. In regard to the latter point, the proportion of workers that only 
enrolled in high school and the proportion of workers that enrolled in college were both 
higher in private banks. This explains why the proportion of workers with at least high 
school attendance is approximately 16 percent higher in private banks than in public 
banks. 
In public banks the proportion of women and men is almost equal (49 percent of 
women) while in private banks the proportion of women is significantly lower (only 40 
percent). The higher proportion of women and older workers in state-owned banks is in 
line with the predictions of the literature that argues that the public sector places greater 
weight on social welfare commitment and hence groups in a weaker position in the labor 
market tend to have a higher probability of being hired. 
The proportion of low skilled workers in both sectors is very small (between 1 
and 2 percent). Most of the employees are foremen, administrative or supervision 
workers. Nevertheless, the proportion of workers in these functions is higher in private 
than in public banks (87 percent against 81 percent). The lower proportion of workers in 
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these occupations in the public sector is almost exclusively explained by a higher 
proportion of managers and highly specialized workers. 
The geographical distribution shows that most of the jobs are located in Lisbon. 
The most significant difference between the two forms of ownership structure is an 
higher representation of private banks in Porto. 
Employees in state-owned banks have a higher wage per hour (15.62 euros 
against 13.99 euros in the private banks) and wage per month (2,185 euros against 2,026 
euros in the private banks) than employees in private banks. Conversely, the number of 
hours worked per month is higher in private banks. These results are, again, consistent 
with the predictions of the theories that postulate the lack of profit pressure and the 
greater weight on social welfare commitment in public firms, since these two factors may 
translate in some wage advantages for workers. Nevertheless, we let a more extensive 
discussion of the differences on wages in the two sectors for the sections where we 
compare the wages in the two sectors taking the possible selection into account. 
The median employment duration is higher for public banks (the median 
employment duration in public banks is 8.25 years while for private banks it is only 7.99 
years). The hazard rates are also higher in state-owned banks (0.13 in public banks 
against 0.07 in private banks). For both outcomes the differences are statistically 
significant. One of the possible explanations for the latter results is the positive state 
dependence obtained for the estimated Weibull model in Table 34. Since the tenure in the 
public banks is higher, and thus the employment spells are longer, then the positive state 
dependence leads to a higher probability of the spell terminating for the public sector. 
Furthermore, the positive state dependence also helps to explain why the median 
employment duration is not very large and why the median employment duration is lower 
for private banks (remember that private banks have a stronger positive state 
dependence). 
Both in public and in private banks the proportion of open-ended contracts is 
extremely high. Nevertheless, it is slightly higher in public banks where it achieves 96 
percent against 93 percent in private banks. 
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8. Ownership Effects 
8.1 - Simple Sector-Choice Model 
Table 38 displays the results from the estimation of the simple sector-choice 
model described in subsection 4.1. The results show that being a women reduces the 
likelihood of employment in a private bank. Furthermore, the probability of choosing a 
private bank decreases, but at a diminishing rate, with age (the inversion only occurs for 
71 years). These results are in line with the predictions of the theories that suggest that 
the public sector places greater weight on social welfare commitment, and thus, some 
groups that are in a weaker position in the labor market (such as women and older 
workers) receive both wage and non-wages advantages from public employment. In 
particular, they may have an increased probability of being hired in public banks. These 
advantages could explain why these groups are more likely to be employed in public 
banks rather than in private banks. 
The lower likelihood of employment in the private sector by women is in line 
with the findings of Brainerd (2002) for Russia and of Lewis and Frank (2002)24 and 
Blank (1985) for the US. However, for the latter case the results are not statistically 
significant. 
Employees that at least enrolled in high school are more likely to have an 
employment in a private bank. Nevertheless, the probability of being employed in a 
private bank is slightly higher for workers that only enrolled in high school than for 
workers that enrolled in college. Again, a possible explanation for these results is the 
protection by public banks of workers in a weaker position (in this case workers with less 
education), which could imply that these workers have greater wage and non-wage 
compensations and higher probability of being hired in the public sector. These results 
are different from the results obtained by Blank (1985) for the US since in her case those 
with lower education prefer the private sector, while those with more education prefer the 
public sector. 
                                                
24 Lewis and Frank (2002) obtain a non-statistically significant effect of gender on the probability 
of holding a job in the public-sector when they exclude from the public sector teachers, bus service, 
U.S.Postal Service, water supply, irrigation and sanitary services. 
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Managers and highly specialized workers are the occupation group less likely to 
work in a private bank. Foremen, Supervision and Administrative workers are also less 
likely to work in a private bank than less qualified workers. We expect a positive 
correlation between education and the likelihood of being a manager or a highly 
specialized worker. Hence, the negative effect of being manager or highly specialized 
worker on the likelihood of working in a private bank is attenuated by the positive effect 
of education. 
Figure 7 reports the distribution of the propensity scores, distinguishing between 
individuals in the treated and in the control group. As expected, the distribution for the 
treated is more left-skewed than the distribution of the control group and thus the 
distribution for treated has a larger mass in the right tail. This implies that the probability 
of working in a private bank is higher for workers that are already working in a private 
bank. These different distributions of the propensity score for treated and untreated 
provide some evidence that there is some selection in the choice of employment sector. 
 
8.2 - Matching Estimators 
Table 39 reports the propensity score matching estimators in 2005 for the 
outcomes analyzed. The results show that, on average, the wage per hour for a employee 
in a private bank is 0.08 euros lower than the wage she would receive if she worked in a 
public bank. However, this difference is not statistically significant and thus our results 
suggest no distinguishable differences on wages by working in a private bank rather than 
in a public bank. 
In contrast, the estimators for the average treatment effect on treated for the 
median employment duration, the hazard rate and the likelihood of an open-ended 
contract are statistically significant at a five percent level. The median employment 
duration is more than half year lower by working in a private bank rather than in a public 
bank. Working in a private bank instead of a public bank also implies a 6 percentage 
points lower hazard rate. Finally, the likelihood of an open-ended contract is 2.1 
percentage points higher in private banks. 
The finding that there are not distinguishable differences in the wages per hour 
between private and public banks is consistent with the predictions of the literature that 
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argues that when firms are operating in competitive markets and are facing the same 
competitive environment, there should not be differences between private and public 
firms (Williamson, 1969, 1970, Caves and Christiansen, 1980, Vickers and Yarrow, 
1991). According to that literature, when firms operate in competitive product markets, 
they will need to control their costs and thus, in these circumstances, it is expected 
industrial relations reform, greater constrains on pay growth, and greater emphasis on 
efficiency improvements. Since all the banks (including the public banks) in Portugal 
operate in a highly competitive environment, this helps to explain our results. 
When we compare private and public banks’ wages, we should take into account 
that private firms are more likely to provide more generous now-wage compensations 
(e.g. free car, pension plans) to reduce tax allowance. Indeed, there is some anecdotal 
evidence that this is true. So, our results may suggest that the overall compensation (wage 
and non-wage compensation) is higher in private banks. However, since we do not have 
data for non-wage compensation we cannot make any inference about that and thus we 
cannot make inferences about the overall compensation. 
Our results for wages are in some way surprising due to some of the specificities 
of the Portuguese economy. After the 1974 Revolution, in order to reduce income 
inequalities, there was a lot of pressure to increase the wage compensation of workers in 
general, and in particular the wage compensation of workers in public firms. This legagy 
of the revolution remains present nowadays. Thus, one could expect that workers were 
better paid in state-owned banks rather than in private banks. Furthermore, there is some 
anecdotal evidence that in public banks there is lower profit pressure (nowadays talking 
about lack of profit pressure might be too strong) and they place a greater weight on 
social welfare commitment.25 Finally, Bender (1998) and Gregory and Borland (1999), in 
their surveys of the literature on wage differentials between public and private firms, 
claim that most of the studies show that, on average, the public sector pays more than the 
private sector. By looking only at these factors, our predictions would be that the wages 
                                                
25 The lack of profit pressures and the greater weight placed on social welfare by public firms do 
not seem specific of Portugal. For example, these characteristics of public firms are also pointed for the US 
by Blank (1985) and for the UK by Haskel and Szymanski (1993) and Pendleton (1999). Katz and Krueger 
(1991) also found that in the US during the 1970’s and 1980’s women and less educated workers were 
better paid in the public sector. 
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by working in a public bank would be higher. However, our findings are not consistent 
with these predictions 
The lower profit pressure and the greater weight placed on social welfare 
commitment, however, may help to explain the found results for the median employment 
duration. We find that by working in a private bank rather than in a public bank, private 
bank’s employees have an 8 months lower median employment duration. This suggests 
more employment stability and job security in the public banks, as suggested in Blank 
(1985). As we pointed before, the explanation for an higher job security in the public 
banks might be the lower profit pressure and the greater weight placed on social welfare, 
assuming that workers prefer more employment stability. 
During the nineties, Portugal was known for having low wages (by EU standards) 
but also low unemployment rates. This may suggest that Portuguese population places 
greater value in employment stability rather than in employment earnings. If this is true, 
it helps explaining why workers do not earn more by working in public banks but have an 
higher median employment duration in these banks. The intuition in that case is the 
following. Since state-owned banks know that workers give more value to stability than 
to earnings and public banks are constrained by competition in the banking industry, then 
the social concerns of public banks are only reflected on more employment stability and 
not on higher wage compensations. Nevertheless, since we do not know workers 
preferences, we cannot test this hypothesis. 
Public banks’ preference for creating differentials relative to private banks on job 
security rather than on wage compensation might also be related with the higher taxpayer 
scrutiny in the public sector. This taxpayer scrutiny normally is focused on wages and not 
on job security. That is, since information concerning job security is less clear than the 
information concerning wages, job security might be a preferred rent-yielding instrument 
to compensate employees in public banks. 
Another explanation for our result is associated with the finding in subsection 6.1 
that shows a stronger positive state dependence in private banks. This implies that in 
private banks it is more difficult to have very long spells because the probability of the 
spell terminating becomes very high as the spell lengthens. 
In regard to the hazard rate, the results show a 6 percentage points lower value by 
working in a private bank rather than in a public bank. This means that the probability of 
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separation in the current year (in our case 2005) was lower if the worker was in the 
private sector. These results should take into account the higher median employment 
duration and tenure found for the public banks and the positive state dependence of 
employment spells found in the estimations performed in subsection 6.1. By working in a 
public bank, a worker in our treated group (private bank’s employees) on average has an 
higher employment duration. Since there is a positive state dependence and thus the 
probability of the spell terminating increases as the spell lengthens, then this higher 
employment duration implies a higher hazard rate. 
Let illustrate the aforementioned intuition with an example. For sake of simplicity 
ignore that the coefficients associated with the regressors are different in each sector and 
consider two identical individuals at the beginning of their working life. One is employed 
in a public bank and the other is employed in a private bank. After 10 years, the 
probability of remaining in the same job is higher for the worker who started working in 
the public bank. However, since she remains in the same bank and the probability of exit 
increases with the employment spell length, then her hazard rate is higher than the hazard 
rate of the other worker. 
In public banks, we have workers with very high values of tenure. So, one way to 
interpret our results for the hazard rate is to relate them with the necessity to restructure 
public banks in order to reduce the overall employment duration. That is, the high hazard 
rate by working in a public bank might be a consequence of long employment spells that 
due to their long length should terminate soon. 
Some literature26 relates positive wage differentials in one sector with longer 
employment duration and lower separation rates. Since we do not find any difference 
between the wage in the two types of banks we cannot establish any relation of this type. 
Nevertheless, as we explain below, when we stratify the workers in different groups, for 
some of these groups a trade-off between wage and job stability seems to emerge. 
Finally, our results imply that the likelihood of an open-ended contract is higher 
in private banks. However, despite significant, the difference between private and public 
banks in the likelihood of an open-ended contract is very small (2 percentage points), 
                                                
26 See Bellante and Long (1981), Ippolito (1987) and Moore and Newman (1991). 
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particularly if we take into account the large proportion of open-ended contracts in the 
banking industry (near 94 percent). 
Table 40 to Table 42 display the results obtained from the propensity score 
matching estimator for the three outcomes analyzed for different groups stratified 
according to age, gender, education and occupation. 
Table 40 and Table 41 show that, on average, the wage per hour and the median 
employment duration of women in private banks is lower than the wage and median 
employment duration that they would have if they were employed in a public bank. 
Indeed, on average, a private bank’s female worker would earn more 0.75 euros and 
would have a nearly half year longer median employment duration if she was employed 
in a public bank. These results suggest that women have better employment conditions 
(higher wages and longer employment durations) in public banks which could help to 
explain why they are more likely to be employed in a public bank. 
On the other hand, for men we find a trade-off between wage per hour and median 
job duration. In particular, on average, a private bank’s male worker earns more 0.35 
euros but has less one year of median employment duration than he would have if he 
worked in a public bank. 
The differences on wages are not statistically significant for men. This gives some 
support to the hypothesis that potential advantages on wages in public banks are 
restricted to the groups in a weaker position in the labor markets. 
Table 40 and Table 41 reveal that a private bank worker with college enrollment 
has a higher wage per hour but lower median employment duration for being employed in 
a private bank rather than in a public bank. Nevertheless, while for wages the difference 
is very large, the difference for median employment duration is very small (nearly 2 
months). Conversely, private bank workers without college enrollment would have a 
higher wage per hour if they were employed in a public bank. Workers with high school 
enrolment but without college enrolment would have higher median employment 
duration if they were employed in a public bank. These results are in line with the 
literature that says that private banks provide higher returns to education. A possible 
explanation for this phenomenon is the lower discrimination on wages and on job 
stability in public banks, which essentially implies higher wages for less qualified 
workers and lower wages for more qualified workers. This lower discrimination in public 
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banks might be associated with the greater concern for social welfare and consequent 
protection of the groups in weaker position. 
The choice of private banks instead of public banks by managers and highly 
specialized workers implies a trade-off between wage per hour and median employment 
duration. On one hand, their choice implies a wage per hour 3.84 euros higher. On the 
other hand, by working in a private bank rather than in a public bank their median 
employment duration is 2.7 years lower. The higher wages of managers and highly 
specialized workers in private firms is in line with the findings of some empirical and 
theoretical literature that points out as possible justifications: (i) the release of pay-scale 
constraints in private firms, (ii) the higher bargaining power of managers and highly 
specialized workers in private firms, and (iii) the higher investment of private firms in the 
managerial sector in order to restructure the firm and catch up with the organizational 
structures of the competitive market (Chong and Leon, 2007). 
In contrast, foremen, supervision and administrative workers in private banks 
would have both higher wages per hour and higher median employment duration if they 
worked in a public bank. 
In regard to age, we find that for workers with less than thirty years the choice of 
a private bank instead of a public bank implies a trade-off since they earn less but have an 
higher median employment duration than if they were employed in a public bank. In 
contrast, for workers with more than thirty years the choice of type of bank seems not to 
have a significant effect on wages. However, the choice of a private bank by workers 
between thirty and fifty years old implied lower median employment duration. 
Overall, the stratification by different groups shows that there is some protection 
of younger workers and women in public banks, since private bank workers in these two 
groups, on average, would have higher wages and longer employment duration if they 
switched to a state-owned bank. On the other hand, for men and workers with more than 
30 years of age we do not find differences on wages by working in a private bank rather 
than in a public bank. However, on average, these workers would have a longer 
employment duration if they worked in a public bank. Finally, our results also reveal that 
private banks provide higher returns of education. 
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Table 42 reveals that for all subgroups analyzed the hazard rates of workers in 
private banks would be higher if they were employed in public banks. The explanation is 
the same that we provided for the general case. 
 Table 43 presents the DID-Propensity Score Matching estimators. As we pointed 
out before, we should be careful when we compare these estimators with the usual 
Propensity Score Matching estimators in table 8, because the treated group in the DID-
Propensity Score Matching estimators is a subgroup of the treated group in the usual 
Propensity Score Matching estimators. Now, the treated group are the workers that were 
in public banks in 1985 and who worked in a private bank in 2005. 
Our results show that the treated group had a gain of 2.33 euros in the wage per 
hour by working in a private bank rather than in a public bank. Despite the large positive 
effect, the estimator is only significant at a 10 percent level. Nevertheless, our result 
suggests that the workers that switch from a public to a private bank (either because the 
bank where they worked was privatized or because they decided to quit from the public 
bank where they worked and moved to a private bank) had gains in their wage per hour 
because of that switch. These workers also had a gain on median employment duration 
since their median employment duration is more than 2 years higher than the employment 
duration they would have if they remained in a public bank. 
Overall, these results suggest large gains from switching from public to private 
banks for workers employed in public banks in 1986. 
8.3 - Marginal Treatment Effect 
Table 44 and Table 45 display, respectively, the results from step 3 of the 
algorithm to find the Marginal Treatment Effect on wage per hour and on the likelihood 
of an open-ended contract. Since we believe these results per se have some interest, we 
briefly discuss them. The analogous to these results for the median employment duration 
and hazard are discussed in subsection 6.1 and reported in Table 34 and Table 35. 
Table 44 shows that age increases (but at a diminishing rate) the log wage per 
hour of workers in the public sector until they achieve 50 years. For workers in the public 
sector with more than 50 years, age has a negative effect on wages per hour. The age 
variable in the wage equation may reflect both cohort and life cycles effects. 
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The effect of tenure on public banks’ wage per hour is exactly the opposite 
because for workers with less than 18 years of tenure the effect is negative while for 
workers with more than 18 years of tenure the effect is positive. 
Age always has a positive effect on private banks’ wages per hour, however the 
effect is always very small. This helps to explain why for workers with less than 49 years 
the effect of age on wages per hour is higher in public banks than in private banks. In 
private banks, tenure has a positive effect on the wage per hour of workers with less than 
15 years of tenure, otherwise the effect is negative. 
Our results show that, ceteris paribus, on average, the wage per hour is lower for 
women in both sectors, but the difference relative to men’s wages is higher in private 
banks. Indeed, in a private bank the wage of a female worker is nearly 11 percent lower 
than the wage of an otherwise equivalent male worker, while in a public bank the wage of 
a female worker is nearly 9 percent lower than the wage of an otherwise equivalent male 
worker. This result may help to understand why, as we found in subsection 8.1, women 
prefer to work in the public sector. This result should also be related with the 
aforementioned hypothesis that public banks have more social concerns and thus they 
protect groups in weaker position in the labor market (such as women). The finding of a 
lower penalization on wages for female workers in state-owned banks is similar to the 
findings in Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988), Moore and Raisian (1991), Belman and 
Heywood (1994) and Mueller (2000). 
In regard to returns to education, our results suggest that in public banks the 
returns to education are not significant and, in fact, workers with only high school 
enrollment seem to have a lower wage than workers with less than 10 years of schooling. 
In contrast, in private banks there is evidence of significant returns to schooling since the 
wage per hour of workers with college enrollment is nearly 33 percent higher than the 
wage per hour of an otherwise equivalent worker with less than 10 years of schooling. 
Furthermore, the wage per hour of workers with high school enrollment is nearly 24 
percent higher than the wage per hour of otherwise equivalent workers with less than 10 
years of schooling.27 
                                                
27 These results are in line with the findings of Ho et all (2002) who found that both returns to 
education and the gender wage discrimination increased after the privatization. However, we should notice 
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Finally, Table 44 shows that managers and highly specialized workers have the 
higher wages in both sectors, followed by foremen, supervision and administrative 
workers. 
Table 45 reveals that for state-owned banks only age, gender and firm size have a 
significant effect on the likelihood of an open-ended contract. In particular, worker’s age 
reduces the likelihood of an open-ended contract while firm size increases the likelihood 
of an open-ended contract in a public bank. In state-owned banks female workers have 
higher likelihood of an open-ended contract than otherwise equivalent male workers. This 
last result provides one more time evidence that public banks provide some protection to 
female workers. In contrast with state-owned banks, we find that age increases the 
likelihood of an open-ended contract and women have a lower likelihood than otherwise 
equivalent male workers. The coefficient on firm size for private banks also has the 
opposite sign than the one for public banks. 
Figure 10 to Figure 13 display for each of the analyzed outcomes the plot of the 
MTE on different values of the propensity score for a male worker with 40 years old, 10 
years of tenure, high school education and a foremen, supervision or administrative 
occupation, and who works in a firm with 5000 employees. 
Figure 10 shows the graph of the MTE on log wage per hour. This graph has the 
expected shape. Workers that are more likely to work in the private sector have a positive 
and high marginal treatment effect by working in the private sector rather than in the 
public sector. This effect is decreasing with the likelihood of working in the public sector. 
Indeed, for workers that are less likely to work in the private sector the marginal 
treatment effect is negative. 
Despite the expected shape, it is interesting to notice that workers with a high 
likelihood of working in the private sector have a high premium for working in the 
private sector. On the other hand, the workers with a low likelihood of working in the 
                                                                                                                                            
that our results are not relative to the effect of the privatization process but instead they evaluate the effect 
of ownership. 
Adamchik and Bedi (2000) results are not so supportive of the higher returns to schooling in 
private sector. They found that for men the returns to schooling are higher in private sector, particularly for 
University educated workers, However, for women their results seem to suggest that public sector has 
higher returns to schooling. 
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private sector have a penalization by working in that sector but the magnitude of the 
penalization is much smaller than the premium received by workers with a high 
likelihood. For workers indifferent between working or not in the private sector for 
values of the propensity score between 0.4 and 0.6, the graph is almost flat, revealing that 
the effect is nearly equal for all these workers. 
Figure 11 shows that the MTE on open-ended contracts is negative for all values 
of the propensity score. The effect is less negative for workers more likely of being 
employed in a private bank. 
Figure 12 reveals that the MTE on log median employment duration increases 
with the propensity score for workers more likely to be working in a private bank and 
decreases with the propensity score for workers less likely to be working in a private 
bank. Furthermore, for a large range of values of the propensity score the MTE is almost 
flat. This suggests that for several workers the employment in a private bank may have 
the same effects on job stability despite the different likelihood of working in a given 
sector. 
The MTE on employment duration is positive for values of the propensity score 
between 0.25 and 0.97. Thus, for workers indifferent between working in a private or 
public bank for these values of the propensity score, employment in a private bank 
implies higher employment duration. Conversely, for values of the propensity score 
below 0.25 or above 0.97, the employment in a private bank has a negative effect on the 
median employment duration. 
The results for the workers that are more likely to be working in a private bank 
are in some way surprising. Not only the MTE on the log of median employment duration 
increases with the propensity score, but indeed the MTE is negative for these workers. 
So, our results suggest that for these workers employment in a private bank implies a 
trade-off between wages and job stability. In particular, for these workers, employment in 
a private bank allows higher wages but it has a negative effect on the median 
employment duration. 
In the previous subsection we show that the average treatment effect on treated on 
median employment duration is negative. On the other hand, in this subsection we reveal 
that for a large range of values of the propensity score the MTE effect on log of median 
employment duration is positive. The explanation for these results, which at first glance 
 
170 
may look inconsistent, is that workers more likely of receiving the treatment (and thus 
more likely of being in the treated group) have a negative MTE. It is the negative effect 
for these workers that explains the negative average treatment effect on treated. 
Finally, Figure 12 shows that the MTE on log hazard is always positive. This 
implies that for individuals indifferent between employment in a private bank or public 
bank, the choice of a private bank implies an higher hazard rate (at time 10). Since the 
treatment parameter identified by this method is different from the treatment parameters 
identified by the other methods, this result does not imply a contradiction with our 
previous results. 
9. Evaluation of the privatization process 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 display the evolution of some summary statistics for the 
pre- and post-privatization period. 
After the privatization processes, as expected, there was a large increase in the 
number of workers in private banks. Indeed, in the pre-privatization (1986-1989) period, 
private bank workers were only 11 percent of the banking industry workforce while in the 
post-privatization period (1996-2006) they represented nearly two thirds of the 
employees in the banking industry. Furthermore, in the post-privatization period the 
number of workers in public banks slightly decreased and the number of workers in 
private banks increased. 
In the pre-privatization period employees in public banks were older and had 
higher tenure than workers in private banks. These differences were considerably high. 
After the end of the privatization process these differences had a big reduction, which 
was expected because several of the public workers before the privatization become 
private workers when the firms where they worked switched from public to private. 
However, after 1998 this difference started to increase and thus in 2006 there was, again, 
a large difference between the age and tenure of employees in public and private banks. 
The proportion of women working in the banking industry in the pre-privatization 
period was relatively small (lower than 30%) but almost equal in both types of banks. In 
the post-privatization period the proportion of women in the banking industry started to 
increase in both types of banks. However, this increase was higher in the public banks 
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and thus in 2006 the proportion of women was nearly 8% higher in public banks than in 
private banks. 
In the pre-privatization period wages per hour were higher in private banks. In 
contrast, there were almost no differences in the median employment duration. After the 
end of the privatization processes this pattern changed. Median employment duration 
became consistently higher in public banks while wages per hour also became higher in 
public banks after 2001. 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 display, respectively, the propensity-score matching 
estimators for wage per hour and median employment duration in the pre- and post-
privatization period. 
Figure 14 reveals that in the pre-privatization period workers in private banks 
received a higher wage per hour for being employed in a private bank rather than in a 
public bank. In the post-privatization period this situation changes because, with 
exception of 2000, the differences were always small and oscillated between positive and 
negative values. 
Figure 15 shows that before the privatization, workers in private banks would 
have had the same median employment duration if they had worked in public banks. On 
the other hand, in the post-privatization period, particularly after 2001, workers in private 
banks have a lower median employment duration by working in a private bank rather 
than in a public bank. 
10. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine ownership effects on labor outcomes for the banking 
industry in Portugal. We find that if private bank workers were employed in public banks 
they would have the same wage but higher employment duration. This suggests that 
public banks may create differentials relative to private banks on job security and not on 
wages. 
The wage gap between men and women is lower in public banks but the 
differential on employment duration is lower in private banks. However, women in 
private banks would have higher employment duration if they worked in public banks. 
This partially explains why women are more likely to be employed in public banks. The 
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greater differentiation on wages in private banks is also visible in the returns to education 
since private banks provide higher returns to education. 
A second contribution of this paper is to evaluate the privatization process that 
occurred in Portugal between 1989 and 1996. According to our results privatization 
improved workers compensation, particularly in the banks that remained public. 
















We are particularly thankful to Sergio Urzua as some of the main ideas of the 
paper have been proposed by him. We are also thankful to Sebastian Buhai by useful 
comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are our responsibility. 





Abraham, K. and H.Farber (1987), Job Duration, Seniority and Earnings, American 
Economic Review 77, 278-297 
Adamchik, V. and A.Bedi (2000), Wage differentials between the public and the private 
sectors: evidence from an economy in transition, Labour Economics 7, 203-224 
Al-Obaidan, A. (2002), Efficiency effect of privatization in the developing countries, 
Applied Economics 34, 111-117 
Bação, P. (1997), Inovação e aplicaçoes financeiras em Portugal, Estudos do GEMF 9 
Bellante, D. and A. Link (1981), Are Public Sector Workers More Risk Averse Than 
Private Sector Workers?, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 34, 408 - 412 
Bellante, D. and J. Long (1981), The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society: The 
Case of Public Employees and Their Unions, Journal of Labor Research 2, 1 - 14 
Belman, D. and J. Heywood (1995), State and Local Government Wage Differentials: An 
Intrastate Analysis, Journal of Labor Research 16, 187 - 201 
Belman, D. and J. Heywood (2004), Public Wage Differentials and the Treatment of 
Occupational Differences, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 23, 135-
152 
Bender, K. (1998), The Central Government-Private Sector Wage Differential, Journal of 
Economic Surveys 12, 177 -220 
Bender, K. (2003), Examining Equality Between Public- and Private Sector Wage 
Distributions, Economic Inquiry 41, 62 - 79 
Blanchard, O. and P.Portugal (2001), What Hides behind Unemployment Rate: 
Comparing Portugal and U.S. Labor Markets, The American Economic Review 
91, 187-207 
Blank, R. (1985), An Analysis of Workers’ Choice Between Employment in the Public 
and Private Sectors, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 38, 211-224 
Brainerd, E. (2002), Five Years After: The Impact of Mass Privatization on Wages in 
Russia, 1993-1998, Journal of Comparative Economics 30, 160-190 
Cameron, A. and P.Trivedi (2005), Microeconomics - Methods and Applications, 
Cambridge University Press 
 
174 
Carneiro, P., J. Heckman and E. Vytlacil (2010), Evaluating Marginal Policy Changes 
and the Average Effect of Treatment for Individuals at the Margin, Econometrica 
78, 377-394 
Caves, D. and L. Christiansen (1980), The Relative efficiency of Public and Private 
Firms in a Competitive Environment: The Case of Canadian Railroads, Journal of 
Political Economy 88, 956-976 
Disney, R. (2007), Public-private sector wage differentials around the world: Methods 
and Evidence, mimeo 
D’Souza, J. and W. Megginson (1999), The Finantial and Operating Performance of 
Newly Privatized Firms in the 1990’s, The Journal of Finance 54, 1397-1438 
Dustmann, C. and A. van Soest (1998), Public and Private Sector Wages of Male 
Workers in Germany, European Economic Review 42, 1417 - 1441 
Ehrlich, I., G. Gallais-Hamonno, Z. Liu and R. Lutter (1994), Productivity Growth and 
Firm Ownership: An Empirical Investigation, The Journal of Political Economy 
102, 1006-1038 
Farber, H.(1994), The Analysis of Interfirm Worker Mobility, Journal of Labor 
Economics 12, 554-593 
Farber, H. (1995), Are Lifetime Jobs Disappearing? Job Duration in the United States: 
1973-1993, NBER Working Paper 5014 
Farber, H. (1999),Mobility and Stability: the dynamics of job change in labor markets, 
Handbook of Labor Economics 3, 2439-2483 
Figueiredo, A., F.Figueiredo and N.Monteiro (2008), Labor Adjustments in Privatized 
Firms: a Statis Approach, FEP Working Paper 306 
Galal, A., L. Jones, P. Tandon and I.Vogelsang (1994), Welfare Consequences of Selling 
Public Enterprises, Oxford University Press 
Gregory, R. and J. Borland (1999), Recent Developments in Public Sector Labor 
Markets, Handbook of Labor Economics 3, 3573 -3630 
Gutierrez, R. (2002), Parametric frailty and shared frailty survival models, The Stata 
Jornal 2, 22 - 44  
Gyourko, J. and J. Tracy (1988), An Analysis of Public- and Private-Sector Wages 
Allowing for Endogenous Choices of Bothe Government and Union Status, 
Journal of Labor Economics 6, 229 -253 
 
175 
Hartman, R. (1983). Pay and Pension for Federal Workers, Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution. 
Haskel, J. and S. Szymanski (1993), Privatization, Liberalization, Wages and 
Employment: Theory and Evidence for the UK, Economica 60, 161 - 182 
Heckman, J and E.Vytlacil (1999), Local Instrumental Variables and Treatment Effects in 
a Latent Variable Model, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America 96, 4730-4734 
Heckman, J, H. Ichimura and P.Todd (1998), Matching as an Econometric Evaluation 
Estimator, The Review of Economic Studies 65, 261-294 
Heckman, J, S.Urzua and E. Vytlacil (2006), Understanding instrumental Variables in 
Models with Essential Heterogeneity, Review of Economics and Statistics 88, 
389-432 
Heckman, J. and E.Vytlacil.(2007),. Econometric Evaluation of Social Programs, Part I: 
Causal Models, Structural Models and Econometric Policy Evaluation,  Handbook 
of Econometrics, in: J.J. Heckman & E.E. Leamer (ed.), Handbook of 
Econometrics, edition 1, volume 6, chapter 70 and chapter 71 Elsevier 
Heckman, J, D.Schmierer and S.Urzua (2008), Testing the Correlated Random 
Coefficient Model, mimeo 
Ho, S., X. Dong, P. Bowles and F. MacPhail (2002, Privatization and Enterprise Wage 
Structure During Transition: Evidence from rural industry in China, Economics of 
Transition 10, 659-688 
IMF (2006), Portugal: Financial System Stability Assessment, including Reports in the 
Observance of Standards and Codes on the following topics: Banking 
Supervision, Securities Regulation and Insurance Regulation, IMF Country 
Report No. 06/378 
Ippolito, R. (1987), Why Federal Workers Don’t Quit, The Journal of Human Resources 
22, 281-299 
La Porta, R. and F. Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), The Benefits of Privatization: Evidence 
from Mexico, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 1193 - 1242 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A.Shleifer (2002), Government Ownership of Banks, 
The Journal of Finance 57, 265-301 
 
176 
Lewis, G. and S. Frank (2002), Who Wants to Work for the Government?, Public 
Administration Review 62, 395 -404  
Katz, L. and A. Krueger (1991), Changes in the Structure of Wages in the Public and 
Private Sectors, NBER Working paper #3667 
Monteiro, N. (2009), Regulatory Reform and the Portuguese Banking Labour Market: 
two decades later, Empirical economics 36, 557-574 
Monteiro, N. and M.Portela (2009), Rent sharing in Portuguese Banking, mimeo  
Monteiro, N. (2010), Using Propensity Matching Estimators to Evaluate the Impact of 
Privatization on Wages, Applied Economics 42, 1293-1313 
Moore, W. and R.Newman (1991), Government Wage Differentials in a Municipal Labor 
Market: The Case of Houston Metropolitan Transit Workers, Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 45, 145 - 153 
Moore, W. and J. Raisian (1991), Government Wage Differentials Revisited, Journal of 
Labor Research 12, 13-34 
Mueller, R. (2000), Public- and Private-Sector Wage Differentials in Canada Revisited, 
Industrial Relations 39, 375-400 
Mumford, K. and P.Smith (2004), Job tenure in Britain: Employee characteristics versus 
workplace effects, London School of Economics and Political Science 71, 275-
297 
Nickell, S. (1979), Estimating the probability of leaving unemployment, Econometrica 
49, 1417-1426 
Nunes, A. , C. Bastien and N. ValŽrio (2005), Nationalizations and De-Nationalizations 
in Portugal (19th and 20th centuries): a historical assessment GHES Working 
Paper 22 
OECD (1999), Financial Sector Reform, Portugal OECD Economic Surveys, Special 
Features 
Portugal, P. and J. Varejão (2010), The Hidden Side of Temporary Employment: Fixed-
term Contracts as a Screening Device, Banco de Portugal Working Papers 
292010 
Pendleton, A. (1999), Ownership or Competition? An evaluation of the effects of 
privatization on industrial relations institutions, processes and outcomes, Public 
Administration 77, 769-791 
 
177 
Prescott, D. and B.Wandschneider (1999), Public/Private Sector Wage Differentials in 
Canada - Evidence from the 1991 and 1982 Surveys of Consumer Finance, 
Applied Economics 31, 723-731 
Quinn, J. (1979), Wage Differentials Among Older Workers in the Public and Private 
Sectors, The Journal of Human Resources 14, 41 - 62 
Robinson, P. (1988), Root-N-Consistent Semiparametric Regression, Econometrica 56, 
931-954 
Shirley, M. and P. Walsh (2000), Public versus Private Ownership: The Current State of 
the Debate, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series #2420 
Smith, S. (1977), Government Wage Differentials, Journal of Urban Economics 4, 248-
271 
van der Gaag, J. and W. Vijverberg (1988), A Switching Regression Model for Wage 
Determinants in the Public and Private Sectors of a Developing Country, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 70, 244 - 252 
Vickers, J. and G.Yarrow (1991), Economic Perspectives on Privatization, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 5, 111-132 
Williamson, O. (1969), Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm, in H. Manne (ed.), 
Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities 
Williamson, O. (1970), Corporate Control and Business Behavior: An Inquiry into the 
Effects of Organizational Form on Enterprise Behavior, in Prentice-Hall 








Tables and Figures 
 
Table 31. Evolution of Banks 
 
  
1985-1989 1990-1996 1997-2000 2001-2005 
Number of banks 214.6 223.5 182.8 165.5 
 (15.81) (26.29) (9.106) (7.141) 
% of firms by ownership     
Public 0.053 0.034 0.016 0.012 
Private 0.947 0.966 0.984 0.988 
 (0.00572) (0.0143) (0.000823) (0.00450) 
Average Size (Number of workers)     
Public 3756.6 3010.1 4712.7 5910.4 
 (2232.5) (2634.6) (4324.5) (6313.0) 
Private 24.54 103.2 159.7 154.2 
 (109.8) (575.2) (656.1) (590.4) 
% of workers by ownership     
Public 0.892 0.518 0.329 0.320 
 (0.0416) (0.210) (0.0358) (0.0143) 
Private 0.108 0.482 0.671 0.680 
  (0.0416) (0.210) (0.0358) (0.0143) 
 
 
Table 32. Employment Relations Between 1996 and 2006 
  Private Public Total 
Number of employment relations 24463 7446 31909 
Mean duration of each spell 2.9733 2.3227 2.8216 
Median of  each spell 2 1 2 






Table 33. Employment Relations Between 1985 and 1988 
  Private Public Total 
Number of employment relations 1669 1475 3124 
Mean duration of each spell 1.3643 1.4569 1.4172 
Median of  each spell 1 1 1 




Table 34. Proportional Hazard Model for the Period 1996-2006 
  Public Private 
Age -0.830*** -0.515*** 
 (-21.81) (-20.43) 
   
Age Square 0.0100*** 0.00572*** 
 (19.34) (16.21) 
   
Women 0.0844* 0.0197 
 (2.16) (0.40) 
   
Firm Size -0.000154*** -0.0000701*** 
 (-17.57) (-6.16) 
Education (years of schooling)   
High School (between 10 and 12 years) -1.318*** -1.181*** 
 (-14.60) (-9.72) 
College (More than 13 years) -1.438*** -1.643*** 
 (-14.98) (-13.10) 
   
Occupation   
Managers and highly specialized workers -1.049* 0.466* 
 (-2.08) (2.18) 
Foremen, Supervision and Administrative 
workers 
-0.8 -0.041 
 (-1.60) (-0.21) 
Constant 15.31*** 8.003*** 
  (16.96) (17.10) 
alpha 2.187*** 3.199*** 
 (43.15) (40.44) 
gamma 0.592*** 6.011*** 
  (7.03) (23.35) 
N 7446 24463 
Note: The reference group is less qualified workers with less than 10 years of 
schooling. 
 
We consider all employment relations in the period 1996-2006, that started in 1996 or after in firms 
created before 1996 
t statistics in parentheses   






Table 35. Proportional Hazard Model for the Period 1985-1988 
  Public Private 
Age -0.337*** -0.0646* 
 (-8.42) (-2.42) 
   
Age Square 0.00417*** 0.000758* 
 (7.44) (2.23) 
   
Women -0.0219 -0.135 
 (-0.32) (-1.47) 
   
Firm Size 0.000132*** -0.00141*** 
  (5.30) (-6.99) 
   
Education (years of schooling)   
High School (between 10 and 12 years) 0.270** 0.0563 
 (2.79) (0.57)  
College (More than 13 years 1.001*** 0.272* 
 (8.24) (2.30) 
   
Occupation   
Managers and highly specialized workers 0.328 -0.182 
 (1.23) (-1.04) 
Foremen, Supervision and Administrative workers  0.468*** -0.156 
 (4.67) (-1.63) 
   
Constant 0.894 -2.585*** 
  (1.36) (-5.22) 
alpha 3.158*** 2.910*** 
 (23.85) (29.69) 
gamma 0.003 0,0000003 
  (0.04) 0.00  
N 1475 1669 
Note: The reference group is less qualified workers with less than 10 years of schooling. 
We consider all employment relations in the period 1985-1988, that started in 1985 or after in firms 
created before 1985 
t statistics in parentheses   






Table 36. Macroeconomic Conditions 
  1986 2005 
Growth rate of GDP 1.18% 0.50% 
Employment (thousands) 3900 5015.017 
Growth rate of employment -0.82% 0.00% 
Government budget (% of GDP) -5.90% -6.00% 
Unemployment rate 9.86% 7.57% 
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Table 37. Summary Statistics 2005 
  Private Public Difference 
Wage per hour 13.9936 15.6249 -1.6313 
 (10.926) (8.855) (0.118) 
Base Wage 2026.179 2185.079 -158.9005 
 (1641.785) (1241.384) (17.415) 
Hours worked per month 144.9873 139.8186 5.1687 
 (8.722) (4.579) (0.087) 
Median Employment Duration (years) 7.9909 8.2512 -0.2604 
 (1.782) (3.596) (0.029) 
Hazard rate 0.0671 0.1280 -0.0609 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.001) 
Firm Size (Number of workers) 2440.163 11562 -9121.834 
 (2433.001) (107.708) (22.679) 
Age (years) 38.1152 42.4914 -4.3761 
 (9.287) (9.689) (0.108) 
Women 0.4055 0.4920 -0.0864 
 (0.491) (0.500) (0.006) 
Tenure (years) 11.4749 17.7784 -6.3035 
 (8.412) (9.158) (0.100) 
Education (years of schooling)    
Preparatory education (less than 9 years) 0.0967 0.2561 -0.1594 
 (0.296) (0.437) (0.004) 
High School (between 10 and 12 years) 0.5013 0.3869 0.1144 
 (0.500) (0.487) (0.006) 
College (More than 13 years) 0.402 0.357 0.045 
 (0.490) (0.479) (0.006) 
Region    
Lisbon 0.4237 0.4594 -0.0358 
 (0.494) (0.498) (0.006) 
Porto 0.1726 0.1015 0.07117 
 (0.378) (0.302) (0.004) 
Others 0.4037 0.4391 -0.0354 
 (0.491) (0.496) (0.006) 
Occupation    
Managers and highly specialized workers 0.1113 0.1700 -0.0587 
 (0.314) (0.376) (0.004) 
Foremen, Supervision and Administrative workers 0.8746 0.8116 0.0629 
 (0.331) (0.391) (0.004) 
Low skilled Personnel 0.0142 0.0184 -0.0042 
  (0.118) (0.134) (0.001) 
N 22232 11521   




Table 38. Logit Model for the Probability of Choosing the Private Sector 
  Coef. T-Statistic 
Age -0.0931*** -8.50 
Age Square 0.00066*** 5.11 
Women -0.566*** -22.59 
Education (years of schooling)   
High School (between 10 and 12 years) 0.999*** 26.49 
College (more than 13 years) 0.848*** 19.47 
Region   
Lisbon 0.0996*** 3.70 
Porto 0.605*** 15.37 
Occupation   
Managers and Highly Specialized Workers -1.258*** -12.07 
Foremen, Supervision and Administrative workers -0.724*** -7.44 
Constant 3.416*** 14.00 
N 33753   
Notes: Reference group: Less qualified workers with less than 10 years of schooling, living outside 
Lisbon or Porto.   
Log likelihood =-20059.531   
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001   
 
Table 39. Propensity Score Matching 
  Treated Control ΔTT2005 SE T-Stat. 
Wage per hour 13.9936 14.0697 -0.0760 0.1243 -0.61 
Open-ended contract (1) 0.9315 0.9107 0.0209 0.0028 7.43 
Median Employment 
Duration 
7.9909 8.6858 -0.6949 0.0425 -16.36 
Hazard Rate 0.0671 0.1314 -0.0643 0.0006 -108.07 
N 22,232 11,521     
      
Note: The propensity score matching estimation is performed using a biweight kernel with replacement 
for the control group. For each estimator we present bootstrap standard errors based on 100 replications. 
The propensity score was defined as P (D = 1|X) and it was derived from the probabilities obtained from 
the choice model. 
(1) For Open-ended contract the number of treated observations is 22,152 and the number of untreated 
observation is 11,517. 





Table 40. Propensity Score Matching - Wage per Hour 
  Treated NT Control NC ΔTT2005 SE T-Stat. 
Age (years)               
Less than 30 8.8039 5250 9.6283 1482 -0.8244 0.0937 -8.70 
Between 30 and 50 14.9476 14365 14.8722 7045 0.0755 0.1339 0.56 
More than 50 19.1722 2617 18.5729 2994 0.5993 0.4373 1.37 
Gender        
Female 11.9279 9016 12.6737 5668 -0.7458 0.1130 -6.60 
Male 15.4029 13216 15.0506 5853 0.3523 0.2071 1.70 
Education (years of schooling)        
Preparatory education (less than 9 
years) 
14.1446 2150 14.7228 2951 -0.5781 0.1873 -3.09 
High School (between 10 and 12 
years) 
12.6881 11144 13.7443 4457 -1.0562 0.1246 -8.47 
College (More than 13 years) 15.5915 8938 14.3513 4113 1.2401 0.2750 4.51 
Occupation        
Managers and highly specialized 
workers 
27.5043 2474 23.6590 1958 3.8452 0.5710 6.73 
Foremen Supervision and 
Administrative workers 
12.3653 19443 12.9476 9351 -0.5822 0.0813 -7.16 
Low skilled Personnel 8.5815 315 11.1757 212 -2.5942 0.4064 -6.38 
 
Table 41. Propensity Score Matching - Median Employment Duration 
  Treated NT Control NC ΔTT2005 SE T-Stat. 
Age (years)               
Less than 30 6.1206 5250 5.4030 1482 0.7176 0.0457 15.71 
Between 30 and 50 8.8056 14365 10.7857 7045 -1.9801 0.0375 -52.83 
More than 50 7.2698 2617 5.0073 2994 2.2626 0.0574 39.45 
Gender        
Female 8.0645 9016 8.5129 5668 -0.4484 0.0544 -8.24 
Male 7.9406 13216 8.9611 5853 -1.0205 0.0636 -16.04 
Education (years of schooling)        
Preparatory education (less than 9 
years) 
5.8252 2150 4.5374 2951 1.2879 0.0410 31.39 
High School (between 10 and 12 
years) 
8.0778 11144 9.6344 4457 -1.5567 0.0519 -29.98 
College (More than 13 years) 8.4049 8938 8.5870 4113 -0.1821 0.0628 -2.90 
Occupation        
Managers and highly specialized 
workers 
7.9619 2474 10.6655 1958 -2.7036 0.0915 -29.53 
Foremen Supervision and 
Administrative 
8.0285 19443 8.5208 9351 -0.4922 0.0440 -11.18 





Table 42. Propensity Score Matching - Hazard Rate 
  Treated NT Control NC ΔTT2005 SE T-Stat. 
Age (years)               
Less than 30 0.1176 5,250 0.1737 1,482 -0.0561 0.0024 -23.02 
Between 30 and 50 0.0554 14,365 0.1153 7,045 -0.0599 0.0005 -131.97 
More than 50 0.0295 2,617 0.1280 2,994 -0.0985 0.0009 -103.86 
Gender        
Female 0.0686 9,016 0.1367 5,668 -0.0681 0.0009 -79.82 
Male 0.0660 13,216 0.1260 5,853 -0.0601 0.0008 -74.40 
Education (years of schooling)        
Preparatory education (less 
than 9 years) 
0.0387 2,150 0.1472 2,951 -0.1085 0.0011 -102.14 
High School (between 10 and 
12 years) 
0.0632 11,144 0.1287 4,457 -0.0655 0.0008 -82.05 
College (More than 13 years) 0.0786 8,938 0.1310 4,113 -0.0523 0.0011 -48.49 
Occupation        
Managers and highly 
specialized workers 
0.0582 2,474 0.1078 1,958 -0.0497 0.0015 -33.61 
Foremen, Supervision and 
Administrative 
0.0685 19,443 0.1340 9,351 -0.0656 0.0006 -104.37 
Low skilled Personnel 0.0418 315 0.1593 212 -0.1175 0.0041 -28.90 
 
 
Table 43. DID - Propensity Score Matching 
            
Wage per hour  15.335 13.005 2.330 1.271 1.830 
Median Employment Duration 4.471 2.161 2.310 0.309 7.470 





Table 44. Auxiliary Regression for the MTE of Log(Wage per Hour) 
  Coef. T-Statistic 
Age 0.2588*** 20.62 
Age Square -0.0026*** -20.79 
Tenure -0.0742*** -17.54 
Tenure Square 0.0021*** 21.48 
Women -0.0975* -2.43 
Education (years of schooling)   
High School (between 10 and 12 years) -0.2547** -2.86 
College (more than 13 years) 0.0373 0.45 
Occupation   
Managers and Highly Specialized Workers 1.2555*** 11.71 
Foremen, Supervision and Administrative workers 0.6656*** 8.66 
Firm Size  0.000006** 3.07 
Cross Terms   
Age × P (X) -0.2372*** -14.04 
Age Square × P (X) 0.0026*** 14.32 
Tenure × P (X) 0.1224*** 19.50 
Tenure Square × P (X) -0.0037*** -22.79 
Women × P (X) -0.0247 -0.44 
Education (years of schooling)   
High School (between 10 and 12 years) × P (X) 0.4664*** 3.26 
College (more than 13 years) × P (X) 0.2489 1.84 
Occupation   
Managers and Highly Specialized Workers × P (X) -0.6174*** -3.75 
Foremen, Supervision and Administrative workers × P (X) -0.4506*** -3.69 
Firm Size × P (X)  -0.00000002 -0.01 
Observations                                                                                        33753   





Table 45. Auxiliary Regression for the MTE of Open-Ended Contracts 
  Coef. T-Statistic 
Age -0.1315*** -16.17 
Age Square 0.0015*** 18.39 
Women 0.0915*** 3.46 
Education (years of schooling)   
High School (between 10 and 12 years) -0.0509 -0.87 
College (more than 13 years) 0.0447 0.82 
Occupation   
Managers and Highly Specialized Workers -0.1252 -1.78 
Foremen, Supervision and Administrative workers -0.0736 -1.46 
Firm Size  0.000005*** 4.87 
Cross Terms   
Age × P (X) 0.2969*** 27.84 
Age Square × P (X) -0.0034*** -30.15 
Women × P (X) -0.1720*** -4.62 
Education (years of schooling)   
High School (between 10 and 12 years) × P (X) 0.0737 0.78 
College (more than 13 years) × P (X) -0.0893 -1.00 
Occupation   
Managers and Highly Specialized Workers × P (X) 0.2853** 2.64 
Foremen, Supervision and Administrative workers × P (X) 0.1742* 2.17 
Firm Size × P (X) -0.000008 -4.82 
Observations                                                                                      33669   








Figure 7. Propensity Scores Density 
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Figure 9. MTE - Open-ended Contracts 
 
 
Figure 10. MTE - Log(Median Employment Duration) 
 
 
Figure 2: MTE - Open-ended contracts)

















Figure 11. MTE - Log(Hazard Rate) 
 
Figure 4: MTE - Log(Hazard Rate)












Figure 12. Summary Statistics 



















Figure 14. PSM - Wage per Hour 
 
Figure 15. PSM - Median Employment Duration 
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Figure 8: PSM - Median Employment Duration
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